Detailed Cluster Structure, Cognitive and Physiological Mechanisms of the “Irrationals-Rationals” Trait
V. L. Talanov
Detailed Cluster Structure, Cognitive and Physiological Mechanisms of the “Irrationals-Rationals” Trait
Using material from 160 clusters that substantively generalize questionnaire items correlating with the psychological (socionic) trait “Irrationals-Rationals,” the detailed structure of the trait is revealed. Properties hitherto unknown, or not used in its diagnosis, are identified. Cognitive mechanisms at the psychological level that explain the trait are proposed and experimentally tested. On the basis of an analysis of published data and their comparison with the experimental results, the physiological factors underlying the division of people into rationals and irrationals are substantiated. Numerous examples show that formation of the irrational psychological pole is primarily determined by dominance of the thalamic center of brain activation with participation of the striopallidal system, whereas formation of the rational pole is determined by the mesencephalic reticular formation with participation of the posterior hypothalamus, amygdala, insular cortex, prefrontal cortex, and cholinergic structures of the forebrain. The socionic trait “Irrationals-Rationals” is compared with its analogues in the scientific systems of the “Big Five” personality factors, American type theory, and R. B. Cattell’s factor structure of personality.
Keywords: cognitive psychology, psychophysiology, socionics, personality types, Myers-Briggs, Intuition, Sensing, Logic, Ethics, perceiving functions, judging functions, hypothalamus, reticular formation, thalamus, modulating systems, CNS activation.
CONTENTS:
The role of the nonspecific thalamus in the irrational psychological pole
The rational modulating center
Mesencephalic reticular formation
Cholinergic structures and pathways of the forebrain
Association nuclei of the thalamus
Substantive analysis of the rationality clusters
Rate of decay of emotional traces and behavioral plans (Table 2)
Control of impulses and drives (Table 7)
Psychological inertia and mobility (Table 13)
Conservatism of sensations or need for new and varied sensations and nonconservatism (Table 14)
Emotional depth or superficiality (Table 18)
Industriousness or avoidance of activity (Table 17)
Excessive evaluative activity (Table 4)
Dependence or independence from others’ opinions (Table 3)
Responsibility and competence (Table 9)
Improvisation or deliberate preparation (Table 5)
Planning, consistency, predictability, pedantry, and striving for completion (Table 12)
Attitude toward the future (Table 10)
Memory characteristics (Table 11)
Table 2. Deactualization of emotional traces and behavioral plans
Table 3. Dependence on opinions
Table 4. Excessive evaluative activity
Table 5. Improvisation or deliberate preparation
Table 9. Responsibility and competence
Table 10. Attitude toward the future
Table 12. Planning, consistency, predictability, completion, and pedantry
Table 13. Psychological mobility
Table 14. Need for new and varied sensations and nonconservatism
Table 17. Avoidance of activity
Table 18. Emotional superficiality
Pharmacological model of irrationality
Separately on the role of the cerebral cortex
Age dependence of the rationality-irrationality index
The “Irrationals-Rationals” trait in different psychological paradigms
American type theory (the MBTI® questionnaire, etc.):
Table 23. Percent representation of sociotypes in population frequency distributions
Irrationality-Rationality in “Big Five” personality-factor models
Irrationality-Rationality projected onto R. B. Cattell’s factors
To all masters of direct mirrors
Introduction {#раздел01}
This study is part of the author’s scientific program for the detailed investigation and disclosure of the substantive content of socionic traits; it continues work already completed on the detailed disclosure of the content and cognitive mechanisms of Extraversion-Introversion (Talanov, February 2007) and Intuition-Sensing (Talanov, March 2007). Knowledge of the substantive content of a trait (across its broadest possible spectrum) makes it possible not only to improve the procedure of psychological and socionic diagnosis, but also to reach the “behind-the-scenes” cognitive mechanisms of psychological dichotomies, bringing us closer to an understanding of the physiological mechanisms of brain function underlying them. There is another important aspect to expanding knowledge about the traits: modern neo-Jungian psychological personality typology, including socionics, has to this day been built on a foundation of hypotheses and conjectures not tested experimentally. Even when these conjectures become part of scientific culture and seemingly receive confirmation from many years of experience among practicing psychologists, for science they nevertheless remain no more than untested assumptions. Indeed, one can never completely exclude the influence on supposedly “generally accepted facts” of artifacts of scientific fashion and mass hypnosis; such cases have occurred more than once in the history of science. Thorough, methodologically sound experiments can and should transfer the theoretical foundation of socionics from the category of hypotheses into the category of firmly established scientific facts. One of the cornerstones of the foundation of socionics and American type theory (the principal branches of modern neo-Jungian personality typology) is the assertion that, in so-called “rationals,” who are more inclined toward planning than improvisation, one of the two “judging” functions of the psyche (Ethics or Logic) is hierarchically leading (program). Correspondingly, in irrationals, who are more inclined toward improvisation than planning, one of the two available perceiving functions (Intuition or Sensing) should occupy the principal hierarchical position. Only at first glance does this assertion appear obvious. In socionic circles it is indeed almost universally accepted, but it has not been confirmed by convincing experiments. Experimental testing and, as it appears to us, effective proof of the validity of this assertion also became part of the present work. Second, it is not entirely clear whether the axis of rationality has the same direction in socionics and in type theory, or whether the direction of this axis as adopted in different scientific schools is shifted toward Extraversion or Introversion, Intuition or Sensing, Logic or Ethics. In other words, are the systems of psychological coordinates the same in the most significant neo-Jungian schools, or do the boundaries between psychological types defended by them differ markedly because the basic psychological axes are oriented differently? Finally, of extreme importance for understanding human nature and human society is scientific clarification of the characteristics of the physiological brain mechanisms underlying the properties of psychological types. With respect to the trait of psychological rationality (competence, as this factor is called in five-factor models of personality), a large body of physiological data has accumulated in recent years which, when compared with the results of our experimental psychological studies, already makes it possible to reveal its biological nature.
For all these reasons, the next object of our consideration was the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait, which in practice is also the most poorly diagnosed of the four principal neo-Jungian traits, further increasing interest in it. To investigate it, prolonged work was carried out involving the selection, analysis, and generalization of numerous diverse primary traits (questionnaire items) correlating with the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait.
To obtain correlations, we did not measure the magnitude of Irrationality-Rationality directly by means of any special scale. In that case, a possible initial error would already have been built into the scale. We diagnosed the subjects’ sociotypes as wholes, relying on the properties of these types in a training sample reflecting the averaged views of the socionic scientific community regarding type boundaries. The final diagnosis was made on the basis of the complete set of psychological manifestations (using all 15 Reinin traits and a number of mathematical procedures). The diagnostic procedures and principles are described in greater detail in our previous articles (Talanov, 2006, A, B, C). As the investigated projection of a given primary property onto the rationality-irrationality trait, we used not the simple correlation of the property in question with rationality-irrationality, but the arithmetic mean of the projections of this property onto all 16 sociotypes (taking into account their known membership in the rational or irrational pole). This also made it possible to avoid the parasitic effects of the sample’s inevitable skewness, in which the pattern of empirical correlations observed in the sample can be substantially distorted because different sociotypes are represented unequally in it.
How was the sample formed, and on what basis was the sociotype diagnosis made? Data from socionic questionnaire surveys of 1,400 people using various experimental questionnaires were employed. More than 600 people stated their socionic TIMs a priori; their results were used as a training sample, on the basis of which algorithms were subsequently developed to refine the diagnosis of the socionic TIM both for these individuals and for the other respondents. Correlations of questionnaire items (for the final calculation of percentage projections in the cluster tables) were measured both with socionic traits calculated from the stated TIMs and with traits calculated using mathematical procedures for diagnostic refinement. Correlations were also measured with so-called “images” of traits, calculated using formulas for the nonlinear socionic generation of some Reinin traits by pairs of other traits. In all cases, very similar correlation values were obtained, which makes it possible to regard the study results as reflecting the true profile of the socionic “Irrationals-Rationals” trait. In Tables 1-19, the final projection percentages were calculated by averaging three types of values, namely: projections of questionnaire items onto the stated TIMs; onto TIMs calculated from 15 traits across the entire sample using the data-symmetrization procedure (Talanov, 2006 A); and onto TIMs calculated from the images of the traits.
Thus, the procedures included diagnosing sociotypes in the sample, selecting primary properties for correlational and cluster analysis, and, finally, semantic analysis of these properties and their “assembly” into semantic clusters. As a result, for the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait we identified 160 generalized empirical clusters, grouped in Tables 1-19.
We shall analyze the results collected in these tables in sequence.
The sum of behavioral manifestations of the perceiving functions is more pronounced in irrationals, whereas behavioral manifestations of the judging functions are more pronounced in rationals; hence, a function manifests itself more actively in the program position than in the creative position {#раздел02}
The results corresponding to the title of this section are briefly presented in Table 1. What is meant here is that if, for example, LII and ILI are compared, then in LII Logic will be more pronounced than Intuition (of course, only as an average group tendency across all LIIs, and not necessarily in every individual LII). In the ILI group everything should be exactly the opposite – Intuition will be more pronounced. The question arises: how can incomparable things, in this case Logic and Intuition, be compared? They can be compared if a single universal scale is used to measure heterogeneous traits. On this scale, the magnitude of the deviation of any trait from the population mean is measured in fractions of the so-called “standard deviation,” that is, in fractions or percentages of the width of the population distribution of the trait. In that case it becomes possible even to compare a person’s height with the acidity of that person’s saliva. If saliva acidity is +2 standard deviations while height is only +1 standard deviation, then it is clear which of them is greater. These values can also be summed. The sum will obviously be +3 standard deviations from the mean. The same applies to comparing differently named psychological functions. All measurements of psychological functions and traits in this article and in the author’s other works (unless specifically stated otherwise) are made by us only on a universal scale; therefore, here and below, we can freely compare heterogeneous quantities with one another.
If Sensing is measured only with sensing questions, and Intuition with a scale containing purely intuitive questions (aimed specifically at Intuition rather than at the negation of Sensing), we obtain two independent scales for measuring each of these functions. If we subtract the readings of the sensing scale from those of the intuitive scale, we obtain the balance of the two functions, that is, the algebraic magnitude of the trait – positive for intuitive types and negative for sensing types. But instead of subtracting, one can, conversely, add the readings of the two scales. In that case, for each person we obtain the sum of all of his or her intuitive and sensing manifestations. This sum will characterize the conventional “strength” of the mixture of the person’s perceiving functions. The same kind of sum can be constructed for a mixture of Logic and Ethics. Let us once again recall that, for correct summation, all functions are expressed in comparable units, that is, in standard deviations from the population mean.
The sums obtained in this way are those used in Table 1. It turns out that the sum of the two judging functions (Logic and Ethics) correlates positively with rationality, that is, it is above the population mean in rationals, whereas in irrationals it is below the population mean. Conversely, the sum of the two perceiving functions is greater in irrationals than in rationals. Naturally, these regularities hold only as a group tendency, when data from a large number of subjects are averaged. Individual results, because of the inaccuracy of self-assessment, can “jump” quite substantially, - therefore it is not necessarily the case that in every particular rational the questionnaire-measured sum of Logic and Ethics will be greater than the sum of Intuition and Sensing. But a statistically reliable group tendency is sufficient for our conclusions.
On the basis of the data in Table 1 we must conclude that the mean degree of manifestation of any function is not the same in its two positions: program and creative. Moreover, it turns out that in the program position the function more strongly “colors” a person’s behavior. But was this really so obvious before our experiment?? Further, Table 1 shows that in rationals (that is, somewhat simplifying, in people with developed behavioral planning) the sum of the two judging functions is indeed more pronounced than the sum of the two perceiving functions. In irrationals, characterized by a predominance of improvisation and impulsivity, the reverse is true. Consequently, the characteristic properties of rationals and irrationals used in their diagnosis (including the planning-improvisation opposition) may, at least in part, be related to the predominance in rationals of the combined “strength” of judging, evaluative functions, and in irrationals of perceiving functions.
The result obtained in Table 1 can also be evaluated in a more precise form, as the correlation between rationality quantitatively measured by questionnaire (using such generally accepted characteristics as preference for planning over improvisation, etc.) and the function f=(L+E)-(I+S). The function “f” characterizes the predominance of the total “brightness” of an individual’s specific logical-ethical manifestations over the individual’s specific intuitive-sensing manifestations. Here L, E, I, S are the questionnaire-measured degrees of expression (that is, levels of “brightness”) of the respondent’s Logic, Ethics, Intuition, and Sensing. It is clear that, in order to measure these quantities separately, each scale for a bipolar trait has to be divided into two independent parts – separately for measuring “pure” manifestations of Logic, Ethics, Intuition, and Sensing. The author carried out all of this work for an experimental socionic questionnaire on which more than 700 respondents were tested. The result under investigation was in no way built into the structure of the questionnaire. The number of questionnaire items made it possible to construct sufficiently reliable independent scales for measuring “pure” manifestations of all four psychological functions. The final correlation coefficient sought between the rationality index and the function “f” was +0.44. This is a very substantial and highly reliable value; - if this correlation were measured again in the general population of all humanity (more than 5 billion people), with 99% probability it would exceed +0.37. After eliminating from the difference between the perceiving and judging functions its correlations with the other Reinin traits, the correlation of the function “f” with the rationality-irrationality trait increases further and reaches +0.51.
Why, then, can we not simply calculate the function “f” to determine the rationality-irrationality pole of a given subject, instead of measuring the balances of planning-improvisation, deliberation-impulsivity, self-control-lack of self-control, and so forth? Because correlations of approximately 0.4 – 0.5 are still insufficient for this task. Among representatives of the irrational pole of rationality-irrationality, in approximately 66% of respondents the sum of the empirically measured normalized values of the two perceiving functions is indeed greater than the sum of the normalized values of the two judging functions. But among the remaining 34% of subjects the reverse is true. A somewhat different percentage index can also be considered – in what percentage of irrationals is one of the perceiving functions the strongest, that is, maximal in magnitude? It is clear that before this comparison the functions are normalized relative to the sample, acquiring the same (unit) variance of the distribution function, so that their magnitudes can be compared. It turns out that 59% of irrationals have one of the perceiving functions as their strongest function (according to its empirical measurement), while 41% nevertheless display a judging function as the “strongest.” An error rate of 30-40% is an impermissible luxury in individual diagnosis of the trait.
Special scales for determining rationality-irrationality, based on those properties that are simultaneously “elevated” in both logical and ethical types and simultaneously “lowered” in intuitive and sensing types – and the notorious planning-improvisation property belongs precisely to such scales – produce a result better by an order of magnitude. Why? Because in the latter case we rely on properties that are almost equally characteristic of all functions belonging to one pole of rationality-irrationality. They add together and reinforce one another. When calculating the function “f,” by contrast, we rely on unstable statistics for strictly individual properties of functions, properties that are specific to Logic and separately specific to Ethics, and that do not add together or reinforce one another in any way. Thus, reliable measurement of rationality still requires seeking behavioral manifestations that are equally (or nearly equally) characteristic of both rational logical types and rational ethical types. Such properties exist; they are precisely what is represented in Tables 1-19, but their “brightness” nevertheless differs substantially among representatives of different TIMs, even when the TIMs belong to the same pole of rationality-irrationality. The entire problem therefore lies in maintaining, within a diagnostic scale, a balance among properties that are primarily characteristic of logical or ethical types, or of intuitive or sensing types. Otherwise, measurement of rationality (or irrationality) will be skewed toward one or two functions.
It should be noted, however, that there is another explanation for the absence of a “one-hundred-percent” correlation between irrationality measured by questionnaire scales and the predominance of the total “brightness” of the perceiving functions over the judging functions. In our view, this explanation is even more weighty and important. The point is that the socionic rationality-irrationality trait is primarily determined, as we shall see, not by the hierarchy of the four psychic functions, but by the balance of two subcortical modulating centers with a clear physiological “localization.” The externally observable irrational or rational behavioral properties of a person are determined to the greatest extent by this subcortical opposition, and not by one or another arrangement of the person’s psychic functions. The “information metabolism” of the functions characteristic of rationals and irrationals proves to be only one particular consequence of the subcortical opposition between two brain-modulating systems, alongside another of its properties, such as preference for planning or improvisation. Therefore, the correlations between, for example, the total expression of the perceiving functions and the integral behavioral traits of the irrational pole are not particularly large either. This is as it should be when a correlation is measured between two particular consequences of one more fundamental factor.
In the following sections of the article we will show, using numerous examples, that the overwhelming majority of the “irrational” psychological properties represented in the clusters of Tables 1-19 belong to the syndrome complex, well known to physiologists, of dominance of the nonspecific thalamic system of brain modulation, which includes the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus and the nuclei of the striopallidal system - primarily the caudate nucleus and nucleus accumbens.
Signs of dominance of this system can be traced in the memory characteristics of irrationals, in psychological mobility, in an increased drive for stimulating sensations, in reduced static muscle tone and, conversely, facilitation of rapid motor actions, in shortened autonomic reactions, increased impulsivity, reduced forms of all kinds of behavioral control and inhibition, including disinhibition of instincts and motor automatisms, blocking and “switching off” of defensive reactions, etc.
Conversely, the rational behavioral pattern is characterized by dominance of another, competing subcortical activation system. It is primarily associated with the nonspecific divisions of the posterior hypothalamus and the reticular formation of the midbrain and produces other, partly opposite effects (this system also includes the amygdala, the cholinergic systems of the forebrain, the insular cortex, the frontal limbic and prefrontal cortex, and a number of other structures – in general, this evolutionarily later system has more constituent parts). The “rational” center is responsible for emotional and logical evaluation of consequences and for the use of past experience; it is conservative and rather negative toward any risk and innovation, and it is particularly adapted to maintaining prolonged wakefulness and prolonged elevation of cortical tone.
The “irrational” center, consisting of the nonspecific thalamic nuclei and basal ganglia of the striopallidal system (including the caudate and accumbens nuclei), provides the possibility of rapid and short-term changes in reactivity when a new stimulus appears or when its quality changes (Traugott et al., 1968; Sharpless, Jasper, 1956; Magoun, 1965). From this general description of the functions of the two centers alone, one can already hypothesize that dominance of the “rational” center associated with the mesencephalic reticular formation indeed produces the rational behavioral pattern, whereas dominance of the thalamo-striopallidal center produces the irrational behavioral pattern. The following sections of the article show that this is indeed the case, and that correspondence of the general properties of rationals to the effects of artificial stimulation of the “rational” center, as well as correspondence of the properties of irrationals to the effects of stimulation of the “irrational” subcortical center, is confirmed by almost all of the behavioral clusters studied, down to details and minor particulars.
Each of the two subcortical centers that modulate overlying cortical activation includes many structures, which will be discussed below. In order not to confuse the reader with terminology, for brevity and clarity we will hereafter also refer to the “irrational center” as the “impulsive-perceiving” or “thalamic” center, and to the subcortical center that produces the rational behavioral pattern as the “planning-evaluative” or “mesencephalic-hypothalamic” center (mesencephalon is the Latin name for the midbrain).
When the “rational” subcortical center is dominant, its ascending influences activate the neofrontal cortex, which is predominantly associated with supporting the rational functions of the psyche. But a substantial part of the characteristic behavioral properties by which we diagnose the poles of rationality and irrationality are primarily associated not with activation of the neofrontal cortex or other cortical zones; rather, they are directly determined by the balance of activity between two subcortical activation centers: thalamic and mesencephalic-hypothalamic. Hence the “break” in the correlation - when we measure (expertly or by questionnaire) the balance of Irrationality-Rationality from integral behavioral properties, we are primarily identifying the balance of two subcortical activation centers, thalamic and mesencephalic-hypothalamic, and not at all the derivative balance of perceiving and judging functions (which coincides, to a certain extent, with the balance of activation between posterior and anterior cortical regions). The balance of the perceiving and judging functions itself (that is, the function “f” introduced above) is determined by the pattern of cortical functional activity. Although this pattern is related to the balance of particular subcortical regulatory centers, it is also independent to a certain degree and does not correspond to that balance with complete precision.
What has just been said is an extremely important point which may “decode” many of the things that are unclear today in neo-Jungian personality typology and, in particular, in socionics. Specifically, in its understanding and diagnosis of the rationality-irrationality trait, socionics gravitates more strongly than Briggs-Myers typology toward the balance of perceiving and judging functions. Briggs-Myers typology, as well as five-factor models of personality, in their understanding of the rationality-irrationality factor stand closer to the primary balance of the thalamic and mesencephalic-hypothalamic subcortical activation centers. This is not surprising: the overwhelming majority of all actually diagnosable properties of the rationality-irrationality poles (inertia-mobility, planning-improvisation, etc.) are directly determined by this balance and follow primarily and directly from it, rather than from the hierarchy of perceiving and judging functions that is derivative and secondary in relation to it.
Brief description of the physiological mechanisms underlying the two poles of rationality-irrationality {#раздел03}
A separate article should be devoted to a more detailed description, with evidence and examples of experiments conducted by numerous researchers. Here we will focus only on the principal scientific facts characterizing the composition and properties of the two subcortical modulating systems that produce either the irrational or the rational psychological pole. We will likewise discuss only in outline the contribution of different brain structures to these psychological properties.
First of all, the irrational and rational modulating centers of the brain are asymmetrical in the degree to which different neurotransmitter systems participate in them. Dopaminergic and serotonergic neurons have the greatest weight in supporting the activity of the irrational center (although, of course, neurons associated with other neurotransmitters also participate). In the operation of the rational center, noradrenergic, M-cholinergic, and GABAergic neurons participate to the greatest extent. Let us recall that another balance, the balance between the energy-mobilizing ergotropic system and the energy-saving and restorative trophotropic system, corresponding to Extraversion-Introversion, is characterized by a different distribution of neurotransmitter systems “between the poles.” There, both norepinephrine and dopamine correspond to the ergotropic system, while serotonin gravitates toward the trophotropic system.
The principal structures of the irrational modulating center are the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus and the predominantly dopaminergic nuclei of the striopallidal system, primarily the caudate nucleus (n. caudatus) and nucleus accumbens (n. accumbens).
The role of the nonspecific thalamus in the irrational psychological pole {#раздел04}
The thalamus (“visual tubercle”) is a structure of the so-called diencephalon, which also includes the metathalamic region (metathalamus), hypothalamic region (hypothalamus), epithalamic region (epithalamus), and subthalamic region (subthalamus). The thalamus is a massive paired oval structure situated centrally between the cerebral hemispheres. Because the thalamus is closely involved in supporting the functions of the neocortex, it reaches its greatest development and size in humans. The thalamus of each hemisphere has a volume of approximately 20 cm³, which constitutes about one and a half percent of the total volume of the hemisphere. The thalamus is both an important subcortical link in the sensory and motor systems of the brain and a link in the nonspecific intracerebral regulation of the activity of different brain zones and regions. The thalamus is anatomically and functionally heterogeneous and consists of about one and a half hundred small neuronal complexes (nuclei). To some degree, all thalamic nuclei possess relay, integrative-associative, and modulating functions. According to the predominance of one or another function, thalamic nuclei are divided into relay nuclei (switching streams of sensory information), association nuclei (closely connected with other thalamic nuclei and with association areas of the cortex), and modulating (nonspecific) nuclei.
The irrational modulation center primarily includes the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus. They are regarded as a kind of continuation of the brainstem reticular formation (RF), but are even more differentiated and functionally organized than the nuclei of the brainstem RF. The nonspecific nuclei are often called the reticular formation of the thalamus; in a certain sense they are the uppermost and “forward” (rostral) division of the ascending reticular formation. The nonspecific nuclei are characterized by polysensory input; “attention neurons” (novelty detectors) that respond to signal novelty are often found in them (Jasper, 1964).
In Jasper’s experiments in 1956, it was discovered that rhythmic electrical stimulation of the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus leads to excitation of cerebral cortical neurons and arousal responses. But it turned out that the character of this excitation is entirely different from that produced by stimulation of the lower-lying reticular formation of the mesencephalon, that is, the midbrain (which belongs to the rational modulating center). There is, however, also a similarity. Both when the mesencephalic part of the RF is stimulated and when the RF is stimulated at the level of the nonspecific thalamus, the frequency and amplitude of the stimulating electrical impulses are important. Excitation is produced only at high frequency and amplitude, whereas prolonged impulses with a low repetition frequency and low amplitude produce, on the contrary, inhibition. Reciprocal relations were identified between the reticular activating system and the nonspecific thalamic system. This is determined by the fact that the nonspecific thalamus has connections with the inhibitory part of the mesencephalic reticular formation in the region of the serotonergic raphe nuclei (a serotonergic center in the pons, below the midbrain). Thus, excitations from the mesencephalic RF and from the nonspecific thalamus are coupled by a negative-feedback mechanism.
The cortical activation responses elicited from the nonspecific thalamus are local and more resistant to extinction as experiments are repeated and habituation to the stimulus develops (that is, they provide a longer orienting response), but in themselves they are shorter in duration than the tonic cortical activation produced by the mesencephalic reticular formation. Thus, activation responses elicited by the mesencephalic RF and by the nonspecific thalamic system differ as generalized versus local, tonic versus phasic, and rapidly versus slowly extinguishing as habituation to the stimulus develops and the stimulus loses its novelty. On the basis of electrophysiological experiments, H. Jasper concluded that the nonspecific thalamic system participates in rapid and short-term cortical activation, in contrast to the slow and prolonged activation carried out by the mesencephalic reticular formation of the brainstem. The mesencephalic RF of the midbrain performs the function of maintaining the tone of the entire cortex, whereas the nonspecific thalamic nuclei activate only those cortical structures that participate in carrying out particular reflex responses. In particular, the nonspecific thalamic system is considered to participate in the organization of attentional processes in the waking organism.
In addition to its mobility and phasic character, activation generated by the nonspecific thalamus (it is precisely this activation that predominates in irrationals) has the further feature that it spreads mainly to the posterior cortex, which is associated with the performance of perceptual functions. At the same time, activation from the mesencephalic formation spreads primarily to the anterior regions of the brain, predominantly in the left hemisphere, and primarily affects the planning and controlling functions of the psyche in the frontal prefrontal and limbic regions of the cortex. We therefore assign the nonspecific thalamus to the irrational, impulsive-perceiving modulation center associated with the irrational pole of the psyche, and the mesencephalic RF to the competing planning-evaluative division associated with the rational pole.
The nuclei of the nonspecific thalamus form a diffuse thalamic projection system that exerts excitatory and inhibitory influences on the cortex. Compared with the excitatory effects of the brainstem, these influences are more restricted and encompass relatively small areas of the cortex. It may be assumed that the relay (switching) nuclei of the thalamus also gravitate toward the impulsive-perceiving division. In terms of the structures it contains, this division is evolutionarily quite ancient. In the child’s ontogeny it initially has an advantage in dominance, which produces the typical “irrational” style of behavior of most children, but with age (in humans – approximately by 7 years) it begins to yield to the competing “planning” division. This sequence is useful in ontogeny because it sustains children’s reactions of curiosity, interest, and surprise in response to novelty; produces holistic and low-detail reactions characteristic of rough and primary familiarization with a new situation; and primarily activates those perceptual functions that are most useful during this period. All of this is useful during the stage of intensive exploration of the world and learning in young mammals. Curiosity should at this time predominate over defensive reactions, while self-protection within this irrational-juvenile syndrome complex is carried out by means of “freezing responses,” characteristic of all young animals that love to play hide-and-seek. Freezing responses are supported by the serotonergic anterior regions of the hypothalamus, which are also part of the subcortical “irrational” modulating center.
The thalamic division of the irrational modulating system provides, first, an advantage to cortical zones associated with perception. Second, it is oriented toward urgent adaptation to new and rapidly changing environmental conditions and therefore provides short-term, local, selective activation of brain structures that can be rapidly reorganized, with emphasis on the posterior (perceiving) regions of the cortex. Third, it provides strong and slowly extinguishing responses to stimulus novelty – this is achieved by strengthening and prolonging the second, nongeneralized, so-called analytical phase of the orienting reflex, as well as by supporting “novelty detectors” in other parts of the brain. The adaptive significance of the operation of the impulsive-perceiving modulation center is to provide favorable conditions for search, for identifying in the environment any objects potentially useful for the direct and urgent satisfaction of the organism’s biological needs. Correspondingly, the activity of this division, first, occurs as if in short bursts of activation, only for the period during which an interesting stimulus is present, and is then again replaced by inhibition. In such cases activation is said to be phasic in character. Second, the activity of the division is accompanied by a preference for parallel and predominantly right-hemisphere modes of information processing, mobilization primarily of short-term memory, and strengthening of orientations toward exploratory-orienting activity and toward the individual’s current biological needs. An optimistic orientation toward success is also supported – for what is a search without hope! The operation of the nonspecific thalamus is closely coupled with the operation of the anterior hypothalamus and the nuclei of the striopallidal system (whose connections with the cortex are mediated through the thalamus). Taken together, their dominant activity produces all the characteristic features of the irrational behavioral pole.
The complex of changes in conditioned-connection function, reception, and motor activity that emerges when the influence of the nonspecific thalamic systems is strengthened makes possible the easy formation of diverse, broadly generalized connections and the detection of previously formed connections, and thereby facilitates urgent adaptation to rapidly occurring environmental changes.
The role of the striopallidal system in forming the properties of the irrational psychological pole {#раздел05}
Functionally activated dopaminergic nuclei of the striopallidal system, primarily the caudate nucleus (n. caudatus) and nucleus accumbens (n. accumbens), exert a major influence on formation of the typical psychological properties of the irrational pole.
The caudate nucleus is associated with storage of motor programs - primarily motor automatisms, learned movements, and skills, whereas the nucleus accumbens - a more ancient structure - is involved in storage of innate behavioral programs, that is, biological instincts (Danilova, Krylova, 2005).
Normally, the striopallidal system is under the control of the limbic system and neocortex, especially its prefrontal zones, which specialize in planning and controlling behavior. The frontal limbic cortex, associated with emotions, controls the innate instincts stored in the nucleus accumbens, while the frontal prefrontal cortex, more closely associated with the cognitive-logical functions of the psyche, controls the motor programs of acquired and learned behavior stored in the caudate nucleus – various motor automatisms. Inhibitory control is exercised by the frontal cortex by means of GABAergic neurons in the caudate and accumbens nuclei. When this control is weakened, disinhibition occurs, releasing the innate and acquired behavioral programs stored in the caudate and accumbens nuclei. This often takes the form of antisocial or uninhibited behavior. Difficulty controlling one’s sexual passions, a burst of aggression in response to an insult, an indecently high fence around a country house, and a dog set upon someone who violates the territorial boundary – all of these are possible manifestations of innate instinctive programs released outward. In such cases psychologists speak of reduced control over socially undesirable forms of behavior. This occurs more often in logical irrationals.
In ethical irrationals, whose emotional limbic cortex is more active, logical normative control by the prefrontal cortex suffers more, and this, first, makes their behavior appear contradictory and inconsistent from the standpoint of others and, second, prompts them to blurt out what is usually concealed. In addition, motor automatisms are released from the caudate nucleus (because the activity of inhibitory GABAergic interneurons is weakened), making the motor pattern of behavior seem uninhibited and the movements expressive, larger in amplitude, and less restrained. Disinhibited automatisms may manifest themselves in mere trifles – for example, in frequent habits among SEE, SEI, IEE, or IEI of constantly rubbing their hands, compulsively tapping or rubbing a finger on the arm of a chair, scratching themselves, rocking on a chair, and so forth. At the same time, voluntary (controlled) movements in irrationals become somewhat more difficult and at times contain many superfluous elements.
Because control of the striatal nuclei by the prefrontal and limbic cortex is weakened, delayed behavior is difficult for irrationals. Their responses acquire an impulsive, immediate character.
In addition, through the thalamic system, the striopallidal system, which includes the caudate nucleus and nucleus accumbens considered above, participates in forming selective activation of the neocortex, ensuring readiness of all its links – incoming (afferent), associative, and outgoing (efferent) - to execute a particular goal-directed behavior. It is the striopallidal system that distributes activation resources of voluntary attention in the cortex in accordance with behavioral tasks. Therefore, people with activated functions of the striopallidal system (that is, irrationals) have a better-developed function of voluntary attention, and attention itself is more flexible and mobile. The caudate nucleus (its dorsal, occipitally oriented division, most closely associated with motor function) participates in mapping sensory signals onto the coordinates of surrounding space – therefore irrationals with sufficiently high functioning of the left-hemisphere divisions of the premotor cortex, that is, primarily irrationals with strengthened Sensing, Logic, and Extraversion (SLE, SLI, but also SEE), have better directed attention than other TIMs and possess a better internal map of the surrounding external space (hence their dexterity and rapid reaction to unpredictable signals arriving from different directions). With regard to those TIMs, including irrational ones, in which these abilities are insufficiently expressed (EII, IEE, ILI), one may tentatively say that the functions of precisely the dorsal division of the caudate nucleus are weakened in them, while the functions of the ventral division (oriented toward the facial part of the skull) may, against this background, be well expressed.
Whereas inputs from motor cortical fields, motor thalamic nuclei, and the substantia nigra predominate in the dorsal segments of the caudate nucleus, inputs from limbic emotional cortical fields and limbic thalamic nuclei, the basal nucleus of the amygdala, and the ventral tegmental nucleus predominate in the ventral segments of the caudate nucleus (Gorbachevskaya A. I., 2002). The ventral division is associated with a sense of humor and perception of surprises and unexpected events, responds actively to pleasures and enjoyment, and is also associated with the functions of Intuition.
The nucleus accumbens of the striatum is another important structure of the irrational modulating center of the brain. It belongs entirely to the ventral divisions of the striatum and has predominant connections with limbic-emotional zones, receiving, among other things, innervation from the amygdala and hippocampus. Dopaminergic neurons of the nucleus accumbens play a key role in the experience of pleasant sensations by humans and animals. In addition, the nucleus accumbens contains many novelty neurons that respond with impulse activity to new objects and unexpected events. This excitation is transmitted to dopaminergic neurons of the nucleus accumbens and stimulates the dopaminergic system of other striopallidal nuclei, which is accompanied by a feeling of hedonic pleasure, subjectively experienced enjoyment. Therefore, in irrationals, in whom the functions of the nucleus accumbens are usually strengthened, unexpected events and everything new in general acquire a subjectively pleasant coloration and accordingly attract them. Irrationals with strengthened nucleus accumbens function are those people who crave unexpected events and want to be surprised. For this reason, irrationals like surprises and have an increased need for new stimulating sensations; they are prone to risk, which is reflected in higher scores on the sensation-seeking scale of Marvin Zuckerman’s “SSS” questionnaire. The reaction to jokes with an unexpected ending has the same nature: an unexpected ending causes a pleasant sensation and laughter, and the nucleus accumbens is responsible for this reaction. Therefore, the sense of humor is stronger in irrationals than in rationals, and among irrationals it is best developed in those who have increased functional activity of the ventral divisions of the striatum: the nucleus accumbens and the ventral divisions of the caudate nucleus.
Increased functional activity of the nucleus accumbens favors an increased propensity for risky actions, in particular risky investments. This too is a characteristic feature of most irrational TIMs compared with the group of rationals.
The opposite behavioral pole, associated with increased fear of losing what one has, is determined by activity of the so-called insular cortex (to be discussed later), which forms part of the structural pattern of the rational center. This creates distinctive differences between irrationals and rationals in their relation to harmful habits (smoking, drug use, etc.). Because of their attraction to everything new, irrationals more often become acquainted with harmful habits, but they also give them up more easily and become drawn into them more slowly; psychological and physiological dependence therefore takes longer to arise in them. Rationals find it much more difficult to give up already formed harmful drives – because of an increased fear of losing existing pleasures, which formally act for them as a positive resource protected by their functionally active insular cortex. According to our preliminary experimental data, logical irrationals find it easiest to control and limit their negative physical predilections and habits.
Disruption of the normal hedonic function of the nucleus accumbens (usually for the genetically determined reason of a deficiency of dopamine D-2 receptors in it) produces impatience in obtaining pleasures, even if small but immediate, and, in particular, contributes to gambling addiction and an increased attraction to dopamine-stimulating drugs (cocaine, amphetamine, heroin, etc.).
Thus, weakening of the dopaminergic functions of the nucleus accumbens (primarily in ethical rationals) contributes to the rapid formation of various kinds of pathological dependence (gambling addiction, drug addiction). By temporarily solving the problem of D-2 receptor deficiency through stimulated dopamine release, repeated use of drugs suppresses dopamine receptors still further, which leads to formation of physiological dependence. Psychological dependence, by contrast, is formed through the active functional role of the insular cortex, which conservatively stands guard over “resources of pleasure” and blocks any actions (for example, giving up smoking, drinking, cocaine use, slot-machine gambling, etc.) that could lead to temporary dysphoria. The insular cortex, which is most active in rationals, will be discussed in the next subsection.
In addition to the nonspecific thalamus and striopallidal system, nuclei of the ventral (anterior) hypothalamus participate in the operation of the irrational center, exerting an inhibitory influence on the mesencephalic RF. The structures of the hypothalamus can in a certain sense be regarded as a transitional link from the irrational modulating division to the rational one. Some of its nuclei participate more actively in the operation of the irrational, impulsive-perceiving division, while another part (predominantly noradrenergic nuclei) participates in the operation of the planning division. The serotonergic division of the anterior hypothalamus, which supports the ancient “freezing” reflexes (already discussed above in connection with the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus), participates most actively in the operation of the irrational center.
The rational modulation center {#раздел06}
Let us now consider the structures of the other, rational modulating center of the brain, which produces the properties of the rational behavioral pole. Its principal elements are the mesencephalic division of the reticular formation, certain nuclei of the posterior hypothalamus, the cerebellum, the amygdaloid complexes, the cholinergic system of the forebrain, the ancient insular cortex (regio insularis = insula = Island of Reil = insular lobe), the frontal prefrontal cortex, and partly the frontal limbic cortex. Also related to it are GABAergic inhibitory neurons in the striopallidal nuclei that are controlled by the frontal cortex, as well as the septum with the hippocampus and the association nuclei of the thalamus. As we can see, numerous structures participate in the operation of the center, predominantly structures that are evolutionarily later than those of the irrational center. According to N. N. Traugott (1968), the “rational” subcortical center of nonspecific influence on the CNS includes as its basic structures the reticular formation of the midbrain and the posterior hypothalamus, from which ascending influences, through the basal cholinergic system, spread to the dorsal hippocampus, the amygdala, and the entire cerebral cortex.
The rational modulation center is oriented toward supporting complex, meaningful forms of voluntary behavior and toward making maximally useful use of the individual’s past unpleasant experience. For this reason, in the composition of its elements it overlaps to some extent with the ergotropic “fight-or-flight” division, which likewise perceives the world through the magnifying glass of strenuous work, potential danger, and unending problems. But whereas, in the arrangement of the structures of the ergotropic division, the task determining that arrangement was energetic mobilization of the organism for expansion, aggression, or resistance to aggression, the task assigned to the “planning” division is different: to plan an optimal long-term behavioral strategy, take account along the way of the experience of past errors, and obtain advantage not through rapid situational responding (“fortune favors the bold”), but through foresight, construction of complex chains of behavior, temporary suppression of some needs for the sake of others deferred in time, and also for the sake of conserving available resources.
The set of neurotransmitters supporting the activity of neurons and brain structures involved in operation of the “rational” center consists primarily of norepinephrine, GABA (a transmitter implementing local inhibitory control), and acetylcholine.
The immediate apparatus of the rational, “planning-evaluative” modulating center consists of relatively young brain structures and old structures closely connected with them (predominantly noradrenergic), namely:
the mesencephalic reticular formation (RF of the midbrain), which establishes the mode of tonic activation and arousal;
adrenergic nuclei of the posterior and partly anterior (ventral) hypothalamus, associated predominantly with social needs and sexual libido (including, probably, the preoptic area of the ventral hypothalamus, associated with selection of one’s level in the social hierarchy);
the new and old divisions of the cerebellum;
the paired amygdaloid complex (the cerebral amygdala), which regulates needs and provides encoding of negative emotional experience (the amygdala of the left cerebral hemisphere participates most strongly in operation of the center);
the prefrontal frontal association cortex (noradrenergic and cholinergic neurons);
a system of GABAergic interneurons which, under control of the prefrontal cortex, tonically inhibits the neuronal networks of the dopaminergic basal ganglia (the caudate nucleus, i.e. the neostriatum, n. caudatus, and the nucleus accumbens, i.e. n. accumbens), in which innate and acquired programs of motor actions are stored. Removal of this control leads to release of inhibited, undesirable and therefore previously repressed automated behavioral programs stored in the basal ganglia (aggression, swearing, picking one’s nose with a finger in polite company, scratching oneself, etc.);
the association nuclei of the thalamus, closely connected with association fields of the neocortex and especially highly developed in humans compared with primates;
possibly, certain other structures, including:
the hippocampal cortex – its noradrenergic and cholinergic systems, responsible for its activation in the theta-rhythm mode, that is, for the analytical work of the hippocampus in extracting particular elements from memory images;
the septum, which acts as the pacemaker of the hippocampal theta rhythm;
the inferior temporal cortex, especially the left, responsible for constancy of visual perception and for perception of negative emotional facial expression.
Mesencephalic reticular formation {#раздел07}
The reticular (literally, “net-like”) formation of the brainstem (hereafter RF) constitutes the principal neuronal mass both of the medulla oblongata (the zone of transition from the spinal cord to the CNS) and of the higher divisions of the brainstem: the pons and the midbrain. Structurally, it consists of an enormous number of nerve fibers forming a network and establishing numerous connections both among different divisions of the RF and with other brain structures. It is accepted that the RF performs the principal integrative and controlling functions of the CNS. RF neurons are grouped into nuclei and subnuclei. The region of the RF in the midbrain is predominantly activating, particularly with respect to the cerebral cortex, whereas the region of the RF in the medulla oblongata performs the role of an inhibitory system. The RF of the medulla oblongata and pons is more closely connected by neural pathways with the thalamus and subthalamus, whereas the RF of the midbrain is more closely connected with the posterior hypothalamus.
The mesencephalic reticular formation (the reticular formation of that part of the brainstem that lies above the pons and belongs to the so-called midbrain) provides broad diffuse tonic excitation of the cortex, primarily of its anterior regions, which include the prefrontal cortex.
Connections between the RF and the cortex are mediated through the thalamic nuclei and through the basal cholinergic system. Descending fibers originate from the old and new cortex and run in the reverse direction toward structures of the hypothalamus, midbrain, and lower structures of the brainstem RF. Through the descending systems of connections, all lower RF formations come under the management and control of those programs that arise in the cerebral cortex and whose execution requires a change in activity. Thus, the activation block, with its ascending and descending influences, operates with feedback as a single self-regulating apparatus that produces changes in cortical tone while at the same time itself remaining under cortical control.
The assignment of the mesencephalic RF to the structures of the rational modulating center is based on the fact that the RF provides activation of the anterior prefrontal cortical zones, is controlled by these zones, and is in a negative-feedback relationship with the nonspecific thalamic activation of the “irrational” modulating center.
Cholinergic structures and pathways of the forebrain {#раздел08}
The planning-evaluative division also necessarily includes the cholinergic structures and pathways of the forebrain (the so-called “basal cholinergic system,” including the nucleus of Meynert and others) – they provide connections among brainstem, neocortical, hippocampal, septal, limbic-cortical, and thalamic centers; through them the direct activating influence of the mesencephalic RF on the neocortex and hippocampus is implemented. They also serve as a connecting link with the thalamic system of nonspecific activation (that is, with the irrational modulating center).
The cholinergic structures of the forebrain are under cortical control, despite the fact that corticofugal projections to the basal forebrain are relatively limited. The most prominent return pathway to the forebrain is formed by fibers from the prefrontal cortex.
Cholinergic neurons of the forebrain also participate in the hippocampal activation response, which is reflected in enhancement of the hippocampal theta rhythm. Enhancement of the hippocampal theta rhythm in response to electrical stimulation of the RF is implemented through the pathway: RF - basal cholinergic system of the forebrain - hippocampus.
Amygdala {#раздел09}
The amygdala is a paired organ consisting of two amygdaloid complexes located in different cerebral hemispheres. The function of the left amygdala is more psychologically rational than that of the right. The right amygdala is more closely associated with Extraversion and Ethics, while the left is associated with the rational pole, Introversion, and Logic. The functions of both amygdalae are somewhat more closely coupled with Intuition than with Sensing. These conclusions can be drawn from examination of patients in whom the amygdalae are stimulated or damaged because of various pathological factors (Madorsky, 1985). Each amygdala is divided into two principal groups of nuclei: the dorsomedial group (or central nucleus) and the basolateral part (or lateral nucleus). The central nucleus represents the output of the amygdala to executive mechanisms. Electrical stimulation of the central nucleus in dogs causes the emotion of fear and defensive behavioral reactions. The connection of the amygdala with negative emotions, and especially with fear, was confirmed as early as the 50s in experiments by the Oxford neuropsychologist L. Weiskrantz, who performed selective destruction of the amygdala in monkeys.
The amygdaloid complex (cerebral amygdala), through the evolutionarily younger basolateral group of its nuclei, has direct activating projections to the ventromedial hypothalamus, dorsal thalamus, and frontal regions of the neocortex. The dorsolateral nuclei of the amygdala project to the olfactory tubercle, diagonal region, septum, and ancient emotional limbic cortex. Through the stria terminalis system they also exert an inhibitory influence on the nuclei of the ventromedial hypothalamus. The amygdala participates in regulation of the hierarchy of needs, both biological and social, by influencing the hypothalamus. It plays an important role in emotional-memory processes and in the genesis and control of aggressive-defensive reactions.
Experiments on animals and humans have demonstrated that the amygdala is involved in facial perception; as in the inferior temporal cortex, neurons have been identified in it that respond to particular faces regardless of their viewing angle and orientation, as well as to patterns of facial emotional expression. Destruction of the amygdala impairs emotional memory — connections between sensory signals and particular emotional states cease to function and cease to form. Recognition of facial expressions of negative emotions, above all fear, is especially severely impaired.
Injection of NE into the amygdala, or electroshock, which also increases NE release, improves long-term emotional memory in rats. Administration of drugs that block the sympathoadrenal system (propranolol) leads in humans to reduced metabolic activity of the amygdala, which is necessary for formation of emotional memory. Such patients demonstrate selective impairment of memory related to emotional episodes, while memory for neutral, nonemotional events remains intact (Danilova, Krylova, 2005). Thus, the adrenergic nuclei of the amygdala are actively involved both in the system of defensive reactions, which is especially developed in rationals, and in processes of emotional long-term memory.
The amygdala participates in decoding emotional signals sent by other individuals, making it possible to construct behavior in accordance with their meaning. Following bilateral removal of the amygdala in primates, social intragroup behavior is disrupted because the animals cannot make a social evaluation of signals indicating the emotions and intentions of partners and arriving through visual, auditory, and olfactory channels.
Following bilateral removal of the amygdala, a specific syndrome arises in which all fears and inhibiting restraints disappear, resembling an extreme pathological manifestation of the irrational behavioral pole. It has been termed “Klüver - Bucy syndrome.”
Our experimental studies have shown that rationals are characterized by strengthening of so-called declarative memory for emotionally negative stimuli and situations (including instantaneous encoding in memory of offenses inflicted upon them). These properties are supported precisely by the functionally active cerebral amygdala.
Prefrontal frontal cortex {#раздел10}
By its structural type, the prefrontal cortex of the brain (its zones facing the skull) belongs to the association cortex. Its principal functions (in A. R. Luria’s definition) are the “functions of programming and control” over complex forms of behavioral activity. Across the ascending series of animals, development of the frontal lobes proceeds in parallel with development of intellectual abilities. At the same time, the ratio of the area of association fields to the total cortical surface increases substantially, while the area of projection fields decreases correspondingly. As a later ontogenetic “superstructure,” the frontal lobes perform the universal function of general organization of behavior and higher forms of associative activity. They become fully prepared for activity in the child only at 4-7 years of age, when association pathways support the increasing ontogenetic improvement of the mechanisms of associative (conditioned-reflex) activity of the brain (Danilova, Krylova, 2005).
When the prefrontal convexital cortex is damaged, the “internal plan” of activity suffers and its social motives weaken (including professional interests, attachment to relatives, etc.). Interest in the future disappears; career aspirations and the ability and desire to plan one’s behavior over the long term decrease. Complex programs of motor and speech actions are replaced by simplified and constantly reproduced stereotypes. When intellectual problems are solved, the stage of hypothesis construction drops out; the sequence in which pictures are viewed in tests is disrupted, and so forth. The functions of self-criticism and activity control weaken. Volitional processes of activity programming, which support voluntary behavior and its strategic aspect, are impaired. Patients cease, as it were, to relate their current activity to the main goal – the goal link simply drops out. The described disturbances are associated primarily with damage to the left-sided cortex.
It is not difficult to see from this enumeration that damage to the prefrontal cortex primarily impairs those functions that are best represented in the rational pole of individuals. Consequently, the prefrontal cortex is an important element of the “rational” modulating center of the brain.
From the standpoint of the specific needs that it supports, the general requirement imposed on the operation of the rational planning modulation center is the need to sustain prolonged effort and prolonged, nondeclining activation of the corresponding functional zones of the brain. Inertia, constancy, stubbornness, persistence, doggedness, if one wishes, even viscosity – these are the key words that well convey the scope and specificity of these requirements. These requirements correspond to the tonic character of brain activation provided both by the ergotropic and planning divisions, in contrast to the phasic, that is, impulsive, mobile, and rapidly decaying character of activation provided by the thalamic impulsive-perceiving division.
From the standpoint of increased demands for persistence and perseverance, another need that is preferentially supported by the rational center, and especially by the prefrontal cortex included within it, is illustrative. This is the so-called need for competence, usually assigned by biologists to the group of “ideal” needs important for the individual’s self-development. The need for competence manifests itself in the striving to repeat the same action until complete success in its execution is achieved. Alongside the need for novelty preferentially supported by the impulsive-perceiving division, it is an important natural prerequisite for learning, but occupies an important place among rational rather than irrational properties - together with an inclination toward planning, strengthened negative emotional encoding, and psychological inertia. It is probably worth recalling that this need gave its name in the five-factor model of personality to the entire factor of rational properties of the psyche (the so-called “competence factor”). It is precisely this need that suffers first when the prefrontal zones of the brain are damaged.
“Neuropsychologists and neurophysiologists unanimously consider that one of the most substantial aspects of frontal dysfunctions (the so-called ‘frontal syndrome’) is a disturbance of the ability to plan adequate behavior, a disturbance in taking account of the effects of actions performed, and consequently an inevitable deterioration of self-control. The processes of programming, regulation, and control of conscious activity depend to a considerable degree on the prefrontal divisions” (Danilova, Krylova, 2005).
K. Pribram (1975) believes that the frontal lobes form a set of neural programs that impart structure to individual experience, thereby constructing the “grammar” of behavior. Thus, it is precisely the frontal lobes that are the principal brain regions responsible for planning future behavior.
The frontal cortex is the principal source of voluntary activation carried out by the individual. Corresponding energetic resources, reflecting the resource requirements embedded in the structure of the plans it generates, must also be allocated for those behavioral plans. Therefore, descending impulses (both inhibitory and selectively activating) from the frontal cortex to all other brain structures are very important; they ensure preparation and distribution of the resources of all brain structures in accordance with the planning performed.
The cortex exerts its inhibitory, controlling influences on the nuclei of the striatum through a system of inhibitory GABAergic interneurons of the striatum; specifically, the cortex exerts an excitatory (glutamatergic) effect on the inhibitory efferent (GABAergic) terminals of the Spiny 1 system located in the striatum.
Insular cortex {#раздел11}
The cerebral insula (insula, PNA, BNA, JNA; syn.: central lobe, Island of Reil) is a part of the cerebral hemisphere that forms the floor of the lateral sulcus and is separated from the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes by the circular sulcus. The insular cortex is one of the most ancient cortical regions and lies deeply embedded within the brain (when the skull is opened, it is not visible from the outside). In the course of evolution, the brain expanding from other regions surrounded the insular cortical area on all sides, concealing it deep within the brain beneath other cortical layers. The insular cortex is activated in response to pain and fear. The insular cortex receives nociceptive (pain) projections from the thalamus and the anterior cingulate cortex. The thalamus registers pain and codes its intensity; the anterior cingulate cortex provides emotional memory. The insular cortex performs weighing and decision-making in this process.
The sight and smell of appetizing food also strongly excite the insular cortex. The insular cortex is also excited at moments when a person weighs the damage and losses that could result from possible actions. The insular cortex is activated when a person sees before them a stranger who is subconsciously unpleasant to them. The insular region is also excited in anticipation of physical pain and, in general, in anxious people. There is an opinion that the insular cortex plays an important role in formation of such a psychological quality as an orientation toward success or toward avoidance of failure. High insular-cortex activity favors selection of the second orientation.
Activation of the insular cortex corresponds to the feeling of discomfort produced by awareness of resources being lost. In “optimists,” who believe that every new action and every new bold step is pleasant and useful, the nucleus accumbens of the striopallidal system is more active. In pessimists and skeptics, the insular cortex is more active, warning against the unpleasant and frustrating consequences of losing habitual comfort. For this reason, high functional activity of the insular cortex can not only help a person but also hinder them. In particular, it impedes giving up harmful habits (smoking, overeating, cocaine use, etc.), because its characteristic “greed” for resources causes it to warn against possible unpleasant sensations and prevents it from giving “approval” to interruption of the harmful habit.
The listed psychological characteristics accompanying insular-cortex activity belong to the rational pole, and its activity often stands in a negative-feedback relationship with the leading brain structures of the irrational modulating center (including the nucleus accumbens). Therefore, the insular cortex should be assigned to the structures of the rational modulating center. In humans, the insular cortex has a larger area in the left hemisphere, which once again indirectly confirms its gravitation toward the structures of the rational modulating center, which as a whole has a rather left-hemisphere functional asymmetry.
Overall, the insular cortex is responsible for such psychological qualities as skepticism, fear of trouble, greed, fear of losses, conservatism of habits, and a preferred orientation toward avoiding failure – all of these traits are characteristic of the rational pole.
Let us recall an old joke. The optimist says: - It is good to be a giraffe! You drink vodka, and it flows down so pleasantly. It flows, flows!… (activation of the nucleus accumbens). The pessimist says: - And what if it comes back up? (activation of the insular cortex).
Hippocampus and septum {#раздел12}
The hippocampus and the closely associated septum perform analytical decomposition of a complex signal into components and then compare these components with images in long-term memory, not as wholes but by constituent parts, searching for suitable analogies for individual components in the holistic images stored in memory. Under normal conditions, “intuitive anxiety” is based precisely on this mechanism – on the sudden detection, within the current holistic image of a situation, of individual components that evoke an analogy with the past and call unpleasant memories to mind. When this mechanism is blocked, holistic images retain the ability to be compared with memory only as wholes as well, according to their integral characteristics. On the one hand, this strengthens the capacity for subtle sensing of certain differences between two whole stimulus objects that are difficult to isolate because perception is integral (hence the accelerated formation of discriminations to complex stimuli in irrationals). On the other hand, weakened hippocampal function also produces an increased readiness to identify complex signals with one another without analyzing them, disregarding sensed differences if some probable reward looms behind such identification (“risk is a noble business,” - irrationals are inclined to say). In its functionally active operation, the hippocampus interferes with seeing what is new; it tends to discover the familiar in everything because of the similarity of certain elements, and therefore the hippocampus is little used in operation of the irrational division, which is oriented toward searching for changes in the familiar picture of the world. In operation of the rational division, by contrast, it is important because it provides extraction of weak signals from complex integral stimuli and makes it possible to find analogies for them in memory. At least in certain model states that imitate the irrational behavioral pattern (for example, with administration of sodium amytal), hippocampal activity is strongly damped and the theta rhythms normally characteristic of it almost do not arise in the EEG. The effect of entraining theta rhythms with flickering light also disappears, which likewise indicates functional weakening of the hippocampus and septum.
It should be said that, among the other structures of the rational modulating center, the hippocampus stands somewhat apart – its functional activity is in reciprocal relationships both with the mesencephalic reticular formation and with prefrontal-cortex activity, although these too belong to the structures of the rational modulating center. Thus, there are certain problems and ambiguities concerning participation of the hippocampus in operation of the center.
The hippocampus is very important for learning processes, and therefore its functional activity is much higher in young individuals than in adults. The hippocampus is important for both sensing and intuitive functions. It may be more important for Intuition because it helps to find commonality even in heterogeneous material. It is also possible that the property of increased CNS sensitivity to weak sensory stimuli, which in V. D. Nebylitsyn’s psychophysiological school was identified with “weakness” of the nervous system and measured by the effect of theta-rhythm entrainment, is provided precisely by the hippocampus and septum. A series of experiments we conducted involving direct measurement of “weakness” using ХНК-2 indices in the visual analyzer shows an association of “weakness” with rationality and Logic, which may also indirectly indicate a closer connection of the hippocampus with the rational center of brain modulation..
Association nuclei of the thalamus {#раздел13}
A clear parallelism is found between development of the association nuclei of the thalamus and the association zones of the frontal and parietal cortex (a practically one-to-one correspondence). The association nuclei of the thalamus are directly connected with the association zones of the cortex, prefrontal and parietal. On this basis, it makes sense to assign the association part of the thalamus rather to the structures of the rational modulation center.
The integrated operation of the planning-evaluative, “rational” center of nonspecific modulation provides tonic (that is, temporally inert) activation predominantly of the anterior and association zones of the cortex, and first and foremost of the prefrontal cortex, focusing on their diffuse activation and not setting itself the task of rapidly reorganizing the activity of cortical regions. The operation of the division primarily advantages the anterior (prefrontal) higher association areas of the cortex, which perform the functions of long-term planning of any activity.
It should be noted that structures of the left hemisphere are involved in operation of the planning division to a greater extent than structures of the right hemisphere (for the irrational modulation center considered earlier, the reverse is true). For the planning-evaluative division, this applies at least to such clearly paired brain organs as the amygdala and frontal cortex, for which interhemispheric lateralization of functions has already been studied fairly well.
Whereas the strategy of the irrational center, based primarily on operation of the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus, was directed toward current satisfaction of pressing biological needs, the strategy of the rational center of the brain’s modulating system is directed toward constructing a complex hierarchy of the system of needs, with social and other “long-lasting” needs assigned the leading place within it. An important role here is acquired not only by social needs, but also by the tasks of learning, accumulating negative experience, and using it in the individual’s long-term strategy.
The operation of the subcortical and cortical apparatus of the rational center contributes to satisfaction of the following social needs (zoosocial needs in animals):
the need to belong to a particular social group;
the need to occupy a particular position in this group in accordance with the individual’s subjective representation of the hierarchy of that group;
the need to increase one’s social status (the need for social dominance);
the need to follow behavioral patterns accepted in the given group.
Among biological needs, the planning division most clearly supports the most social of the biological needs, namely the sexual instinct (libido), and does so through involvement in the division’s operation of hypothalamic and amygdalar nuclei specialized in supporting and regulating libido.
Let us note that most of the needs listed, unlike the group of needs supported by the thalamic irrational center (that is, needs for food, drink, and new sensations that provide occasion for exploratory-orienting activity), are associated with a much more intense competitive struggle for resources. Therefore, the range of duties of the rational center requires more active involvement of the noradrenergic ergotropic system, which mobilizes the organism for struggle and emphasizes the significance of various anxieties and dangers encountered in that struggle (strengthening negative-emotional memory and the organism’s aggressive-defensive reactions). Hence there is a certain structural and biochemical commonality in the operation of the ergotropic and planning divisions, which belong to the general brain system of modulation.
Neither of the two opposing modulation divisions can function without participation of the other division. The planning-evaluative division cannot operate effectively without the nonspecific thalamus, and the impulsive-perceiving division of the thalamus cannot function normally without the mesencephalic reticular formation, the cholinergic structures of the forebrain, and so forth. Therefore, one can always speak not of complete but only of partial dominance in the operation of either division. Excessively strong dominance of one of the divisions looks like pathology and is, in essence, pathology. Let us regard this as an important qualification.
The planning-evaluative division consists, as we have seen, of many brain structures. Naturally, one cannot expect all rationals (or irrationals) to display exactly the same balance of participation of different structures in its operation. The inevitable differences evidently create a physiological prerequisite for substantive manifestation of other socionic traits (“Reinin traits”) as well, beyond the four principal traits of the so-called “neo-Jungian basis” (version, rationality-irrationality, Logic-Ethics, Intuition-Sensing).
Substantive analysis of the rationality clusters {#раздел14}
Rate of decay of emotional traces and behavioral plans (Table 2) {#раздел15}
In irrationals, thoughts, interests, intentions, and evaluations that have “served their purpose” (taken together in emotional and logical modalities) are easily and rapidly deactualized and displaced from consciousness.
In rationals, matters are different: they are prone to emotional obsessions, emotional fixation and difficulties with emotional repression, reflection on the past, particular stability of the system of ethical evaluations and relations, persistent unpleasant sensations arising from the incompleteness of any action begun, obsessive thoughts, and doubts. Overall, they are characterized by slowness of repression and difficulty deactualizing most emotional and/or logical premises. A certain intellectual and emotional inertia and “viscosity” of rationals, which will also be discussed in connection with the clusters of psychological mobility, is likewise explained in part by the slowness of the processes of repression and deactualization.
A related trait is the sharply increased ability of rationals to remember offenses instantly and for a long time, and the ease with which traces are formed in response to emotionally negative reinforcement. In cognitive psychology, this property of instantaneous and long-lasting emotional encoding, which for some reason is always associated with unpleasant experience, is called declarative memory.
What can explain these differences between rationals and irrationals? We will first consider explanations at the psychological-cognitive level and then turn to a physiological explanation.
In rationals, the role of the program function is performed by one of the evaluative and reasoning functions: Logic or Ethics. In our article on the psychophysiological model of the TIM (Talanov, 2006, C), the mechanism of its operation was analyzed in detail. According to the “T” model of information metabolism proposed and considered there, the program function has excitation and inhibition thresholds that differ greatly in level; in other words, the input filters on its independent excitation and inhibition channels do not coincide in bandwidth. Because of this, within its own domain the program function cannot regulate itself: a signal arising within the function corresponds to the passband of the input filter so that the function can “hear” itself, but this signal does not pass through the sieve of the filter at the inhibitory input of the program function. Therefore, the program function cannot generate effective inhibitory influences within its own domain of activity; it is forced to receive them only from outside, from the other psychic functions of the same individual. This is what gives rise in rationals to persistent difficulties with inhibition, repression, and deactualization of any activity within the domain of the program judging function.
For the creative function, by contrast, the filters on the excitatory and inhibitory channels always coincide in bandwidth. Thanks to this, Ethics or Logic in the creative position (in irrationals) easily regulates itself and, when necessary, easily inhibits any activity within its own functional domain by means of its own signals. This is what provides mobility, switchability, inhibitability, repression, and easy deactualization of any activity of the principal judging function (located in the creative position).
On the other hand, according to the laws of model “T,” irrationals should display the opposite pattern with respect to mobility of the perceiving functions. Their program perceiving function should possess considerable rigidity and persistence within its own domain and should be difficult to regulate. This partly does occur! (See clusters 32-35 in Table 7). In intuitive irrationals, the intuitive function becomes “unrestrainable” and poorly controlled; in sensing irrationals, the sensing function does so, which in the latter manifests itself as difficulty coping with biological needs and desires. Until these desires are fully satisfied, they acquire an importunately dominant, viscously rigid character in sensing irrationals.
Unfortunately, this explanatory scheme explains nothing about the rate of repression of the products of the “weak” functions occupying the third (contact) and fourth (mobilization) positions in the model. The point is that according to either model – “T” or “A,” it makes no difference, - in this case everything should be the opposite: the rational functions should become more mobile in rationals. Experience, however, shows that rationals retain the tendency toward greater viscosity of the rational functions even for functions in “weak” positions. Thus, emotional obsessions (cluster 12) are above average not only for ESE, ESI, EIE, and EII types, but also for LSE, LSI, LIE, and LII, in whom Ethics is, generally speaking, in the controllable and flexible contact position. Although this tendency is weaker (+0.12 standard deviation compared with +0.29 for the first group of TIMs), it is nevertheless present. Only a physiological explanation can account for this paradox. Indeed, we already stated in the preceding section that in irrationals the ascending influences of the thalamic center of CNS modulation dominate, whereas in rationals those of the mesencephalic-hypothalamic center of CNS modulation dominate. This distinction initially “creates” irrationals and rationals, because in the former it secondarily strengthens operation of the perceiving functions in the posterior parts of the brain, whereas in the latter it stimulates operation of the judging functions in the frontal neocortex and anterior divisions of the limbic cortex. At the same time, apparently, in irrationals the cortical regions corresponding to the perceiving functions become the “triggering element” in information-processing cycles (the pacemaker), whereas in rationals the cortical regions corresponding to the judging functions do so, which ultimately determines the differences between the properties of the program and creative functions.
For irrational TIMs with Ethics in the inert mobilization position (Talanov, 2006), the mean value of emotional obsessions is (-0.23); for irrational TIMs with Ethics in the more flexible but likewise weak contact position, the value of emotional obsessions is slightly lower and equals (-0.25). Let us recall that for rational TIMs with Ethics in the program position, emotional obsession equaled +0.29, whereas for TIMs with Ethics in the creative position it equaled +0.12. Thus, not only rationality but also the location of the function affects its inertia, and in accordance with model “T” it is greater in the program position than in the creative position, and greater in the mobilization position than in the contact position. However, as we can see, the greatest influence on inertia and the rate of decay is exerted not by the position of the function but by the very fact that the TIM is rational or irrational. This result can be explained only by the influence of the general physiological factor of rationality, which primarily imparts to behavior a more inert or more mobile character, doing so simultaneously in all psychic functional domains and irrespective of any laws of information metabolism.
Operation of the thalamic modulating center corresponding to irrationals is tuned to short-term and rapid, locally mobile (phasic) changes in cortical tone, whereas operation of the mesencephalic center corresponding to rationals is tuned to prolonged (tonic) elevation of the tone of broad areas of the cerebral cortex. This is an evolutionarily determined dichotomy; the brain activation centers corresponding to it arose in evolution earlier than the cortex and the psychic functions associated with it. And when we speak of differences in mobility-inertia and of different rates of repression of the products of psychic functions in irrationals and rationals, the matter, first and apparently foremost, lies precisely in the difference between the general dynamic properties generated by two alternative and ancient activation centers. The dynamic properties corresponding to each of them are equally and universally transmitted to all divisions of the cortex and to any higher-level brain activity. Only to a substantially lesser extent is inertia-mobility affected by various “clever” cognitive mechanisms at the psychological level interpreted by models “T” and “A.”
Still less can psychological models explain without forcing the matter the substantially better declarative memory of rationals for emotionally negative stimuli (instantaneous encoding of offenses and unpleasant events in long-term memory). Moreover, this applies to both ethical and logical types. From the physiological standpoint, this characteristic of rationals is explained by the active participation in operation of the rational mesencephalic center of the two paired amygdalae of the brain, which are responsible, among other things, precisely for encoding negative emotional experience (especially the left amygdala).
The few genetic studies that exist likewise support heritability of the rationality-irrationality pole above chance level, and consequently support its determination by very ancient, precortical physiological causes. We processed E. S. Filatova’s statistics on family pairs published in the work of the Bulgarian psychologist Ivan Popov, “On the Inheritance of Socionic Traits” (2006). Retaining in the statistics only family pairs with the same pole of the trait, we found that children inherit their parents’ rationality-irrationality pole in 75% of cases (statistics for 53 children). This, incidentally, is the highest heritability index among all 15 traits. Heritability indices approaching it in magnitude for the quadral traits, as well as Carelessness, Yieldingness, and Constructivism, amount to only 66-68%. The statistics are, of course, small, and many methodological objections can be raised against them, but they at least do not contradict an explanation of rationality-irrationality through one of the most ancient temperamental-physiological mechanisms of the nervous system. If rationality-irrationality were determined only by short-range cortical relations, heritability would almost certainly be zero. In particular, this is shown in a twin-method study performed by staff of the St. Petersburg institutes of physiology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and of evolutionary physiology and biochemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ivonin et al., 2002). The authors of that work conclude that only formation of regulatory nonspecific mesencephalic and diencephalic structures of the brainstem and associative thalamo-cortical systems of intracerebral integration is genetically determined. Short intercortical connections within each hemisphere, by contrast, are not genetically determined.
Other confirmations of the thesis that most properties of rationals and irrationals are determined by the opposition between two subcortical modulating centers have already been presented above in the section on physiological mechanisms.
In socionics, a widespread assertion (it would be more correct to call it a belief, and before processing the experimental results the author shared it as well) holds that the psychic functions themselves primarily have either a rational or irrational character, - depending on whether they are judging or perceiving. The rational or irrational properties of the functions then supposedly secondarily form the properties of the poles of the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait, completely mediating all manifestations of these properties through the hierarchy of functions in cycles of information metabolism. However, from what has been said above it is evident that this assertion proves to be false or, at the very least, not entirely true. Unconditional belief in it will have to be abandoned.
In fact, if one reflects on the matter, the dubiousness of the assertion that the superstructural functions of the psyche are “primary” relative to fundamental properties of temperament could have been noticed even before our experiments. The internal contradiction in the thesis of the primacy of the functions and their positions relative to the integral properties of the “rationality-irrationality” trait is visible even without using evolutionary considerations. Two functions that are almost equal in strength and brightness (program and creative), yet possess certain opposite properties, cannot possibly impose on the integral bearer of the TIM the property of only one of them, the first.
Almost the same picture existed with the Extraversion-Introversion orientation of the functions. There, however, the very assertion that this orientation alternates in the first pair of functions proved incorrect on examination – both functions proved to be simultaneously either extraverted or introverted, oriented either toward a strategy of energy expenditure or a strategy of energy conservation (Talanov, 2006a, 2006b, 2007c). As it turned out, it is not the first function that dictates the TIM’s Extraversion-Introversion orientation; rather, the orientation of all its leading functions is determined “from below” by an ancient brain dichotomy. The Extraversion-Introversion dichotomy was ultimately reduced to an ancient balance between two strategies: the energy-consuming strategy of flight and fight (ergotropic) and the strategy of energy restoration (trophotropic). At the dawn of vertebrate evolution, evolution even created two separate peripheral nervous systems to support the competition and coexistence of these two strategies (the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic nervous system). Finally, it turned out that this opposition is even more ancient than the nervous system itself and is based on an opposition, extending back to invertebrate organisms, between two neurotransmitter biochemical systems: the catecholaminergic system (noradrenergic and dopaminergic) for the ergotropic-extraverted pole, and the predominantly serotonergic system for the trophotropic-introverted pole (Talanov, February 2007).
Now, in turn, it emerges that the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait is also built on an ancient temperamental foundation, and that the largest part of the characteristics of its poles is determined not by the later laws of information metabolism but by the much more ancient dichotomy between two modulating systems, one of which serves the more ancient strategy of primary rough familiarization with the environment and immediate satisfaction of needs (irrationals), while the other serves the strategy of planning, regulation of needs, use of past experience, strengthening of social mechanisms, and self-protection (rationals). And it is precisely this dichotomy “from below” that primarily influences the actually existing information metabolism of the functions, forms different mosaic activation of cortical zones, determines in an integral fashion and “over the heads” of the psychic functions a substantial part of the psychological differences between the rational and irrational poles, leaving to information metabolism proper, that is, to the hierarchy of cortical functions, only a small part of the final work of forming this temperamental trait. Why should this be surprising? Everything is evolutionarily understandable and lawful.
Perhaps, to a certain extent, one can even speak of a rational or irrational character of both of an individual’s first two psychic functions? Is it justified, for example, to suppose that in rationals the leading perceiving function also has a rational shade in its properties? Let us examine this using the ability to switch sensory attention as an example. From the standpoint of the positions of the functions in the hierarchy, Sensing should be more flexible and controllable in sensing rationals, and with it the focus of sensory attention should also be more flexible and controllable. From the standpoint of the physiological explanation, however, the focus of attention will be more flexible and controllable in sensing irrationals - because of the phasic character of activation of the posterior cortical regions. What is actually the case? Let us compare the psychotypes SEE, SEI, SLE, and SLI with the group of psychotypes ESE, ESI, LSE, and LSI. Mean ability to switch attention rapidly in the first group of four TIMs (cluster 104) is (+0.15), whereas in the second group it is (-0.11). Thus, the role of the physiological factor clearly outweighs the other. Hence the conclusion:
Everything in a socionic TIM that is genuinely stable and genetically determined is encoded not at the level of the extremely plastic neocortex, but at the level of the ancient brainstem and limbic mechanisms of the brain.
Behavioral control (Table 6) {#раздел16}
The table contains clusters related to restraining control over actions and behavior. In any situations – at work, in everyday life, in spending money and allocating a budget, in restraining emotions or one’s verbal responses, in limiting one’s aggression or autoaggression, in adapting one’s behavior to a required style, in inhibiting any impulsive reactions up to and including their preliminary supervisory control – in absolutely all such situations, rationals have an advantage in restraining and normative control.
At the psychological level of explanation, one may suppose that this is determined by the evaluative, supervisory role of program judging functions, which in rationals operate constantly in a “background” mode. From this standpoint, judging functions in creative positions, that is, in irrationals, cope poorly with the task of control. Strict supervision of behavior is unavailable to them. They merely solve the specific task posed and function only for as long as the program function permits them to do so. Only a judging function in the program position is capable, throughout a person’s entire waking state, of carrying out background evaluation and censorship of information about behavioral plans.
However, the physiological explanation of rationals’ increased capacity for control is entirely different and, unfortunately, corresponds only weakly with the psychological-cognitive explanation given above. In irrationals, the thalamic division of ascending activation dominates. Its influences, which provide the individual with rapid and mobile responding to rapidly changing environmental conditions, are characterized, in particular, by suppression of all defensive reactions, broad generalization of conditioned reflexes, and suppression of most types of inhibition, including all forms of behavioral control. A typical pharmacological model of the dominant role of the thalamic division is the action of sodium amytal, which, as is known, is used as a disinhibiting agent and truth serum. Conversely, dominance of the mesencephalic activation center (the reticular formation of the midbrain, posterior hypothalamus, and other structures), which is precisely what produces rationals with all their characteristics in the spirit of socionic models, leads to increased defensive reactions, anxiety, and tension (both internal psychological tension and static muscular tension). At the same time, all forms of internal inhibitory control, including GABAergic control, are strengthened, and those forms of cortical activity associated with defensive reflexes are selectively tonized (already secondarily) (Traugott et al., 1968).
The different level of control ultimately reduces to different effectiveness of inhibition. Thus, as we can see, the physiological explanation requires neither the concept of a program function nor that of a creative function, and it successfully dispenses even with the notion of different functional domains.
Another physiological source of behavioral control (in fact, the terminal link of the mechanisms of cortical control already described) consists of inhibitory GABAergic interneurons located in the caudate nucleus and nucleus accumbens. When the frontal cortex plays an active role, these neurons are under its control (in the caudate nucleus – under control of the prefrontal cortex; in the nucleus accumbens – under control of the limbic cortex) and inhibit those action programs that are stored in the memory of these nuclei. The memory of the caudate nucleus contains acquired actions and learned behavioral motor automatisms, whereas the memory of the nucleus accumbens contains innate behavioral programs, that is, simply instincts. If motor automatisms predominate in an irrational (the person’s movements are large in amplitude and loose, the person scratches, picks the nose, rocks on a chair, rubs the palms, etc.) – this is disinhibition of the caudate nucleus and weak control over it by the prefrontal cortex. If instincts are disinhibited – inappropriate aggression, uncontrollable sexual desire, inappropriate and excessive guarding of one’s territory, etc. – this is weakening of limbic influences on the nucleus accumbens of the striatum (n. accumbens).
It appears that, in interpreting differences among people in behavioral self-control as well, the physiological mechanism once again proves to be primary and the psychological mechanism secondary.
Rational behavioral control is not limited only to its restraining forms. There are also obligating, coercive forms of control (also a kind of inhibition!). Cases of coercive, prescriptive-mobilizing control will be considered in discussion of other tables (clusters 65-67, 76-78, 147).
Control of impulses and drives (Table 7) {#раздел17}
The clusters in this table concern a respondent’s uncontrollable “loss of reason” in certain undertakings, ideas, fantasies, desires, aspirations, and pleasures. It is indicative that intuitive and sensing types do not differ greatly in their assessment of their ability to control these drives, regardless of whether the impulses being evaluated belong to the intuitive or sensing domain. What matters first and foremost is the respondent’s rationality or irrationality. Rationals are good at rationally checking, controlling, and restraining their impulses in any motivational domain; irrationals are poor at doing so.
From the standpoint of a hypothetical cognitive mechanism, this may be caused by the program character of the evaluative function in rationals – after all, only an evaluative function is capable of carrying out conscious rational control by forming behavioral plans, while its program position gives it the role of a dominant censor that is constantly operating “in the background” and is itself controlled by no one. Cluster No. 36 is especially illustrative of this mechanism; it combines the ability to control and limit oneself in ambitions, strong desires, the amount eaten and drunk, physical needs, enjoyment and pleasures, hedonic laziness, and even reconstruction of the surrounding space to match a desired pattern. Although the largest part of these impulses has a sensing coloration, intuitive and sensing types differ little in their assessment of their ability to subject them to restraining skeptical control, whereas rationals among both groups have a clear advantage over irrationals.
At the psychological level, again, the correlation of general inhibitory-controlling ability with rationality can be explained by the rational character of almost any self-control, which always relies on evaluation, checking, reflection, feelings, and reasoning, that is, ultimately on the judging functions. Any rational function, when occupying the program position, becomes capable of controlling the individual’s behavior and impulses. The only difference from the preceding table is that Table No. 6 concerned restraining and limiting control primarily over actions and behavior. In Table No. 7, rational functions control aspirations and impulses – with the same good result.
On the other hand, a different cognitive mechanism for control of motivations and impulses in rationals is also possible. The point is that motivations and impulses are associated with the domain of the perceiving functions, while the strong perceiving function in rationals occupies the controllable creative position, where it is easily controlled and inhibited not only by signals from the program function, but also by its own signals generated within its own functional domain (see model “T,” Talanov, 2006, C). But in that case the control mechanism in rationals should nevertheless have a selective character with respect to the rational and irrational functions being controlled. If impulses and motivations (the domain of the perceiving functions) are inhibited in rationals fairly successfully, inhibition of rational evaluations (emotional memories, obsessive thoughts and relations, etc.) occurs in them with substantially greater difficulty than in irrationals. And this is indeed the case (see Table 2). The differences between the effectiveness of inhibition in the domain of the judging functions and in the domain of the perceiving functions do indeed support the proposition that explanations of certain effects of rationality by means of psychological-level cognitive mechanisms based on models of information metabolism have a right to exist, and that not everything in the properties of rationality or irrationality can be reduced exclusively to a physiological explanation.
A third cognitive mechanism of restraining control and inhibition is determined by the position of the suppressed function in the hierarchy and is associated no longer with selective suppression of particular impulses within a functional domain, but with general inhibition of the function’s entire activity as a whole. This mechanism is not related to rationality at all and always acts suppressively on the third and fourth functions of the hierarchy (occupying the contact or mobilization position). It is for this reason that the best inhibition and suppression of any intuitive “ideas” is achieved not in rationals with Intuition in the creative position, but in rationals with Intuition in the last, mobilization position (cluster 35) – despite the fact that the mobilization function, like the program function, is incapable of inhibiting itself within its own domain. This can be explained by the fact that, in addition to “censorial” control by evaluations and behavioral plans generated by the rational program function, sensing rationals also have a general powerful inhibition of Intuition as a whole resulting from its occupation of the final, mobilization position (Talanov, 2006, C). Evidently, this general inhibitory effect on Intuition ultimately proves stronger than the situational effect exerted in intuitive rationals on creative Intuition by the program rational function. However, this type of inhibitory mechanism has a specifically inert character. It can cause suppression of a function, but by no means improves the mobility of its operation; it cannot provide flexible inhibition based on feedback (therefore mobility of a function can be provided only by the second cognitive inhibitory mechanism considered in this section).
Finally, the physiological explanation of good control over drives and impulses in rationals reduces, first, to the active role of inhibitory GABAergic interneurons in the caudate and accumbens nuclei of the striatum, under control from the prefrontal and limbic cortex, and second – to active insular-cortex function, which together strengthen all forms of inhibition and control in the individual.
Psychological inertia and mobility (Table 13) {#раздел18}
Rationals (in group comparison with irrationals) are characterized by reduced psychological mobility and plasticity, cognitive viscosity, difficulties switching and distributing attention, intolerance of rapid shifts and changes in a situation (they simply do not manage to respond adequately in time), tactical inflexibility, uncompromisingness, and conservatism. Rationals are less successful in situations where the organism encounters completely new, changed environmental conditions that require rapid and unprejudiced exploration and learning, readiness to perceive the world “as it is,” rather than persistent attempts to force it into the Procrustean bed of schemes derived from previous experience that no longer work.
Irrationals possess the opposite properties; they are ideally adapted precisely to situations of novelty. In particular, they react rapidly to any changes and feel quite comfortable in situations involving time pressure and many influencing factors, even when these situations require frequent and rapid switching of attention. A tendency toward “flight of ideas” (rapid uncontrolled succession of thoughts and images) is characteristic of some irrationals. Irrationals also tend to show greater learning ability, which, as is known from psychology, is likewise associated with mobility of mental processes (the small magnitude of this tendency is apparently due to the fact that the second necessary component of learning – encoding into long-term memory – is better represented in rationals).
At the level of psychological explanations of the phenomenon of high mobility in irrationals, two possible mechanisms can be distinguished. Everything associated with difficulties in rapidly switching attention among several objects in the perceiving domain, as well as with slowed operation of the sensing and intuitive functions and their excessive step-by-step controllability, is explained by the rational function in the program position – it draws attentional resources toward itself and too frequently intervenes in perceptual activity as an intermediate supervisory link. What is associated with cognitive viscosity, tactical inflexibility, and uncompromisingness within the program judging function’s own domain is explained by its inert character and inability to inhibit within its own functional domain (model “T” - Talanov, 2006, C).
The physiological explanation of the greater mobility of irrationals is again alternative to the psychological explanation. The physiological mechanism of inertia-mobility has already been described in more detail in the section of the article on the physiological mechanisms of the trait. Here we will simply recall briefly once again that rational and irrational behavioral patterns are controlled by different subcortical CNS activation centers. It is these activation centers, through their ascending activating and inhibitory influences, that ultimately establish within the TIM the “order” of the rational and irrational functions. Irrationality is provided by the active role of the so-called thalamic center of CNS activation. Its operation is characterized by broad generalization of conditioned reflexes, facilitation of responses to the widest possible range of stimuli, high speed and amplitude of responses, a mobile (phasic) character of excitation that rises rapidly and intensely and declines just as rapidly in all cortical zones (controllable flexibility and rapid decay of functional activity!), predominance of excitation responses over all the principal responses conventionally regarded as inhibitory, and cessation of the slowing influence on motor and cognitive responses exerted by any “inhibitory inserts.” Under the controlling influence of the thalamic center, the frontal cortical zones associated with rational functions operate in intense and short-term bursts; at the same time, the EEG pattern of the frontal regions is dominated by intense “spindles” of fast beta rhythms that are highly characteristic of thalamic-center influences. Psychopharmacological drugs that exert a so-called “disinhibiting effect” and at the same time improve psychological mobility do so by stimulating the thalamic activation center, while simultaneously suppressing the tonic influence on the cortex from the mesencephalic center (sodium amytal).
The opposite rational behavioral pattern, with constant dominance of the evaluative functions, is supported by a temporally stable (tonic) ascending influence from the mesencephalic activating division of the CNS, that is, from the reticular formation of the brainstem and the posterior hypothalamus. These ascending influences can be strengthened with caffeine. The tonic character of the influence of this center on the anterior neocortex leads to persistent excitation of those frontal cortical zones that are apparently most closely associated with activity of the rational psychic functions. Dominance of ascending mesencephalic influences in rationals, accompanied by activation of the amygdala, insular cortex, and prefrontal cortex, leads to increased tension, preoccupation, obsessive doubts, checking and control, and overall - to constant evaluations and intensive “weighing” cognitive activity. It is clear that this resultant pattern corresponds to greater inertia of mental processes as well. “The mesencephalic division is adapted to maintaining prolonged wakefulness and prolonged elevation of cortical tone. The thalamic division provides the possibility of rapid and short-term changes in reactivity when a new stimulus appears or when its quality changes” (Traugott et al., 1968). The explanatory force of this statement applies fully not only to inertia-mobility, but also to the group of clusters in the next table, which are associated with the need for novelty.
Conservatism of sensations or need for new and varied sensations and nonconservatism (Table 14) {#раздел19}
At the rational pole, this group of clusters characterizes conservatism of habits, preference for stability over change, preference for the familiar over the new, high tolerance for monotonous and routine activities, stability of prolonged concentrated attention on the same task (without a need for frequent distractions and switching), preference for quiet and calm (intolerance of intense sensory stimulation), and absence of an increased need for fresh and new impressions and exciting sensations (which disrupt “sensory equilibrium”).
Correspondingly, irrationals possess the opposite characteristics. In particular, they do not tolerate monotony, are drawn to exciting sensations, need fresh and new impressions, and are frequently distracted and switch during work – because the focus of attention is rapidly exhausted. Moreover, these traits are characteristic of both sensing and intuitive irrationals, although to a greater extent of intuitive irrationals.
At least a substantial part of the properties named can be reduced to the mechanisms of psychological inertia-mobility already considered. This is also confirmed, in particular, by the fact that the profile of additional loadings of this group of clusters on additional Reinin traits looks exactly the same as in the case of the mobility clusters. Indeed, in both cases the properties of the irrational pole correspond to additional loadings on Extraversion, Intuition, and Ethics, whereas those of the rational pole correspond to Introversion, Sensing, and Logic.
We will be somewhat more detailed only with respect to the physiological explanation.
To the reasons already given for the connection of the irrational pole with the thalamic activation center, one may add here that, according to physiological research, dominance of the thalamic center is accompanied by a substantial reduction in the masking effect of sensory interference and facilitation of extracting a useful signal from noise. In addition, under dominance of the thalamic center, acoustic load ceases to reduce auditory sensitivity (Traugott et al., 1968, p. 315). This characteristic of the dominant influences of the thalamic activation center, repeatedly identified in physiological and psychopharmacological studies, fits very well with such a property of irrationals as good tolerance of noise and powerful sensory stimulation (clusters 113, 129, 120). This provides additional confirmation of the close correlation between the thalamic system of ascending activation and the irrational behavioral pattern.
The attraction of irrationals to powerful stimulation can be explained by the rapidly decaying character of thalamic activation, which requires frequent stimulating inputs to sustain it. The striving for novelty and unexpected events is associated with novelty neurons in the thalamus and, especially, in the nucleus accumbens of the striatum. It was already stated above that irrationals with strengthened function of the nucleus accumbens of the striatum are those people who crave unexpected events and want to be surprised.
The hippocampus, which is more active in rationals, may also play a role. As stated in the section on the physiological mechanisms of rationality-irrationality, the hippocampus provides rationals with increased sensitivity to weak sensory and intuitive signals.
Ethical moralizing (Table 19) {#раздел20}
Rationals are more inclined toward moral ideals, moralizing, and uncompromisingness in ethical evaluations. Irrationals are both less interested and more flexible in these matters.
The explanation for these differences is simple: in rationals the “internal coordinate system” in relation to the surrounding world is constructed on evaluative judgments, on how things “ought to be.” In irrationals, the internal coordinate system is based on perceiving functions, that is, on how things actually are. If these characteristics are supplemented by the greater psychological inertia of rationals and the mobility of irrationals, we obtain an entirely sufficient explanation of the properties collected in the clusters of Table 19.
From the physiological standpoint, the matter lies in strengthened function of the emotional limbic cortex, which controls and inhibits (through the system of GABAergic neurons) the innate instincts encoded in the nucleus accumbens.
Emotional depth or superficiality (Table 18) {#раздел21}
The table combines fairly heterogeneous properties, and in most of them rationality-irrationality is not the leading trait but a secondary one, second after Logic, that influences the property. Irrationals are more characterized by superficiality of emotions, which is also manifested in their labile instability, symptoms of emotional flattening, and indifference. Rationals tend to possess deeper and more stable emotions. The differences may be explained by the fact that in ethical irrationals Ethics occupies the flexible and subordinate second position, whereas in logical irrationals Ethics, although more inert than Logic, is sharply weakened in comparison with it.
From the standpoint of the physiological explanation, in irrationals phasic activation from the nonspecific thalamus poorly supports operation of the anterior cortical regions, especially the frontal cortex. According to A. R. Luria (Luria, 1982), a typical symptom of weakening of frontal functions is emotional lability and emotional flattening, including the appearance of indifference toward one’s close relatives.
Industriousness or avoidance of activity (Table 17) {#раздел22}
Rationals are distinguished by noticeably more stable work capacity and greater readiness to work (sometimes up to workaholism). For irrationals, avoidance, whenever possible, of activity imposed on them is typical. At the same time, irrationals are more “eager” for simple muscular activity, in which they see a useful outlet for themselves, whereas rationals are more inclined toward sedentary, including intellectual, work.
First, some differences between rationals and irrationals in the group of clusters under consideration can be explained by the inertly excited state of the cortex in rationals under the influence of tonic ascending activation, and by the “falling asleep” state of the cortex under monotony in irrationals, who, because of the specific character of phasic influences from the thalamic activation system, require constant “awakening” stimulation to maintain activity.
The motor characteristics of irrationals and, in particular, their preference for active physical activity are explained from the standpoint of “disinhibition” of the caudate nucleus of the striatum, as a result of which large-amplitude movements and previously inhibited motor automatisms “ask to come out.” During intellectual work, sitting on a presidium, and the like, irrationals are forced to restrain them by deliberate volitional effort; during muscular activity they can give themselves free rein. Indeed, experimental stimulation of the nonspecific thalamus and caudate nucleus with simultaneous blocking of ascending influences from the mesencephalic reticular formation leads (Traugott et al., 1968) to the following characteristic consequences:
motor activity in patients becomes substantially more lively, and the total number of movements increases;
small finger movements lose precision and coordination, handwriting becomes more sweeping, awkward, and less legible, and coordination during walking also becomes somewhat worse;
motor automatisms that are normally suppressed in adults become disinhibited: patients scratch themselves, stretch, rub their hands, rub their fingers along the back of a chair, swing their legs, change postures excessively often, clean their nose with a finger more often, adjust their hair and clothing without particular need, and so forth;
expressive vividness of facial expression and motor behavior increases (richer gestural accompaniment of speech, excessive accompanying movements);
facial expression and voice likewise acquire a multitude of additional shades and often become exaggeratedly expressive in intonation, especially during conversations about emotionally arousing subjects.
It is not difficult to see that this increased restlessness, motor expressiveness, and looseness suggest the motor portrait of an irrational. As we know, rationals, by contrast, are more characteristically unexpressive, muscularly constrained, sedentary, and well coordinated in their movements, especially in fine details, with even, segmented speech impoverished in intonation. It is well known that an extreme rational both sits and walks like an automaton. In contrast, an extreme irrational, even an SLE, does not have a fully military posture (an LSI has a better one), more often bumps into objects while walking, tends to have less legible handwriting, and, at a comparable level of Ethics, more often displays excited intonations in speech. We did not examine clusters of these behavioral characteristics, but they are well known to socionists. In any case, according to our data, the primary trait of inclination toward “fine” work based on small movements, small details, and nuances is determined by membership in the rational pole by 17%; and handwriting legibility is determined by rationality by 29%.
Already in the opinion of N. Traugott and colleagues (1968), the increased need for expressive motor activity in their cited experiment was caused by an obligatory concomitant increase in activity of the basal nuclei of the striopallidal system accompanying stimulated activity of the nonspecific thalamus. Subsequently, this point of view was repeatedly confirmed experimentally and today is regarded as generally accepted.
From the standpoint of purely psychological models (model “A” or model “T”), the motor differences between irrationals and rationals cannot be explained without obvious forcing.
In addition to perseverance in sedentary work, rationals are also characterized by industriousness oriented toward an ultimate goal. In particular, they have a higher level of so-called “competence,” characterizing an inclination toward repeated practice and repetition until mastery in an activity is achieved. This characteristic should be explained from the standpoint of the prefrontal cortex, which is more functionally active in rationals and which, according to A. R. Luria, is precisely responsible for the corresponding inclinations and abilities.
Excessive evaluative activity (Table 4) {#раздел23}
Rationals are characterized by an increased, sometimes excessive, need for constant evaluation of results and summing up. They are distinguished by a tendency toward obsessive doubts and compulsive rechecking of what has been done. They also often become “bogged down” in collecting and analyzing excessively detailed information about a situation, clearly preferring the stage of analysis and evaluation to the subsequent stage of direct motor activity (“measure seven times, cut once” – that is about them). Rationals are intolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity; at any stage of work they strive to obtain the most detailed possible evaluation of the situation. They are often inclined toward excessive mental rumination “around the goal,” overorganize work, which can reduce its effectiveness in attaining the ultimate goal, especially if a team contains many irrationals, whom this style of activity paralyzes.
What can explain these characteristics?
In this case, psychological explanations are entirely suitable, reinforced by the conclusions of the physiological model regarding greater inertia of all mental processes in rationals. Indeed, the key word is already contained in the section title: excessive evaluative activity. In psychological language, the cause of excessive “mental rumination” is the evaluative (judging) program functions; in physiological language - the tonically excited divisions of the frontal cortex responsible for carrying out logical and emotional evaluations, - all of them in any case lead to “excessive evaluative activity.”
Dependence or independence from others’ opinions (Table 3) {#раздел24}
Irrationals depend little on opinions; rationals sometimes find themselves captive to them, because for an irrational opinions, evaluations, and judgments are merely an instrument, whereas for a rational an opinion is the center of the coordinate system. Thus, rationals experience much stronger dependence on their group and on the “reference” opinions and judgments prevailing within it. Everything connected with social inclusion and social motives of actions is also represented more fully and strongly in rationals. Not only in charitable activity but also in an unrestrained thirst for power, the social component of motivation is much higher in rationals. The sensing-logical extraverts Napoleon Bonaparte and Peter the Great, in building their empires, were guided primarily by egocentric and pragmatic motives without any ideological aesthetics, but the logical-sensing introverts Ivan the Terrible, Nicholas I, Shchedrin’s Ugryum-Burcheev, and Joseph Stalin, even in executioner-like cruelty and the implantation of spying, invariably sought a social ideal, finding it, by virtue of their rational logical-sensing character, in an unbending vertical of power and a social barracks.
For rationals, the fact of approval or disapproval of their actions by a reference group is always important; for this reason they devote much attention to evaluating whether their own behavior, the behavior of acquaintances, and simply the behavior of those around them is “correct” or incorrect. Moreover, the “correctness” of behavior is evaluated not as its effectiveness, but as conformity to accepted normative rules. Hence the adherence to collectivist discipline, the standard “correctness” of external social behavior and expressed judgments, their conformity to stereotypes of public and group opinion, and the emphasized attention to observance of conventional norms of behavior by others. Hence, too, rationals have on average a greater inclination toward moralism, fidelity to one’s word, patronage, and reliability (compared with the combined group of irrationals). The example given of the rational Ivan the Terrible should not confuse us, - although he publicly tested new poisons on the young children of his closest boyars, and although without cause he waged a drunken bloody war against his own Novgorodian subjects. After the fugitive Kurbsky, from Lithuania, accused the tsar of tyranny and devil worship, Ivan the Terrible nevertheless did not spare himself the effort or disdain to write the traitor an even longer multi-page reply in which he diligently justified and exonerated himself on the basis of the Bible – before himself, before Kurbsky, and before history. It is unlikely that an irrational in his place, the no lesser executioner Peter the Great, who likewise killed his own son and destroyed more than 30% of the country’s population, or another SLE – Paul I, would have stooped to hypocritically bashful self-justifications in response to accusations thrown at them.
For the same reason, a rationality scale in questionnaires usually correlates to one degree or another with control scales of lying or social dissimulation, which indicate a tendency among respondents to present themselves in a better light from the standpoint of generally accepted social norms.
Responsibility and competence (Table 9) {#раздел25}
The activity style of rationals as a whole is characterized by higher indices of responsibility, respect for accepted obligations, discipline, competence, diligence, thoroughness, accuracy, and depth of elaboration. The explanation is evidently that rationals are, first, more inert; second, more inclined toward any evaluative activity and therefore weigh things longer and study the subject more deeply; third, again because of increased attention to labels and evaluations, they attach greater importance than irrationals to fulfillment of obligations and to their social reputation. From the physiological standpoint, the cause lies in increased functional activity of the frontal cortex (prefrontal and limbic). Part of the explanation also lies in the fact that rationals are more characterized by fear – because of activation of the amygdala and insular cortex. And fear often acts as an additional stimulus for thoroughness and discipline.
Improvisation or deliberate preparation (Table 5) {#раздел26}
In their affairs, irrationals rely on improvisation without prolonged preliminary preparation. In particular, they sit down with textbooks only a day or two before an examination, almost never write complete texts or even detailed outlines of talks they are to give, and rarely buy train and airplane tickets in advance. The rhythm of life of irrationals is uneven and irregular and is not planned in advance. In both work and free time, it is always alternately crowded and empty – depending on mood and current circumstances, and irrationals feel no desire to bring any order to their lives. This is precisely the style that suits them and in which they can best realize their positive potential. They are always prepared for unexpected events, open to chance, and count on improvisation and on their success precisely under crisis, critical conditions with many influencing factors and a shortage of time, when high mobility of mental processes becomes the principal factor of success.
For rationals everything is different; they are simply physiologically incapable of achieving goals in this way because of their greater inertia. Their strong suit is planning, predictability, systematicity, rhythmicity, and doing things in advance.
From the standpoint of both the psychological and physiological explanations of the rationality-irrationality trait, there is nothing unexpected in these differences. Rationals acquire the characteristics that distinguish them from irrationals through constant tonic and inert activation of the neocortex, which produces the program character of their judging-evaluative functions. In turn, their uninhibited program judging functions then support the process of planning and a specific kind of looking into the future – unlike Intuition, carried out not from the standpoint of interest and curiosity but from the standpoint of a current goal that has been set. And the prefrontal cortex knows how to plan the path toward this goal far into the future. On the other hand, the tonic character of cortical activation in rationals makes them poorly adapted to working in short “bursts” with brief energetic mobilization of all resources, leaving systematic regular work as much more convenient for them and even as the only possible form. Severe stress overload under time pressure, especially when it requires frequent switching of attention, provokes absent-mindedness, confusion, and inhibition in rationals.
In contrast, irrationals are under the influence of phasic activation from the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus, are not afraid of intense stimulating inputs, are little characterized by fears, and for all these reasons no stress overload is frightening to them. The ascending activating influence from the nonspecific thalamus on the cerebral cortex is implemented by short powerful impulses and can reorganize the mosaic pattern of cortical activity very rapidly. But with such an activation system irrationals, conversely, are extremely intolerant of monotony, because any regular rhythm of activity quickly provokes drowsy inhibition in them (characteristically, drugs that stimulate the thalamic brain-activation system are simultaneously mild hypnotics). To keep their brain in an optimally excited state, irrationals need constantly to stimulate themselves with new powerful impulses, to “shake themselves up,” “so that the jelly does not turn into aspic.” Hence their love of irregularity, unexpected events, new impressions, and so forth. Hence also their high success under conditions of activity that place high demands on improvisation and mobility.
Planning, consistency, predictability, pedantry, and striving for completion (Table 12) {#раздел27}
Within this group of clusters, irrationals are characterized by:
inconsistency;
lack of inclination toward prospective temporal planning of activity;
impulsivity (in the sense of rapid and insufficiently weighed responses);
a “ragged” and irregular rhythm of activity with frequently changing pace and changing levels of interest, activity, and effectiveness;
incompleteness, things left unsaid and unfinished, fragmentariness, contradictoriness, “abruptness,” improvisation, and jumps of thought;
unpredictability and unexpectedness of behavior and actions (not only for others, but often for the individual as well);
actions “contrary” to logic, pseudo-alogicality and pseudo-inconsistency caused by playing at doing things “deliberately” and by detachment of the value system from practical tasks and from what is “generally accepted”;
absence or weakness of anticipatory planning of short actions and verbal utterances that are begun – sometimes, when beginning to speak, the individual does not yet know where a series of phrases will lead or how it will end;
rejection of rules and regulations that order life;
“floating attention” distributed among many objects;
“floating attention” easily distracted by suddenly arising secondary associations (as a tendency, only in intuitive types);
distractibility and fussiness (as a tendency);
difficulty concentrating thoughts on a single object for a long time (as a tendency).
Rationals are characterized by:
an inclination toward prospective temporal planning of activity;
consistency;
a stable, regular, and “unbroken” rhythm of activity, - with much more orderly organization than impulsivity;
personal predictability in actions and a striving for predictability and definiteness in the surrounding environment, adherence to role rules (role, obligations, fidelity to expectations, fidelity to fate);
anticipatory planning of verbal utterances and short actions undertaken (at the moment an utterance or action begins, a more or less conscious plan for it is already present, including the goal, final stages, and principal intermediate stages);
pedantry (everything has its place and time; departures from order, regulations, and discipline are impermissible);
the principle that in a game or search one must go all the way to the end (striving for completion);
ability to concentrate a narrow focus of attention on one object (as a tendency);
practical meticulousness and pedantry as an everyday lifestyle (as a tendency);
a narrow local focus of attention (as a tendency);
despotism (as a tendency).
The entire complex of properties listed is easily explained in two ways: first, by the physiological factor of the balance between the thalamic and mesencephalic subcortical activation centers, which, together with characteristics of the functional activity of the prefrontal cortex, produces greater psychological mobility and less weighing of actions (impulsivity) in irrationals. Second, already at the psychological level, the explanation lies in the character of the judging functions – in rationals they are more inert and inclined toward constant anticipatory evaluation and therefore toward planning.
Attitude toward the future (Table 10) {#раздел28}
Irrationals rarely think about the future from the standpoint of their current needs; even their forecasts and anticipations (in intuitive types) have the character of an intellectual game rather than something practical. In contrast, rationals often think about the future precisely from the standpoint of their dominant desires and needs and plan their next day and more distant future. Even apart from direct planning, rationals are much more constant in their goal-directedness, have a stable hierarchy of “long-lasting” needs, desires, and aspirations oriented toward a rational, prospectively directed “must,” rather than toward current pleasure. The explanation lies in the different levels of functional activation of the prefrontal cortex, which are higher in rationals. That the prefrontal cortex supports planning, the orientation of plans toward the future, and maintenance of the goal of activity against which all plans are continually measured was demonstrated already in the works of A. R. Luria (Luria, 1982; Khomskaya, 2003).
Defensive reactions (anxiety, tension, worry, vulnerability, self-criticism, an orientation toward avoiding failure as the first priority) (Table 8) {#раздел29}
This important group of properties is rarely used in diagnosis of rationality-irrationality; however, the typicality of strengthened defensive reactions for the pole of socionic rationals leaves no doubt. In particular, rationals are more characterized by vulnerability and sensitivity to criticism, expectation of unpleasant events, self-criticism, increased emotional reactivity under neuropsychological tension (including at the level of accompanying physiological manifestations – increased heart rate and GSR), obsessive fears, prolonged worry, anxious apprehensions, doubts and vacillation, a tendency toward “winding themselves up,” frequent feelings of internal tension, and increased background muscle tone. They are also characterized by anankastic tendencies: suspiciousness, a tendency to become “stuck” on doubts and repeated checking. Another trait of rationals is caution and foresight (not in the socionic but in the ordinary meaning of this term). In particular, rationals prefer reliable options to risky ones – avoiding failure is preferable to them over a large but improbable gain. In psychology, this characteristic is called an orientation toward avoiding failure (as opposed to an orientation toward achieving success).
Irrationals display the opposite properties. In particular, they tend to be more cheerful and carefree, are not very anxious, have relaxed background muscle tone (with an instantaneous capacity for mobilization), and rate the speed of their thought processes highly.
The greater predisposition of rationals toward defensive reactions is difficult to explain with purely psychological models, including socionic models “T” or “A.” By contrast, invoking a physiological explanation fully solves the problem. Support of defensive reactions is a characteristic feature of the tonic ascending effect of the posterior hypothalamus and the brainstem portion of the reticular formation. When the structures of the posterior hypothalamus and brainstem reticular formation are suppressed, background muscle tone in the form of “tenseness” relaxes and active-defensive tendencies in the form of affects of anger, rage, and malice are substantially softened, while passive-defensive emotional states – feelings of fear, anxiety, worry, tension – disappear completely. Additional stimulation of the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus (that is, an even greater shift of the balance toward the thalamic activating center) produces a marked rise in positive emotions – mood becomes colored by good-naturedness, carefreeness, and a feeling of sympathy toward others, with a shade of some self-satisfaction and self-confidence (Traugott et al., 1968). These differences fully coincide with the profile of properties of rationals and irrationals according to Table 8.
The specific structures of the rational modulation center that directly support defensive reactions here are the amygdala, posterior hypothalamus, and insular cortex. The opposite carefree euphoria within the competing irrational modulating center is supported not only by inhibition of the listed structures, but also by specific excitation of the nucleus accumbens and a number of other dopaminergic nuclei of the basal ganglia of the striopallidal system.
Memory characteristics (Table 11) {#раздел30}
According to the clusters in the table, rationals cope better with transferring current events into long-term memory, but their short-term memory leaves much to be desired. In irrationals everything is the reverse: they have good short-term memory with a large capacity, but voluntary long-term memorization is more difficult for them than for rationals.
These characteristics can be explained at both the psychological and physiological levels. At the psychological level, short-term “working” memory is more closely associated with perceiving rather than judging functions and is therefore better represented in irrationals. Transfer into long-term memory, by contrast, requires corresponding recoding, which is provided by processes of analysis and evaluation, assigning information certain need-motivational meanings, and linking events to emotional and logical anchors; this is provided by the judging functions and is carried out predominantly in the prefrontal cortex.
At the physiological level, it has been shown empirically that increasing the thalamic component of activation (for example, by pharmacologically stimulating it with barbamyl) leads to improvement of short-term memory and deterioration of long-term memorization (by a factor of two to three). Conversely, stimulation of the mesencephalic activation division with Tofranil improves long-term memory (Traugott et al., 1968). The mechanism of these characteristics is that emotional memory (instantaneous encoding) is primarily the responsibility of the amygdala; analytical memory (searching within memory for analogues containing a given small, specific element of the situation) is the responsibility of the hippocampus; and the process of long-term memorization itself is based in the frontal neocortex. All of these structures belong to the rational pole of modulation. For short-term memory, structures of the thalamus and posterior cortical regions directly responsible for perceptual functions are apparently more important.
The noted memory characteristics of inert and mobile individuals (that is, rationals and irrationals) were observed not only in our experiment, but have also been confirmed in many studies. Let us cite, for example, some facts from Golubeva’s review (1980):
- Inert individuals (according to life indicators or a longer reaction delay in time) pay more attention to preliminary study of the task, more often use advance planning, carry out an action according to a scheme better, and adhere to rules. Mobile individuals orient themselves more toward the immediate course of the work process, responding “according to the situation” (Subkhankulov, 1965).
- Inert individuals, compared with mobile ones, have lower movement rhythms and switch from one action to another less often (Klimov, 1969; Yakubchik, 1965).
- An action is formed more slowly in inert individuals; they learn more slowly (Shchukin, 1966).
- When tested after a month and a half, inert individuals retain skills better (Shadrin, 1966).
- Mobile individuals, compared with inert ones, have better short-term working memory, especially under conditions of information interference (that is, with short interstimulus presentation intervals) (Bocharova, Laktionov, 1972).
It has been established experimentally that a reduction in brain norepinephrine concentration slows learning, causes amnesia, and disrupts retrieval of traces from memory. Disturbances of the brain’s cholinergic system lead to the same negative effect (Maryutina, Kondakov, 2005; Gasanov, Melikov, 1986). To a certain extent, these facts can be compared with the fact that the mesencephalic reticular formation is exclusively noradrenergic in nature, while its further ascending modulating influences on the cerebral cortex are transmitted by a network of monosynaptic cholinergic neurons. Therefore, mediation of long-term memory by the noradrenergic and cholinergic systems in any case does not contradict the connection of long-term memory with the modulating influences of the mesencephalic reticular formation and therefore additionally confirms the connection of the rational pole with dominance of influences from the mesencephalic reticular formation.
Truthfulness (Table 15) {#раздел31}
Rationals tend to be more honest, truthful, and candid (although interindividual variation in truthfulness within TIMs and poles of the trait remains greater than the intergroup differences). Irrationals are more capable of bluffing and are better able to pretend and deceive. These intergroup differences between irrationals and rationals should not be regarded as a consequence of rationals being more spontaneous and uninhibited, with what is on their tongue being the same as what is on their mind. Not at all; everything is exactly the opposite. Rationals are more restrained and control themselves better. They may say nothing, but lying is unpleasant for them. For irrationals, evaluations are merely a game or, at best, an auxiliary function. Truth or falsehood is less principled and less important to them than to rationals because it belongs to the domain of the irrationals’ flexible evaluative function.
We do not yet have a physiological explanation of these differences as a function of rationality-irrationality.
Miscellaneous (Table 16) {#раздел32}
Rationals tend to be more religious. Irrationals have dreams more often, and somnambulism also tends to occur more often among them. On average across the group, irrationals listen to music more often and have better musical hearing than rationals (however, other socionic traits, such as Democracy and Positivism, have an even stronger influence on “musical” properties, and therefore the best musical hearing is found in the rational LII).
Table 1. Total representation of manifestations of all functions belonging to one pole of rationality-irrationality {#раздел33}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | IRRATIONALITY (% associated variance; minus indicates association with the rational pole) | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs in which the cluster is maximally expressed (ranked from the maximum down to 0.7×max) | TIMs in which the cluster is minimally expressed (ranked from the minimum down to 0.7×min) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | pure Intuition + pure Sensing (equal number of items); the cluster represents the total manifestation of all perceiving functions | 122 | 49 | |||
| 2 | pure Logic + pure Ethics (equal number of items); the cluster represents the total manifestation of all judging functions | 120 | -28 |
Table 2. Deactualization of emotional traces and behavioral plans {#раздел34}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | ease of deactualization and repression of thoughts, interests, evaluations, intentions (taken together in emotional and logical modalities) | 31 | 55 | Extraversion 18%, Sensing 8% | SEE, SLE | EIE, EII |
| 4 | problems with deactualization of memory traces, difficulty in timely deactualization of already completed action programs and plans (slow decay with reminiscences) | 16 | -19 | Intuition 65% | EII, EIE | SLE, SEE, SEI |
| 5 | holding grudges and vindictiveness | 20 | -25 | Logic 25%, Resoluteness 19%, Sensing 11%, Process 11% | LSI | IEE, IEI |
| 6 | slow and restrained discharge of emotions, their gradual accumulation to a critical mass, discharge of emotions at once in large “explosive” portions | 2 | -37 | Positivism 12%, Strategy 10% | LIE | IEE |
| 7 | constancy and clear definiteness in evaluations and relations | 10 | -41 | Sensing 33%, Logic 12% | LSI | IEE, ILE, IEI |
| 8 | emotional rigidity (emotional fixation, difficulty with emotional repression) | 25 | -48 | Introversion 22%, Process 16% | LSI, EII | IEE |
| 9 | unpleasant sensations from incompleteness of an action begun | 13 | -53 | Sensing 40% | LSE, ESI, LSI | IEE, ILE, IEI |
| 10 | reflection on the past | 15 | -64 | Introversion 10%, Intuition 7% | EII, EIE | SEE, SLE, IEE |
| 11 | stability of relations, sympathies, and antipathies | 10 | -67 | Sensing 17% | LSI, LIE | IEI, ILE |
| 12 | emotional obsessions, slowness of emotional repression and deactualization | 28 | -78 | Introversion 7% | EIE, ESI, EII | SLE, SEE, ILE, IEE, IEI |
Table 3. Dependence on opinions {#раздел35}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | need for independent intellectual initiative unconstrained from outside | 19 | 14 | Intuition 56% | ILI, ILE, LII | LSE, SLE, LSI |
| 14 | egocentrism | 31 | 11 | Logic 27%, Sensing 21%, Resoluteness 18%, Aristocracy 17% | SLE, LSI, SLI | ESE, EII |
| 15 | personal need for autonomy and independence | 12 | 10 | Intuition 29%, Obstinacy 10%, Introversion 8% | SLI, LIE | SLE, LSE, ESI |
| 16 | social dissimulation (a mandatory control scale in questionnaires measuring the tendency to present oneself in a better light from the standpoint of accepted social norms) | 1000 | -22 | Extraversion 47%, Dynamics 7% | LSE | SEI, ILI |
| 17 | collectivist discipline, adherence to conventional social norms of behavior, inclination toward moralizing, decency, honesty, kindness, and reliability | 31 | -60 | Introversion 15%, Ethics 10% | ESI | ILI, ILE, SLE, SEE |
| 18 | personally averaged-standard “correctness” of external social behavior and expressed judgments, their conformity to stereotypes of public and group opinion, emphasized attention to observance of conventional norms of behavior by others | 49 | -67 | Introversion 17%, Sensing 9% | ESI | ILE, SLE, IEE, ILI, SEE, IEI |
| 19 | social inclusion and interest; dependence on the group and on the public opinion prevailing within it | 25 | -78 | Ethics 9%, Judiciousness 5% | EII, ESE, ESI | ILI, SLE, SLI, SEE |
Table 4. Excessive evaluative activity {#раздел36}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | meticulousness, striving for excessively detailed information about a situation | 2 | -28 | Introversion 57% | LII | IEE, ILE |
| 21 | inclination to recheck what has been done | 12 | -48 | Introversion 15%, Logic 10%, Process 10%, Sensing 5% | LSI, LII | IEE, IEI |
| 22 | intolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity | 17 | -48 | Sensing 32%, Logic 14% | LSI, LSE | IEE, IEI, ILE |
| 23 | need to evaluate results and sum up | 7 | -54 | Logic 15%, Foresight 9% | LSE, LII, LSI, EII | IEE, SEE, IEI |
| 24 | inclination toward mental rumination “around” a goal, impeding its direct attainment | 12 | -64 | Introversion 27% | ESI, EII | SLE, IEE, ILE, SEE |
Table 5. Improvisation or deliberate preparation {#раздел37}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | inclination toward improvisation | 10 | 66 | Intuition 13%, Extraversion 11% | SEE, IEE, ILE | LSI, ESI |
| 26 | advance preparation, planning, regulation, organization, punctuality, predictability, consistency, completion, evenness of rhythm, and regularity (as opposed to spontaneity, improvisation, unpreparedness, lateness, chance and unexpected events, inconsistency, arrhythmicity) | 42 | -58 | Sensing 26%, Logic 8% | LSI, LSE | IEE, ILE, IEI |
| 27 | inclination toward prolonged systematic preparation in advance for important matters | 9 | -66 | Introversion 17% | LSI | IEE, SEE, ILE |
Table 6. Behavioral control {#раздел38}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | removal of cortical (limbic) GABA inhibition from the nucleus accumbens – disinhibition and release of innate instincts | 57 | 37 | Extraversion 36% | EIE, SLE, IEE, SEE | LII, EII, ESI, LSI |
| 28-a | removal of cortical (prefrontal) GABA inhibition from the caudate nucleus - release of motor automatisms, symptoms of chorea, deterioration of voluntariness (spontaneity) of movements | 35 | 25 | Intuition 49% | ILE, IEE, IEI | LSI, ESI |
| 28-b | low self-control | 15 | 19 | Extraversion 44%, Ethics 16%, Intuition 14% | ILE, IEE, EIE | LSI, ESI, LII |
| 29 | restraining control of possible harm to oneself - self-control of behavior and needs (“resolute” rationality) | 13 | -17 | Resoluteness 43%, Sensing 11% | ESI, LSI | IEE |
| 30 | restraining control of actions capable of causing harm to others - reliability, compliant dutifulness, and sense of duty (“judicious” rationality) | 18 | -38 | Judiciousness 41%, Sensing 13% | ESE, LSE, EII | ILI, SEE, IEI |
| 31 | self-restraint and self-control, development of inhibitory processes | 21 | -63 | Introversion 22% | ESI | ILE, SLE, IEE |
Table 7. Control of impulses {#раздел39}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32 | unrestrained, uncontrolled imagination | 5 | 39 | Intuition 43% | IEI, ILI, ILE, IEE | ESI, ESE, LSI |
| 33 | fixation on immediate sensory needs, pleasures, and sensations | 19 | 30 | Sensing 41% | SLI, SEI | LII, LIE |
| 34 | sensory hedonism | 18 | 10 | Sensing 46%, Ethics 13%, Dynamics 13% | SLI, SEI | LII |
| 35 | subordination and controllability of imagination | 5 | -38 | Sensing 52% | ESI, ESE, LSI, LSE | IEI, ILI, ILE, IEE |
| 36 | subordination and restraining controllability of sensory actions, including actions motivated by “biological” needs | 22 | -72 | Introversion 20% | ESI, LII, EII | SEE, SLE |
Table 8. Defensive reactions (anxiety, tension, worry, vulnerability, self-criticism, an orientation toward avoiding failure as the first priority) {#раздел40}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 37 | reduced muscle tone (muscular hypotonia) | 11 | 38 | Ethics 19%, Introversion 17% | SEI | LSE, LII, SLE, LIE, LSI, EIE |
| 38 | self-assessment of intelligence (intellect, speed and accuracy of thought processes) | 5 | 37 | Extraversion 16%, Tactics 10%, Logic 8%, Obstinacy 8% | IEE, SLE, ILI | EII, SEI |
| 39 | cheerfulness, carefreeness, self-confidence, enjoyment | 71 | 25 | Extraversion 39%, Emotivism 11% | SEE, IEE | EII |
| 40 | stooped posture | 1 | 22 | Intuition 26%, Logic 12%, Introversion 12% | ILI | ESI, LSE |
| 41 | wide pupils (mydriasis) | 1 | 19 | Process 25%, Strategy 16% | SEI | LIE, ESE |
| 42 | self-confidence and lack of self-criticism | 25 | 15 | Extraversion 57%, Sensing 18% | SEE, SLE, IEE, ESE | EII |
| 43 | carefreeness | 16 | 15 | Extraversion 62% | ILE, IEE, SEE | LSI, EII, ESI, LII, SLI, ILI |
| 44 | orientation toward conquest and victories rather than defense and security | 34 | 10 | Extraversion 77% | ILE, IEE, SEE, LIE | ILI, LII, ESI, EII |
| 45 | acceptability of situations involving increased neuro-emotional load, including situations provoking personal intervention in them | 19 | 9 | Extraversion 82% | SLE, ILE, IEE | EII, SLI, LII |
| 45-a | inclination toward euphoria (function of the dopaminergic striopallidal system) | 17 | 8 | Extraversion 50%, Ethics 12%, Emotivism 10% | IEE, SEE, ESE | EII, ILI, LII |
| 46 | lack of self-confidence and assertiveness | 2 | -10 | Introversion 50%, Intuition 22% | EII, LII, IEI | SLE |
| 47 | masochism | 5 | -12 | Intuition 33%, Yieldingness 19%, Judiciousness 8% | EII | SEE, ESE |
| 48 | preference for “a bird in the hand” over “two in the bush” | 4 | -13 | Sensing 48%, Introversion 15%, Logic 7% | LSI, LSE, SLI | ILE, IEE, LIE |
| 49 | inclination toward doubt | 12 | -14 | Introversion 32%, Intuition 29%, Ethics 13% | EII, ESI | SLE, SEE, LSE |
| 50 | preference for reliable options (avoiding failure is better than a high-risk gain) | 20 | -15 | Introversion 40%, Sensing 21%, Negativism 8% | LSI, LII | ILE, IEE, LIE |
| 51 | nervous-tension anxiety | 13 | -16 | Introversion 18%, Negativism 13%, Intuition 12% | EII, EIE, LII | SLI, IEE, SEE, ESE |
| 52 | anxious foresight | 12 | -20 | Logic 25%, Introversion 20%, Resoluteness 10%, Negativism 9% | LSI, ILI, LII | IEE, ILE |
| 52-a | sense of danger, avoidance of danger | 20 | -25 | Introversion 19%, Resoluteness 11% | LSI, ESI | ILE, LIE, IEE |
| 53 | inclination toward self-abasement | 5 | -27 | Declatimity 16%, Intuition 10%, Strategy 9% | EII | SEE, IEI |
| 54 | worry, suspiciousness, expectation of trouble, inclination toward obsessive fears, obsessive apprehensions, anxious fussiness, painful indecisiveness, aggressive impatience - overall, defensive reactions (the range of symptoms is apparently associated with excitation of the mesencephalic reticular formation, which has numerous M-cholinergic receptors) | 42 | -31 | Introversion 27%, Constructivism 11%, Intuition 11% | EII | SEE, IEE |
| 55 | emotional reactivity (increased heart rate and/or increased palm sweating in a state of neuropsychological tension) | 2 | -37 | Intuition 13%, Process 13%, Carelessness 9% | EIE, EII | SLE |
| 56 | foresight (a complex of behavioral properties expressing this concept in its ordinary meaning) | 24 | -42 | Introversion 26%, Logic 13%, Negativism 8% | LII, ESI, LSI, ILI | IEE, SEE, ILE, IEI |
| 57 | vulnerability and sensitivity to remarks | 6 | -45 | Ethics 25%, Carelessness 11% | ESI, EIE, EII | SLE, SEE |
| 58 | background muscle tone, muscular tension, tenseness, angularity (as opposed to background muscular relaxation) | 12 | -47 | Logic 20%, Extraversion 14% | LIE, LSE, LII, SLE, EIE, LSI | SEI |
| 59 | preference for reliable options over risky ones (avoiding failure is always better than a large but improbable gain) | 12 | -47 | Introversion 28%, Sensing 16% | LSI, ESI, LII | IEE, ILE |
| 60 | self-criticism | 11 | -50 | Introversion 14%, Ethics 8% | EII | SEE |
| 60-a | susceptibility to emotionally negative stimuli, ability to retain for a long time an unpleasant experience that occurred only once (role of the amygdala, especially the left amygdala) | 43 | -51 | Introversion 10% | EIE, EII, ESI | SLE, SEE |
| 61 | anankastic tendencies, suspiciousness, inclination to become “stuck” on doubts and repeated checking | 10 | -54 | Introversion 28% | EII, LII, ESI | IEE, ILE |
| 62 | defensive reactions, worries, and doubts: inclination to “wind oneself up,” to prolonged emotional distress, reflections, and worries (as opposed to carefree superficiality regarding the future and present and rapid deactualization of everything past) | 23 | -55 | Introversion 22%, Intuition 6%, Constructivism 6% | EII, ESI | SEE, IEE |
| 63 | defensive reactions - vulnerability, increased emotional reactivity, fears, worries, anxious apprehensions, doubts and vacillations, frequent feeling of internal tension | 67 | -66 | Introversion 14%, Intuition 6%, Constructivism 5% | EII, EIE, ESI | SEE, SLE |
Table 9. Responsibility and competence {#раздел41}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 64 | active readiness to assume expanded responsibility | 12 | -11 | Extraversion 40%, Sensing 16%, Logic 15%, Resoluteness 6% | SLE, LSE, LIE | SEI, IEI |
| 65 | attention to one’s personal and social obligations, responsibility and reliability | 8 | -54 | Sensing 26%, Logic 11% | LSI | IEI, IEE, ILE |
| 66 | dutifulness, discipline | 9 | -54 | Sensing 30%, Introversion 9% | ESI, ESE, LSI | ILE, IEI, IEE |
| 67 | competence, diligence, thoroughness, accuracy, depth of elaboration | 15 | -56 | Logic 18%, Sensing 16% | LSI, LSE, LII, ESI | IEI |
Table 10. Attitude toward the future {#раздел42}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 68 | disorientation in current time and dates | 1 | 19 | Intuition 35%, Judiciousness 12%, Aristocracy 11%, Yieldingness 10% | IEI, IEE, EII | LSI, ESI |
| 69 | only the ability to forecast and anticipate (without accounting for other characteristics of one’s relation to time) | 28 | -1 | Intuition 53%, Resoluteness 13% | ILI, EIE, LIE | SLI |
| 70 | good “physical” sense of time (effective handling of time intervals and sequence of events, even predictable flow, effective use) | 6 | -3 | Logic 25%, Emotivism 19%, Introversion 14%, Sensing 9% | LSI | ESE, IEE, EIE |
| 71 | sense of time, forecasts, anticipation, thoughts about the future, emotional coloration of the future - complete set | 79 | -7 | Intuition 54%, Resoluteness 15% | EIE, LIE | SLI |
| 72 | only the emotional coloration of thoughts about the future (emotional apperception of the future) | 11 | -8 | Intuition 27%, Ethics 24%, Extraversion 13%, Resoluteness 8% | EIE | SLI |
| 73 | important place of orientations toward the future in the system of values | 15 | -12 | Extraversion 73% | EIE, LIE, IEE | SLI |
| 74 | only interest in the future | 18 | -18 | Extraversion 37%, Intuition 15%, Resoluteness 10% | LIE, EIE | SLI |
| 75 | sense of time - a particular case of interest only in the future | 21 | -24 | Extraversion 44%, Intuition 8%, Resoluteness 8% | EIE, LIE | SLI |
| 76 | constancy in goal-directedness | 7 | -33 | Sensing 35%, Logic 15% | LSE | IEE |
| 77 | rigid, inflexible hierarchy of “long-lasting” needs, desires, and aspirations oriented toward a rational prospectively directed “must,” rather than current pleasure | 11 | -50 | Sensing 20% | LSI | ILI, IEE, IEI, ILE |
| 78 | interest in the future, frequent thoughts about the future | 11 | -52 | Sensing 24%, Extraversion 11% | LIE, EIE | SLI, SEI |
Table 11. Memory {#раздел43}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 79 | effectiveness of voluntary short-term memory | 4 | 37 | Extraversion 24%, Obstinacy 10% | SEE, SLE, ILI | EII, LSI |
| 80 | effectiveness of retrieval from long-term memory (excluding verbal memory for words and names) | 6 | 23 | Dynamics 12%, Result 12%, Ethics 10%, Foresight 9% | IEI | LSI, ESI |
| 81 | one component of memory deterioration - memory gaps for recent events | 11 | 20 | Intuition 48%, Ethics 17% | IEE, IEI | ESI, LSE, ESE |
| 82 | verbal memory - deterioration of memory for object names and needed words (reduction in memory-retrieval processes) | 9 | 1 | Ethics 38%, Intuition 37%, Positivism 11% | EII, IEI | LSE |
| 83 | effectiveness of involuntary transfer of current events into long-term memory (involuntary memorization) | 15 | -48 | Sensing 32% | ESI | IEE, IEI |
Table 12. Planning, consistency, predictability, completion, and pedantry {#раздел44}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 84 | inconsistency | 10 | 50 | Intuition 27%, Ethics 11% | IEE, ILE | LSI |
| 85 | impulsivity | 31 | 50 | Extraversion 32%, Intuition 10%, Ethics 7% | ILE, IEE, SEE | LSI, ESI, LII |
| 86 | incompleteness, things left unsaid and unfinished, fragmentariness, inconsistency, “abruptness,” improvisation, jumps of thought | 49 | 40 | Intuition 44%, Ethics 8% | IEE, ILE, IEI | LSI, LSE |
| 87 | floating attention | 17 | 38 | Extraversion 26%, Ethics 21%, Intuition 10% | IEE, ILE | LSI, LII |
| 88 | actions “contrary” to logic, pseudo-alogicality and pseudo-inconsistency caused by detachment of the value system from practical tasks and from what is “generally accepted” | 10 | 34 | Intuition 59% | IEE, IEI, ILE, ILI | LSI, ESI |
| 89 | rejection of rules and regulations that order life | 10 | 33 | Intuition 36%, Ethics 9% | IEE, ILI | LSI, LSE |
| 90 | distractibility and fussiness | 14 | 18 | Intuition 39%, Ethics 20%, Extraversion 11% | IEE, ILE | LSI |
| 91 | “floating attention,” distracted by suddenly arising secondary associations | 4 | 17 | Intuition 51%, Ethics 13%, Carelessness 10% | ILE, IEE, IEI | LSE, LSI, SLE |
| 92 | difficulty concentrating thoughts on one object for a long time | 23 | 12 | Ethics 42%, Intuition 21%, Carelessness 6% | SEI, EII, IEE, IEI, EIE | LSE, SLE, LSI |
| 93 | despotism | 9 | -11 | Extraversion 28%, Sensing 27%, Resoluteness 24% | SLE, LSI, LSE | SEI, IEI, EII |
| 94 | narrow local focus of attention | 13 | -14 | Introversion 38%, Judiciousness 22%, Logic 12% | LII, SLI | SEE, IEE |
| 95 | practical meticulousness and pedantry as an everyday lifestyle | 14 | -18 | Sensing 72% | LSE, LSI, ESI | ILE, IEE |
| 96 | ability to concentrate a narrow focus of attention on one object | 11 | -19 | Logic 39%, Sensing 19%, Merriness 9% | LSI, LII | IEE |
| 97 | in a game or search one must go all the way to the end (striving for consistency and completion) | 14 | -25 | Sensing 62% | LSI, LSE, ESE | IEE, IEI, ILE |
| 98 | pedantry (everything has its place and time; departures from order, regulations, and discipline are impermissible) | 10 | -46 | Sensing 24%, Introversion 11% | LSI, ESI | IEE |
| 99 | anticipatory planning of verbal utterances and short actions undertaken (at the moment the utterance or action begins, a more or less conscious plan is already present, including the goal, final stages, and principal intermediate stages) | 7 | -48 | Sensing 27%, Introversion 14% | LSI, ESI | ILE, IEI, IEE |
| 100 | personal predictability and striving for predictability and definiteness in the environment, adherence to role rules (role, obligations, fidelity to expectations, fidelity to fate) | 31 | -65 | Sensing 18%, Logic 10% | LSI, LSE | IEE, ILE, IEI, SEE |
| 101 | stable, regular, “unbroken” rhythm of activity, containing much more orderly organization than “bursts” and impulsivity | 25 | -68 | Sensing 18%, Introversion 6%, Logic 4% | LSI, ESI, LSE | ILE, IEE |
| 102 | inclination toward long-term temporal planning of activity | 20 | -68 | Sensing 13%, Logic 8% | LSI | IEE, SEI, ILE, IEI |
Table 13. Psychological Mobility {#раздел45}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 103 | “flight of ideas” - rapid succession of thoughts and images | 2 | 26 | Ethics 38%, Intuition 20% | IEE, SEE | LSI, LSE, SLE |
| 104 | ability to switch attention rapidly | 4 | 19 | Extraversion 41% | SLE | LII, LSI, ILI, EII |
| 105 | learning ability | 4 | 16 | Extraversion 56% | IEE, SEE, ILE | LSI |
| 106 | ability to perceive and simultaneously hold several objects in the field of attention | 15 | 10 | Extraversion 48%, Ethics 23% | SEE, IEE | LII |
| 107 | failures when pronouncing tongue twisters and phonetically difficult words | 6 | -11 | Introversion 41%, Process 23%, Intuition 11% | EII, LSI | SLE |
| 108 | difficulty mobilizing and low response mobility in a stressful situation, poor stress tolerance | 14 | -18 | Introversion 42%, Positivism 29% | EII, LSI | SLE, IEE |
| 109 | intolerance of arousing and intense sensory-emotional stimuli, including those associated with rapid sensory and motor switching, tension, surprises, haste, and risk | 60 | -30 | Introversion 58%, Positivism 5% | EII, ESI, LSI | SLE, IEE, ILE |
| 110 | rigidity, inertia, nonimpulsivity, conservatism, low plasticity and mobility, including “viscosity” of thought | 51 | -40 | Introversion 44%, Sensing 8%, Logic 6% | LSI, LII, ESI | IEE, ILE, SEE |
| 111 | reduced mobility, viscosity of thought, difficulties in switching and distributing attention, intolerance of rapid shifts and changes, inflexibility, uncompromisingness | 38 | -61 | Introversion 29% | LSI, ESI, EII, LII | IEE, ILE |
Table 14. Need for New and Varied Sensations and Nonconservatism {#раздел46}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 112 | need for fresh and new impressions | 17 | 62 | Extraversion 18%, Intuition 8%, Ethics 6% | IEE, ILE, SEE | LSI, LSE |
| 113 | striving for arousing sensations, intolerance of quiet and absence of conflict | 17 | 54 | Extraversion 31% | SEE, IEE, ILE | ESI, EII, LSI |
| 114 | rapid exhaustion of attention from doing the same thing, need for frequent distractions | 21 | 43 | Intuition 24%, Ethics 20% | IEE | LSI, LSE |
| 115 | rapid informational satiation, striving for new impressions and stimuli by moving from place to place | 7 | 35 | Extraversion 44%, Ethics 8% | IEE, SEE | LSI, LII |
| 116 | rapid satiation with sensory stimuli | 4 | 28 | Extraversion 35%, Ethics 13% | IEE, SEE | SLI, LSI, LSE |
| 117 | ignoring what is familiar, habitual, and known; preference for the new | 13 | 25 | Intuition 51%, Extraversion 21% | ILE, IEE | LSI, ESI |
| 118 | nonconservatism, striving for variety and exciting risk, intolerance of quiet, scarcity of events, and stimuli | 124 | 22 | Extraversion 69% | IEE, SEE, ILE | LSI, EII |
| 119 | perceptiveness to the unusual in the ordinary | 7 | 16 | Intuition 58%, Ethics 8% | IEI | LSI, LSE, ESI |
| 120 | need for external sensory stimuli for better mental concentration | 3 | 11 | Intuition 28%, Extraversion 27%, Statics 15% | IEE | SEI, SLI |
| 121 | flair for the new, unusual, and magical, constant search for them, positive emotions upon discovery | 27 | 10 | Intuition 80% | IEI, IEE, ILE | ESI, LSE, LSI |
| 122 | lack of interest in object manipulations and routine procedures | 7 | 10 | Intuition 72% | ILI, EIE, ILE | LSE, ESI, LSI |
| 123 | seeing differences before similarities between objects | 4 | 9 | Ethics 30%, Sensing 19%, Constructivism 16%, Judiciousness 12% | SEI, ESE, SLI | LIE, LII, LSI |
| 124 | sensation of something never seen and unrecognized, novelty detectors | 17 | 9 | Intuition 33%, Ethics 33% | IEI | LSI, LSE |
| 125 | preference for the tried-and-tested over the new | 19 | -16 | Sensing 73% | ESI, LSI | ILE |
| 126 | tolerance of monotonous activities | 9 | -25 | Introversion 32%, Aristocracy 17% | LSI | SEE |
| 127 | constant feeling that everything around is familiar, habitual, and monotonous | 6 | -27 | Logic 23%, Seriousness 13%, Sensing 9% | LSE | SEI, IEE |
| 128 | preference for the habitual over the new | 12 | -41 | Sensing 26%, Introversion 23% | LSI, LSE, ESI | IEE, ILE |
| 129 | preference for quiet and rest, intolerance of intense sensory stimulation | 18 | -45 | Introversion 33% | EII, SLI | SEE, IEE |
| 130 | conservatism of views, ideas, and structures, “stability is better and more valuable than change”; attraction to “preserved,” temporally invariant logical and logical-hierarchical structures | 18 | -48 | Sensing 20%, Logic 13% | LSI, LSE | IEE, SEE |
| 131 | conservatism of habits | 23 | -51 | Sensing 25%, Introversion 12% | LSI, LSE | IEE, ILE |
| 132 | good tolerance of monotony, liking for monotonous and routine activities | 9 | -52 | Introversion 29% | LSI, LII | SEE |
Table 15. Truthfulness {#раздел47}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 133 | ability to bluff, ability to pretend | 8 | 37 | Extraversion 28%, Ethics 14% | SEE, IEE | LII |
| 134 | inclination to be spiteful and capricious and to engage in small covert provocations | 8 | 28 | Resoluteness 29%, Merriness 13% | IEI | ESI, EII, ESE, SLI |
| 135 | fibbing, self-serving lying, trickery | 22 | 20 | Extraversion 24%, Sensing 11%, Aristocracy 9% | LSE, SEE, SLE | EII, LII, LIE |
| 136 | disregard for social truth and openness | 20 | 14 | Aristocracy 33%, Sensing 20%, Logic 13% | SLE | LII, LIE, ESI, EIE |
| 137 | personal truthfulness | 8 | -17 | Introversion 62% | LII, EII, ESI | SLE, EIE, SEE, IEE |
| 138 | frankness, openness | 11 | -21 | Extraversion 26%, Judiciousness 17%, Democracy 14% | ESE | ILI, IEI |
Table 16. Miscellaneous {#раздел48}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 139 | musical ear | 4 | 20 | Democracy 31%, Merriness 10% | LII, SEE | LSE, EII |
| 140 | somnambulism | 1 | 20 | Statics 22% | SEE | LIE, SEI |
| 140-a | mydriasis (inclination toward pupil-dilation reactions) | 1 | 18 | Process 26%, Strategy 14% | SEI | LIE, ESE, LSE |
| 141 | frequency of dreams | 9 | 16 | Intuition 46%, Ethics 19% | IEI | LSI |
| 142 | liking for listening to music | 3 | 16 | Positivism 20%, Extraversion 18%, Intuition 16% | SEE, ESE, IEI, EIE, ILE | ESI, LSE |
| 142-a | repetitive stereotyped movements | 4 | 2 | Intuition 42% | ILE, IEI, IEE, EII | SEI, LIE, SLE |
| 142-b | difficulty remembering and repeating a long series of words just heard - dysfunction of the T2 zone of the left hemisphere - temporal convexital region, pathological retroactive and proactive inhibition of traces) | 1 | -18 | Carelessness 22%, Ethics 14% | SEI, EII, LSI | SLE, SEE, SLI |
| 143 | religiosity | 5 | -21 | Introversion 20%, Yieldingness 10%, Sensing 10% | ESI | SEE, ILE |
Table 17. Avoidance of Activity or Industriousness {#раздел49}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 144 | avoidance of activity, accompanied by preference for simple muscular exertion irrespective of its usefulness | 14 | 67 | Intuition 21% | ILI, IEE | ESE, LSE |
| 145 | reduced industriousness and work initiative directed toward transforming objects (physical and mental labor combined) | 7 | 13 | Intuition 27%, Ethics 16%, Resoluteness 10% | EIE, ILI, SEE | SLI |
| 146 | physical work capacity, motivation for physical work | 5 | 12 | Sensing 27%, Yieldingness 13%, Logic 10% | SLI | EIE |
| 147 | work capacity and industriousness | 30 | -35 | Sensing 36%, Extraversion 12%, Logic 9% | LSE | IEI, ILI |
Table 18. Emotional Depth {#раздел50}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 148 | conflictual choice between Logic and Ethics - in favor of Logic | 2 | 21 | Logic 23%, Sensing 12%, Constructivism 9% | SLE | LII, ESI |
| 149 | emotional instability, lability | 4 | 17 | Extraversion 27%, Ethics 19%, Constructivism 12% | EIE | LII, LSI, LIE |
| 150 | emotional flattening and indifference | 8 | 16 | Introversion 30%, Logic 17%, Constructivism 12%, Intuition 11% | ILI | ESE, LSE, IEE, EIE |
| 151 | superficiality of emotions | 1 | 11 | Logic 62% | SLI, ILE, LII, LSI | EIE |
Table 19. Ethical Moralizing {#раздел51}
| No. | Cluster content | Number of primary traits in cluster | Irrationality | Highest-weight projections onto other socionic traits | TIMs with maximum expression | TIMs with minimum expression |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 152 | striving for moral ideals | 8 | -37 | Introversion 41% | ESI, EII | SEE |
| 153 | firm social morality | 18 | -45 | Judiciousness 26%, Introversion 18% | EII | SEE, SLE |
| 154 | inclination toward uncompromising ethical moralizing (as opposed to the general lack of interest in moralizing and flexible, entirely situation-dependent morality among Irrationals) | 19 | -67 | Introversion 9% | ESI | SLE, ILI |
Pharmacological Model of Irrationality {#раздел52}
A pharmacological model very close to the ideal of a stimulated thalamic system of ascending influences on the cerebral cortex is the action of sodium amytal (barbamyl) (Traugott et al., 1968). Let us examine this experimental model in detail, since it illustrates very well the effects of pharmacologically induced irrationality, which are highly similar to the properties of irrationals in the population.
After administration of the drug, the principal effects observed are euphorizing and disinhibiting. Motor activity is noticeably enlivened; ceremoniousness and restraint disappear. Movements and postures, contacts and topics of conversation become unconstrained and even uninhibited. Speech activity increases considerably. The voice becomes resonant; speech becomes more verbose, rich in associations, jokes, humorous sayings, and proverbs. The richness of intonational modulation increases, up to exaggerated expressiveness. Facial expressiveness increases sharply. The affective coloring of behavior also changes sharply: wariness, concern, unfriendliness, and indifference disappear. Mood becomes elevated, with a shade of carefree cheerfulness, sympathy toward everything around, and good-natured self-satisfaction. There is no influx of energy or thirst for practical activity; on the contrary, against the background of increased sociability and talkativeness, laziness and inactivity increase (the sense of the goal of activity disappears or weakens, which is associated with functional weakening - inhibition - of the prefrontal cortex). There is a weak hypnotic effect, which, however, manifests only in the absence of intense external stimuli. In order to maintain wakefulness at a sufficiently high level, patients seem to strive constantly for strong and intense stimuli, and their presence indeed guarantees a sufficiently high level of wakefulness. Even when patients feel drowsy (which does not always occur), they nevertheless talk and move a great deal and animatedly between brief periods of dozing. Muscular blocks are relieved and muscle tone normalizes. For the duration of the drug’s action, anxiety, fears, and dysphoric-tense states are completely eliminated. Along with intensified “pleasant talkativeness,” control over verbal utterances decreases (barriers to information usually concealed are lowered, while utterances become more impulsive - a word often flies out before the person has time to think) (Traugott et al., 1968).
Unconditioned autonomic reflexes (respiratory and vascular) weaken, although facial responding to external stimuli increases. Physiological components of defensive reactions decrease (for example, in response to electrocutaneous stimulation). In some cases, however, autonomic and motor defensive reactions even increase - against the unchanged background of a sharp reduction in subjective sensations of tension, fear, anxiety, and other emotional components of defensive reactions.
Within conditioned-reflex activity, previously established discriminations deteriorate, that is, the selectivity of conditioned responses deteriorates. Conditioned responses become broadly generalized and arise in response to signals that differ greatly from the standard conditioned stimulus (for example, a sound with a substantially different pitch). Flight of imagination is facilitated and the breadth of associative coverage increases. Inhibitory conditioned reflexes are disrupted (a conditioned inhibitor may turn into a positive stimulus). Delayed conditioned reflexes are also disrupted (their inactive phase shortens or disappears altogether) (Traugott et al., 1968). Overall, the entire observed complex of phenomena fits well within the concept of sharply increased impulsivity.
The formation of conditioned reflexes and short-term memory are not impaired. Short-term memory even improves - a presented series of words is memorized more rapidly and completely. Long-term memory, however, clearly suffers, which becomes apparent when conditioned responses are tested several hours after the drug’s action has ended. Connections with motor responses are especially unstable in long-term memory (Traugott et al., 1968).
Autonomic responses to subsensory stimuli (stimuli whose intensity lies just below the threshold of perception) are suppressed. Absolute hearing thresholds do not change, but only for sounds longer than 50 ms. For shorter sounds (from 2 to 50 ms), absolute thresholds rise sharply. Differential thresholds increase noticeably for very weak sounds (10 dB above threshold) and very strong sounds (70-90 dB above threshold). At medium intensities, differential intensity thresholds do not change. The rise of differential thresholds in the ranges of low and high signal intensities should be interpreted as an elongation of the plateau with a shallow slope of the response curve in the region of weak and strong signals; this simultaneously corresponds to a steeper slope of the response curve in the region of medium signals (increase in ХНК-2, transition of sensory analyzers into a mode of a “stronger” nervous system). The increase in indicators of nervous-system strength in sensory analyzers is confirmed by EEG: the energy index of rhythms in the theta and alpha ranges falls sharply, which is traditionally interpreted as a marker of a strong nervous system, and the entrainment of the electroencephalographic rhythm in these ranges by light flashes, characteristic of a “weak” nervous system, disappears (Golubeva, 1980). Differential thresholds for sound frequency rise strongly, especially for extreme low and high frequencies. Speech intelligibility under conditions of speech noise improves sharply, as does tone detection under noise; detection thresholds decrease (Traugott et al., 1968).
Motor activity becomes considerably more animated, the overall number of movements increases, their amplitude grows (up to one and a half times), rich gesticulation and excessive accompanying movements appear. Motor automatisms normally suppressed in adults are disinhibited: patients stretch, scratch themselves, clean their noses with a finger, rub their hands, swing their legs, frequently change posture, adjust their clothes and hair, and so on. Handwriting becomes larger and more careless. The strengthening of expressive motor components occurs through increased activity of the basal nuclei of the striopallidal system, primarily the caudate nucleus of the striatum. The latency of a simple motor response decreases. When the task is to perform chained movements (a conditioned response in the form of a sequential change of finger movements), the movements begin to become confused; they may occur simultaneously, or each subsequent movement may begin before the preceding one has ended. Elevated static muscle tone is relieved; muscular rigidity, if present before administration of the drug, is eliminated or reduced. Aimless movements do not appear under sodium amytal; “kinetic melodies of movements” and action plans are not disrupted, indicating that the centers regulating movements in the premotor cortex remain largely intact (Traugott et al., 1968).
Characteristic spindles of desynchronized activity appear on the EEG, usually associated with activity of the medial thalamus or caudate nucleus. Activity of the hippocampal cortex weakens sharply, and the representation of theta rhythms in the EEG decreases sharply. The response of rhythm entrainment by flickering light in the theta and alpha ranges is strongly suppressed, indicating an increase in the “strength” properties of the nervous system in the visual analyzer (the equivalent of this is an increase in the steepness of the characteristic slope of the response curve).
Stress reactions in the presence of sodium amytal become, as it were, stratified: on the one hand, their neural mechanisms are suppressed (for example, anxiety, worry, tension, tremor, chills, and mydriasis induced by prior administration of adrenaline disappear); at the same time, the humoral mechanisms of stress operate without obstruction (Traugott et al., 1968).
The described syndrome complex produced by sodium amytal, at least in its clinical picture, very clearly appears from the standpoint of socionic traits as a sharp rise in irrationality, accompanied by a more moderate rise in the poles of Ethics, Intuition, Emotivism, Carelessness and, perhaps, slightly, Introversion. To verify that the psychological properties of the irrational pole play the leading role within the syndrome under consideration, it is enough to glance through Tables 1-19. Among the properties of the irrational pole there we find not only impulsivity characteristic of sodium-amytal effects, reduction of behavioral-control functions, reduction of industriousness, increased mobility, and weakening of all defensive reactions, but also such “exotica” as the drug-induced deterioration of long-term memory against a background of preserved or even improved short-term memory indicators.
In the list of properties of the syndrome complex caused by sodium amytal, there is one point unrelated to pure psychology that we can “seize upon” for a decisive test of whether this syndrome corresponds to the characteristics normally observed in irrationals. The point is that, under sodium amytal, within the integral thalamic syndrome complex, the indicator of nervous-system strength with respect to excitation rises sharply, as we have seen. According to experiments by N. N. Traugott and coauthors, this occurs in both the auditory and visual analyzers.
A natural desire therefore arises to test whether the property of nervous-system strength is also a correlate of the corresponding complex of socionic traits in the population, outside a pharmacological experiment (that is, a correlate of irrationality with additions of Ethics, Intuition, Emotivism, Carelessness, and Introversion). We measured nervous-system strength using the original ХНК-2 method in the visual analyzer (without participation of the motor analyzer) in 98 subjects who had completed a socionic diagnostic questionnaire. The assumption was confirmed completely and almost ideally: nervous-system strength in this sample proved positively correlated with Irrationality, Ethics, Intuition, Carelessness, Emotivism, and Introversion, with the largest correlation obtained precisely with Irrationality. The overall correlation coefficient of nervous-system strength (according to the ХНК-2 method we used) with the weighted sum of socionic traits was +0.46. From this experiment one can already make the converse assumption that the socionic profile of the property of nervous-system strength with respect to excitation in the visual analyzer obtained in it (with Irrationality as the leading component) also extends to the action of sodium amytal, that is, to dominance of the thalamic activating system. Consequently, we have grounds to assert, no longer on the basis of the clinical picture of the syndrome alone, that a sharp increase in socionic irrationality is the leading characteristic property of thalamic dominance accompanying the action of sodium amytal.
Several additional important facts for interpretation follow from this experiment.
First, the direction of the “physiologically natural” axis of irrationality proves different from the direction adopted in socionics. The physiological axis of irrationality corresponding to dominance of the thalamic system of ascending subcortical influences appears as socionic irrationality tilted toward Ethics, Intuition, Introversion, Carelessness, and Emotivism. As we shall see in the later section of the article comparing the rationality-irrationality trait in different psychological paradigms, the “physiological” direction of the rationality-irrationality axis proves closer to the direction used in American type theory and the five-factor model of personality. For this reason, however, in type theory the axes of the basic traits cease to be mutually orthogonal, while in the five-factor model preservation of orthogonality is achieved by moving the Ethics axis substantially away from the direction adopted in socionics (one might even say that this axis ceases to be integral and disintegrates into components among other factors).
Second, the very fact of the association between a strong nervous system and the property of irrationality, which at first glance is highly unexpected, is important. It is possible that the so-called “strength” of the nervous system is primarily provided by functionally active thalamic nuclei. It is also possible that it is a consequence of blocking the functional activity of the hippocampus (the easy entrainment of EEG rhythms in the theta-frequency band characteristic of the “weak” is clearly a hippocampal function, since theta rhythms are associated precisely with the hippocampus). Traugott et al. (1968) also conclude that hippocampal activity is blocked within the thalamic syndrome. From this it follows, in particular, that the property of nervous-system strength in the interpretation that differs from Pavlov’s and was given to it by the work of Nebylitsyn’s school has nothing to do with Extraversion, but perhaps has the very simple physiological meaning of a balance between hippocampal and neocortical mechanisms. It is probably not accidental that small children, in whom hippocampal-septal mechanisms still predominate over neocortical ones, have, according to most authors, a weak nervous system.
Separately on the Role of the Cerebral Cortex {#раздел53}
If the brain’s subcortical activation centers (the thalamus and hypothalamus, the reticular formation of the brainstem) regulate cortical activity, then Jung’s mental functions themselves are directly provided by cortical mechanisms. Therefore, another obvious brain structure clearly influencing the external manifestations of rationality and irrationality is the cortex, which, not only because of general or local excitatory and inhibitory influences from regulatory centers but also because of genetic causes, diseases, local lesions, and so forth, can provide the operation of Logic, Ethics, Intuition, and Sensing in very different ways and with different quality.
The upper and lateral regions of the frontal cortex facing the skull are called the convexital regions and, in terms of their neuronal structure, belong entirely to the new cortex, that is, the neocortex. The lower frontal cortical regions facing the eye sockets (basal, orbital) are zones of ancient cortex and belong not to the neocortex but to the limbic brain, closely interacting with its other structures. In general, lesions of the frontal cortex often impair social emotions; lesions of the right frontal lobe sharply impair self-criticism and weaken criticism of one’s own actions and condition. Thus, judging from the symptoms, the rational, judging mental functions suffer first and foremost. In cases of grossly expressed “frontal” symptomatology, disturbances of active consciousness (that is, active participation of consciousness in current mental activity) reach the stage of echopraxia and echolalia, when awareness of current mental activity is replaced by its complete subordination to the external environment (Khomskaya, 2003). Injuries to people in the frontal lobes of the brain show that they often exhibit a peculiar loss of orientation expressed in an inability to construct plans. Sometimes the patient displays apathy, loss of initiative, emotional inhibition, and indifference to sex. Sometimes receptivity to social signals is lost and disinhibition appears in behavior and speech (Maryutina, Kondakov, 2005; Khomskaya, 2003).
Indeed, damage to most regions of the convexital frontal cortex (both left and right) impairs sequential plans of behavior in particular domains, which indicates a predominant connection of most regions of the convexital cortex with the provision of rational functions.
Some twilight-like states of consciousness, characterized by memory gaps for recent events, are correlated with weakening of Sensing and of the judging functions of the rational pole; according to neuropsychology, they are characteristic of left-sided lesions of the neocortex.
With lesions of almost any regions of the frontal cortex, including especially the basal cortex (lower, orbital, associated with neither hearing nor movements and belonging not to the neocortex but to the limbic brain), indicators of planning and voluntariness of actions, as well as their conscious control, deteriorate. Accordingly, indicators of impulsivity increase in one form or another. Increased behavioral disinhibition and impulsivity, as well as disinhibition of biological drives - food, sex - are especially typical of lesions of the basal frontal cortical regions (facing the base of the skull), which are associated with the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus and the hypothalamic region (Khomskaya, 2003; Luria, 1982). Thus, not only the frontal neocortex (new cortex), but also the frontal cortical regions of the limbic brain are involved in providing rational functions.
Perhaps the only more or less probable exception in the frontal cortex to the rule of preferential provision of rational functions is the left premotor cortex, damage to which does not lead to a distinct behavioral shift toward the irrational pole. Patients with left premotor lesions are characterized by phenomena of inertia and reduced mobility of mental processes - thus, dysfunctions of the left premotor zone even strengthen some properties of the rational pole. Clusters of reduced mobility of mental processes (Tables 1-19) are correlated (almost equally) with both Introversion and Rationality. It is possible that, in cases of damage to the left premotor zones, increasing inertia observed in conjunction with Introversion can be explained by compensatory strengthening of right-hemisphere frontal cortical activity.
The left premotor cortex is to some extent associated with providing the Sensing functions of the irrational pole. This assumption is partially supported by the fact that dysfunctions of the left frontal premotor neocortical region produce stereotyped movements which, according to cluster 142-a, are associated specifically with deterioration of Sensing functions. It cannot be excluded that the association of the left premotor cortex with Sensing may be one reason why Sensing proves in practice to be correlated with the rational pole: any subcortical regulatory-center activating influences directed toward the neocortex stimulate not only the evaluative, judging, planning, and controlling functions of the prefrontal neocortex but also the Sensing of its premotor zones. There is another important fact indicating an association of the frontal cortex not only with rational functions but also with Sensing. According to E. Khomskaya and K. Skakun (E. D. Khomskaya, K. Skakun, 1985), patients with lesions of the frontal lobes of the brain (especially the left) produce a substantially increased number of rare, improbable word associates in an association experiment. The structure of their semantic space is, as it were, loosened; the selectivity and predetermined nature of semantic connections are reduced relative to the norm. It is evident that one can see a certain parallel between the “loosening of semantic space” occurring simultaneously both in intuitive types (Talanov, March 2007) and in patients with dysfunction of the left frontal lobe. The view that schizotypal symptomatology is associated with dysfunctions of the left frontal cortex is very widespread in the psychiatric literature. In this connection, the correlation of Intuition with clusters of schizotypal symptomatology is also noteworthy (Talanov, March 2007). Functional inhibition of the left prefrontal cortex in intuitive types is also accompanied by a reciprocal increase in activity of the left ventral regions of the caudate nucleus, which probably additionally provides some positive mechanisms of Intuition.
The Sensing function is also closely associated with left-hemisphere regions of the inferior parietal area of the brain, specifically cortical area 40 adjacent to the frontal regions. Its dysfunction produces so-called afferent motor aphasia, that is, difficulties and errors in pronouncing phonetically “difficult” words. According to our data, in psychological questionnaires afferent motor aphasia is clearly correlated with weakening of the Sensing pole. It is possible that adjacent regions of the posterior frontal and anterior parietal cortex associated with Sensing give the activity of the left neocortex as a whole a somewhat sensory coloring, alongside its provision of rational functions (first and foremost Logic).
The temporal cortex is less tied to the provision of rational functions, but in many of its zones it participates in providing irrational functions in specific sensory modalities. Moreover, its zones are involved in providing intuitive mechanisms to the same extent (if not more) as sensory ones. Thus, dysfunction of the T2 zone of the left temporal cortex leads to difficulty retaining what has just been heard in short-term auditory memory; patients have difficulty repeating a series of several words. At the psychological level, according to our data, this dysfunction is correlated with reduced irrationality, while it has no correlation with Intuition or Sensing (the corresponding cluster is not presented in the tables).
Thus, numerous structures belonging both to the cortex and to nonspecific systems of activation and regulation participate in the formation of the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait. The balance of the trait can be influenced at the level of different links in this integral system. Of course, the principal influence on formation of the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait should be exerted by activating influences from nonspecific subcortical modulation systems rather than local “cortical” factors. The variegated picture of cortical factors not directly associated with the influence of subcortical centers can most likely provide nuances and accents, perhaps constituting one of the sources of individual diversity within TIMs.
It should be noted that many considerations expressed in the article concerning physiological mechanisms of irrationality and rationality, although based on numerous data, are nevertheless based on indirect data. Therefore, however convincing and logical some of these considerations may seem today, they require additional experimental verification.
Functional Brain Asymmetry with Respect to the Poles of the Irrationality-Rationality Trait and the Opposition of the Thalamic and Mesencephalic Modulating Systems {#раздел54}
According to Sperry and Gazzaniga (Sperri, 1966; Gazzaniga, 1970), the right hemisphere is more capable of abstract, symbolic thinking than the verbal left hemisphere. According to Hamory (Hamory, 1985), the right hemisphere is more sincere and open, while the left is more wary. According to his results, the right hemisphere is also more emotionally harmonious, while the left is emotionally unbalanced. From the experimental results of these authors one can derive the assumption that Intuition is somewhat more closely tied to structures of the right hemisphere and Sensing to the left; Emotivism is more closely tied to structures of the right hemisphere, while Constructivism, associated with emotional imbalance, is tied to the left. According to N. K. Korsakova and L. I. Moskovichyute (1985), the right hemisphere is dominant with respect to short-term memory, while the left is dominant with respect to long-term memory. According to E. G. Simernitskaya (1985), the right hemisphere is leading in the provision of perceptual processes.
From the data presented one can conclude that the syndrome of dominance of thalamic ascending influences, characterized by irrationality with shades of Ethics, Intuition, Emotivism, and Introversion, is more closely associated with structures of the right hemisphere, while the syndrome of ascending influences from the evolutionarily younger structures of the “rational” modulating center, including the reticular formation of the midbrain, is associated with structures of the left hemisphere. Thus, the left hemisphere as a whole proves more rational, while the right is somewhat more “irrational.”
S. V. Madorsky (1985), who extensively studied lateral dysfunctions of mediobasal subcortical structures of the brain (the hippocampus and amygdaloid complexes) in the two hemispheres of the human brain, is in principle also in agreement with this conclusion. In his view, evolutionarily older subcortical regulatory centers have closer functional connections with the mediobasal structures of the right hemisphere, whereas subcortical regulatory centers based on phylogenetically younger hypothalamic and reticular-formation nuclei have closer connections with the mediobasal structures of the left hemisphere.
The conclusion concerning hemispheric asymmetry of the properties of rationality-irrationality is also confirmed at an entirely different level, when considering the primary functions of different cortical zones of the two hemispheres.
Let us list the principal facts:
- The frontal neocortex as a whole is rational (this is a fact).
- Its left regions are more closely associated with Sensing; this is also a fact. The convexital regions of the right frontal cortex may possibly (this is still only a conjecture) be more closely associated with Intuition.
- The left regions of the neocortex are more extraverted, the right more introverted. The right regions are more closely associated with anxiety and defensive reactions. These are facts.
- The left regions of the neocortex are more closely associated with Logic, the right with Ethics. These are long-known facts.
What follows from this?
First, it follows that the properties of the thalamic system of ascending modulating influences, which carries, in addition to its principal charge of irrationality, additional shades of Ethics, Intuition, and Introversion, are better correlated with the functions of the cortical regions of the right hemisphere, while the properties of the evolutionarily younger system of reticular-hypothalamic ascending influences are correlated with the functions of the cortical regions of the left cerebral hemisphere. Second, it follows that a certain correlation (in the human population) of Intuition with Ethics and of Sensing with Logic may well be due to natural physiological causes, including causes arising from correlations between the corresponding primary functions in cortical regions.
Age Dependence of the Rationality-Irrationality Indicator {#раздел55}
Indicators of rationality increase with age. Specifically: 1) an increase in rationality with age is detected when the trait is psychologically diagnosed using questionnaires; 2) an increase in rationality with age is also detected in face-to-face expert typing.
Evidence for the first statement is the result of our experiment. When studying correlations between respondents’ age and the four basic traits (Extraversion-Introversion, Rationality-Irrationality, Logic-Ethics, Intuition-Sensing), it was found that only two traits correlate with age. Rationality increases with age (correlation coefficient with the logarithm of age +0.17), as does Sensing (+0.13). Among other socionic traits, the Process-Result trait changes with age - in favor of Result (+0.16). The correlation coefficients may seem insignificant, but their sign is absolutely reliable (p>0.999). This study aggregates the results of several diagnostic questionnaires; the diagnostic scales in the questionnaires changed, but all age trends remained invariant. In total, results from more than 1,200 respondents were aggregated. Thus, Rationality as measured by questionnaire diagnosis increases with age, although not substantially in absolute terms (questionnaire diagnosis smooths age differences because, in questionnaires, a person evaluates their characteristics predominantly in comparison with their own age group).
Evidence for the second statement is our analysis of genetic statistics (the presence of children with known types in family pairs with known types). Two statistical samples were used: E. S. Filatova’s published data on family statistics of sociotypes and information collected by us from various Internet forums, where numerous participants in topics devoted to the inheritance of TIMs supplied their own examples (based on their own families and those of acquaintances). In both cases, TIMs, and hence the poles of traits, were determined exclusively by expert observation. In the first sample there was only one expert (E. S. Filatova); in the second there were more than three dozen experts. In both cases, we included in the statistics only those families in which the psychotype of the children and of both parents had been determined. The final size of Filatova’s sample was 110 children plus the corresponding parents; the forum sample consisted of 140 children plus parents. If type frequencies are compared separately in the group of parents and the group of children, we obtain a selective and reliable instrument for detecting age dependencies of traits. It turns out that in Filatova’s sample, 2.4% more rationals were diagnosed among parents than among children, whereas in the forum sample the difference is enormous: 20.4% more rationals were diagnosed among parents than among children.
Incidentally, the Rationality-Irrationality trait proves to be the only one for which age trends in all three experiments coincide in sign. For example, the trend toward Sensing is confirmed in Filatova’s sample and not confirmed in the forum sample, while the trend toward Result, conversely, is confirmed only in the forum sample. From the standpoint of correspondence with known scientific facts, for example the increase of left-hemisphere asymmetry with age, the profile of trends obtained with questionnaires gives the best indicators; in second place, by a considerable margin, is the sample compiled from the assessments of numerous experts, which removed individual subjectivity of expert evaluation from its results. The sample compiled by a single expert is only in third place.
The result for the rationality-irrationality trend agrees well with known facts concerning the increasing role of the frontal cortex and mesencephalic division of modulation with age, as well as preferential activation of the left anterior cortex, compared with the greater role of the thalamic system and greater activity of the posterior and right cortex in children.
Another incidental result of this experiment, which it would be unfortunate not to note, indicates that genetic studies of the heritability of socionic types and traits conducted by means of expert diagnosis can hardly be regarded as reliable and promising - the diagnoses assigned prove too strongly dependent on subjects’ age and, evidently, on other systematic factors that cannot be taken into account. The small heritability coefficients characteristic of psychological traits simply drown in noise from systematic and random errors. Genetic research in psychology should be conducted only with questionnaires or with instrumental, objective methods of measuring psychological quantities, which makes it possible to eliminate many artifacts and subjective or situational influences. It is possible that expert evaluation, since it is not tied to the reference group of the subject’s peers, reflects real age trends in human physiology more objectively and contrastively, but this is its only advantage, one that is entirely inappropriate specifically in genetic research.
The “Irrationals-Rationals” Trait in Different Psychological Paradigms {#раздел56}
American Type Theory (the MBTI® Questionnaire, etc.) {#раздел57}
Analysis of extensive literature and type-theory Internet sites makes it possible to establish which behavioral properties the system for diagnosing the poles of irrationality and rationality relies upon in the leading current of American type theory. These properties are as follows:
Irrationality (in comparison with socionics, the irrationality scale in type theory is somewhat tilted toward Intuition and partly toward Ethics and Introversion):
- externally poorly organized behavior;
- high psychological mobility in conversations, including frequent changes of conversation topics;
- avoidance of work that is not amusement and does not bring current, immediate pleasure;
- intolerance of any “obligatory stuff”;
- intolerance of prolonged advance preparation;
- passivity in setting tasks (instead of setting tasks, one should wait until life itself formulates them);
- preference for uncertainty (uncertainty is often evaluated as better than certainty)
- preference for creative spontaneity and underestimation of neatness;
- absent-mindedness;
- striving for novelty;
Rationality (in comparison with socionics, the scale in type theory is tilted toward Sensing and partly toward Logic and Extraversion):
- personal responsibility, adherence to obligations and to the principle of definiteness and clarity of social roles;
- intolerance of surprises;
- intolerance of lateness;
- order, neatness, everything should be in its place (the trait is especially emphasized in the diagnostic system of type theory);
- adherence to planning one’s affairs - including daily planning and written planning;
- irritability and uncompromisingness, a certain dogmatism when expressing judgments;
- striving for completeness and completion.
All semantic clusters used in American type theory to diagnose irrationality-rationality are also among the empirically identified socionic characteristics of this trait (Tables 1-19). In this sense there are no surprises. The exception is “absent-mindedness” - in socionics the property of “absent-mindedness” clearly loads more strongly on Intuition than on Irrationality (Talanov, March 2007). At the same time, by referring to Tables 1-19 it is not difficult to see that all clusters used in American type theory have one characteristic and selective feature: in the diagnosis of Rationality they simultaneously load on Sensing and partly on Logic and Extraversion. The clusters used to diagnose the irrational pole, at the same time, load on Intuition and additionally (although to a lesser degree) on Ethics and Introversion. Additional interrelations of this kind should lead (and, of course, do lead) to convergence of the “Rationals” axis, as interpreted, for example, by the MBTI®, with the axes of Sensing types, Logical types, and Extraverts. The rational pole as a whole becomes excessively close in its properties to behavioral characteristics typical of the LSE type. Conversely, the axis of Irrationals as interpreted in American type theory forms an acute rather than a right angle in psychological space with the axis of Intuitive types, selectively leaning toward Intuition, Ethics, and Introversion, which as a result gives the irrational pole an excessive emphasis on characteristics of the IEI sociotype.
In contrast, socionic “rationality-irrationality” (Tables 1-19) also has content clusters with entirely opposite signs for the additional “loadings” (although they are few), linking, for example, Rationality with Ethics, Intuition, and Introversion (clusters Nos. 4, 10, 17, 19, 33, 40, 54, 55, 57, 60, 63, 75, 154). In the Briggs-Myers system, however, such clusters are ignored altogether and are not used in diagnosis, as a result of which the system of four psychological coordinates in American type theory is not orthogonal but rather sharply oblique (with a strong correlation between Rationality and Sensing). For this reason, the type boundaries in the MBTI® and similar questionnaires, compared with socionics, are somewhat shifted, and the frequencies of types diagnosed in the population also prove different. Thus, as a consequence of mixing Rationality with Sensing, the frequency of the SJ club in the MBTI® should be noticeably “elevated” relative to socionics, while the frequency of NJ should be reduced relative to that of the NP club. This assumption is fully confirmed by examination of Table 21. It should be noted that “obliqueness” and mixing of the Rationality scale with Sensing are somewhat less characteristic of the Keirsey questionnaire.
If in socionics as well we understand Rationality exclusively as planning and striving for completion, and Irrationality only as spontaneity and attraction to uncertainty and change, we will also inevitably obtain an association between the rational pole and Sensing (planning and striving for sequential completion is not only a rational property but also a Sensing property - Talanov, March 2007). This is precisely what occurs when most socionic questionnaires with simplified scoring algorithms are used, except that the indicated tendency is expressed more weakly than in the MBTI® (see Tables 20-23, rows 4 and 5). In these tables, distributions Nos. 1 and 2 should evidently be regarded as most characteristic of the American type-theory paradigm, while distributions Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11 are characteristic of the socionic approach to typing. Distributions 3, 4, and 5 gravitate toward distributions Nos. 1 and 2, although sources 4 and 5 advertise themselves as operating within the socionic paradigm. The entire issue lies in the questionnaires used. Evidently, the questionnaires used on sites 4 and 5 are closer in their diagnostic approaches to the MBTI® questionnaire than to socionic views of type boundaries.
The greater representation of Intuition in distributions 6-11 should hardly be interpreted too profoundly - most likely, the corresponding shift is caused by characteristics of sample formation in these studies (Intuitive types more often know their TIM in advance, and they also more often agree to labor-intensive studies exceeding a 90-question questionnaire). Let us recall that Intuition, alone among the four Jungian traits, according to our experimental data, is positively correlated with any objective tests of intelligence (Logic correlates overall more weakly, and even then only with certain tests in intelligence batteries, while Irrationality correlates with intelligence only at the level of a very weak tendency). Interest in cognition and in everything new is also provided precisely by Intuition (Talanov, March 2007).
How justified is the existence in psychology of a Rationality axis that is clearly correlated with Sensing? On the basis of empirical facts in the material of the present article, we have already sufficiently substantiated the view, repeatedly declared earlier both by socionists and by the creators of the American Briggs-Myers system, that the rationality-irrationality trait indeed reflects to a certain degree the order of the first and second functions in information metabolism (specifically, which function - judging or perceiving - is the program function). If precisely this rule is elevated to an absolute, as is done in socionics, then the correlation of Rationality with Sensing and Irrationality with Intuition, produced by a “skew” in the diagnostic scales, is completely incomprehensible and inadmissible. It turns out that as soon as a person acquires Intuition, immediately thereafter, much more often than should occur, this function for some reason necessarily becomes program rather than creative. Intuitive rationals consequently become an almost unnatural and rare deformity of nature. SEE compared with ESE, SLE compared with LSE, and LII and EIE likewise become an “unnatural deformity.” In particular, this tendency toward “crookedness” should result in type-theory questionnaires, together with numerous short socionic questionnaires, evidently diagnosing many socionic EIEs (confirmed by other Reinin traits) as IEEs, causing the frequency of IEE to rise and that of EIE to fall (Table 23). For the same reason, the frequency of EII diagnosed by the MBTI® and “short” socionic questionnaires is twice as low as the frequency of IEI, and the frequency of LII falls far below that of ILI. In our view, the actual broad representation in the observed social environment of numerous, stable, and entirely self-satisfied SEEs and SLEs, LIIs and EIEs refutes the view of them as a psychophysiological “oversight” of nature. Consequently, underestimation of their frequency by distortions in diagnostic scales must be regarded as an artifact, and the parasitic correlation of Rationality with Sensing, Logic, and Extraversion must be eliminated.
How can this “affliction” be overcome in questionnaires? Ethics is more impulsive than Logic, while Sensing is more inclined to neatness and linear sequential planning than Intuition; therefore, the opposition “planning-improvisation” lacks proper symmetry with respect to the four mental functions. Consequently, one must abandon excessive identification of rationality-irrationality solely with the property of planning-spontaneity. In particular, the list of behavioral properties used in questionnaire and expert diagnosis of rationality-irrationality should be broadened and strengthened by those characteristics that increase the “weight” of the right-hemisphere frontal neocortex and are selectively characteristic of intuitive rationals and sensory irrationals (see clusters Nos. 10, 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, 63, 75, 78, 3, 33, 39). Questionnaire diagnosis can also proceed along an entirely different, purely mathematical route: after calculating a preliminary value of rationality-irrationality from the planning-spontaneity balance, an obligatory correlational correction can be introduced into the result obtained, based on independently measured balances of Intuition-Sensing and Logic-Ethics. This means, for example, that from the obtained “raw” value of Rationality one should then subtract the algebraic value of the Sensing-Intuition balance multiplied by the correlation coefficient between the raw Sensing and Rationality scales. If nothing of this kind is done, while preserving fidelity to the tradition of interpreting rationality-irrationality that goes back to I. Briggs Myers, then the weights of the functions of the right-hemisphere frontal cortex and frontal limbic cortex in the rational pole will inevitably be underestimated.
Table 20. Percent Representation of Combinations of “Socionic Clubs” in Population Frequency Distributions of Sociotypes (American Type Theory and Socionics) {#раздел58}
N - Intuitive types, S - Sensing types, P - Irrationals, J - Rationals
| Study No. | Source | Sample size | NP+SJ | NJ+SP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | MBTI® statistics for the USA // http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/my-mbti-results/how-frequent-is-my-type.asp - typing using the MBTI® questionnaire | more than 100000 | 65 | 35 |
| 2 | Worldwide MBTI® statistics (all countries) http://vikrob.narod.ru/; Menshikova O. R. MBTI: Testing Results. Comparisons with American Data. http://www.fast.ane.ru/tests/research/mbti2.htm | more than 100000 | 62 | 39 |
| 3 | http://keirsey.com/cgi-bin/stats.cgi - typing using the short Keirsey questionnaire (70 questions) | 6741198 | 64 | 36 |
| 4 | http://www.your-ideal.com/stat.shtml - typing using a fixed short socionic questionnaire | 27574 | 61 | 39 |
| 5 | http://socionics.labirint.org - typing using a fixed short socionic questionnaire | 1084 | 74 | 26 |
| 6 | A. V. Glushkov. Method for determining sociotype using the Voll method (non-questionnaire method). 1st Scientific Seminar on Socionics in Moscow, October 1, 2002. “… Over 5 years, 369 students of the Kirov Medical Academy were examined …” | 369 | 59 | 41 |
| 7 | Socionic statistics of Globas (Lithuania), approx. 450 people - method of socionic diagnosis unknown, presumably individual typing by interview | 450 | 44 | 56 |
| 8 | http://socionics.org/people/stats.asp/ - declared TIMs (dating questionnaires), diagnostic method not fixed | 6785 | 60 | 40 |
| 9 | The author’s own socionic statistics (TIMs declared a priori and independently by questionnaire respondents before typing) - the need to complete a long questionnaire selects predominantly Intuitive types for the procedure | 660 | 54 | 46 |
| 10 | The author’s own socionic statistics for a group of questionnaires (TIMs diagnosed during examination) - the need to complete a long questionnaire selects predominantly Intuitive types for typing. The selected algorithm for questionnaire-based socionic diagnosis of TIMs (use of all 15 Reinin traits, improved orthogonalization of scales) leads to a substantial reduction of correlations between traits, which equalizes the percentage balance between clubs. | 742 | 48 | 52 |
| 11 | The author’s own socionic statistics for another, alternative group of experimental questionnaires (TIMs diagnosed during examination) - the need to complete a long questionnaire selects predominantly Intuitive types for typing, although, due to characteristics of sample formation (the study was conducted at the peak of socionics’ popularity), to a lesser extent than in the preceding case No. 10 | 799 | 49 | 51 |
Table 21. Percent Representation of “Socionic Clubs” in Population Frequency Distributions of Sociotypes (American Type Theory and Socionics) {#раздел59}
N - Intuitive types, S - Sensing types, T - Logical types, F - Ethical types, E - Extraverts, I - Introverts, P - Irrationals, J - Rationals. Sources of the studies (by ordinal number) are given in Table 20.
| Study No. | NT | NF | ST | SF | NP | NJ | SP | SJ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 10 | 17 | 30 | 43 | 19 | 8 | 27 | 46 |
| 2 | 14 | 17 | 34 | 36 | 19 | 12 | 27 | 43 |
| 3 | 14 | 30 | 27 | 29 | 21 | 23 | 12 | 44 |
| 4 | 16 | 25 | 28 | 31 | 24 | 17 | 23 | 36 |
| 5 | 7 | 36 | 22 | 35 | 29 | 14 | 12 | 45 |
| 6 | 15 | 33 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 18 | 22 | 30 |
| 7 | 30 | 22 | 22 | 26 | 21 | 31 | 25 | 23 |
| 8 | 27 | 33 | 20 | 19 | 39 | 22 | 18 | 21 |
| 9 | 33 | 33 | 17 | 17 | 37 | 29 | 17 | 17 |
| 10 | 24 | 30 | 21 | 24 | 27 | 27 | 24 | 21 |
| 11 | 26 | 21 | 29 | 24 | 24 | 23 | 28 | 25 |
Table 21 (Continued)
| Study No. | TP | TJ | FP | FJ | EP | EJ | IP | IJ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 16 | 24 | 30 | 30 | 24 | 25 | 22 | 29 |
| 2 | 20 | 28 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 37 | 17 | 18 |
| 3 | 10 | 31 | 23 | 36 | 18 | 35 | 15 | 32 |
| 4 | 17 | 27 | 30 | 26 | 27 | 27 | 21 | 26 |
| 5 | 5 | 24 | 35 | 35 | 29 | 35 | 11 | 25 |
| 6 | 21 | 19 | 30 | 29 | 25 | 21 | 27 | 27 |
| 7 | 24 | 28 | 22 | 26 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 32 |
| 8 | 25 | 22 | 32 | 21 | 28 | 20 | 29 | 23 |
| 9 | 25 | 24 | 29 | 21 | 26 | 17 | 28 | 29 |
| 10 | 25 | 21 | 27 | 27 | 26 | 20 | 25 | 29 |
| 11 | 33 | 22 | 20 | 26 | 26 | 23 | 26 | 25 |
Table 22. Percent Representation of the Poles of Psychological Traits in Population Frequency Distributions of Sociotypes (American Type Theory and Socionics) {#раздел60}
N - Intuitive types, S - Sensing types, T - Logical types, F - Ethical types, E - Extraverts, I - Introverts, P - Irrationals, J - Rationals. Sources of the studies (by ordinal number) are given in Table 20.
| Study No. | N | S | T | F | E | I | P | J |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 27 | 73 | 40 | 60 | 49 | 51 | 46 | 54 |
| 2 | 31 | 69 | 48 | 53 | 66 | 35 | 46 | 55 |
| 3 | 44 | 56 | 41 | 59 | 53 | 47 | 33 | 67 |
| 4 | 41 | 59 | 44 | 56 | 53 | 47 | 47 | 53 |
| 5 | 43 | 57 | 29 | 71 | 64 | 36 | 40 | 60 |
| 6 | 47 | 53 | 40 | 60 | 46 | 54 | 51 | 49 |
| 7 | 52 | 48 | 52 | 48 | 45 | 55 | 46 | 54 |
| 8 | 61 | 39 | 48 | 52 | 48 | 52 | 57 | 43 |
| 9 | 66 | 34 | 50 | 50 | 43 | 57 | 54 | 46 |
| 10 | 54 | 46 | 46 | 54 | 46 | 54 | 51 | 49 |
| 11 | 47 | 53 | 55 | 45 | 49 | 51 | 52 | 48 |
Table 23. Percent Representation of Sociotypes in Population Frequency Distributions (American Type Theory and Socionics) {#раздел61}
Sources of the studies (by ordinal number) are given in Table 20.
| Study No. | ILE | LII | SEI | ESE | SLE | LSI | IEI | EIE | SEE | ESI | ILI | LIE | IEE | EII | SLI | LSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3,2 | 2,1 | 8,8 | 12,3 | 4,3 | 11,6 | 4,4 | 2,5 | 8,5 | 13,8 | 3,3 | 1,8 | 8,1 | 1,5 | 5,4 | 8,7 |
| 2 | 4,5 | 2,5 | 5,5 | 14,0 | 7,5 | 7,0 | 3,5 | 4,0 | 9,5 | 6,5 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 7,5 | 2,0 | 4,0 | 15,0 |
| 3 | 2,3 | 5,2 | 2,9 | 12,2 | 2,7 | 10,6 | 6,6 | 7,5 | 4,7 | 9,4 | 3,0 | 3,5 | 8,6 | 7,1 | 2,1 | 11,6 |
| 4 | 4,9 | 4,5 | 5,8 | 8,4 | 4,6 | 8,5 | 7,6 | 4,0 | 8,3 | 8,4 | 3,3 | 3,2 | 8,6 | 5,0 | 3,9 | 11,0 |
| 5 | 1,1 | 2,9 | 1,8 | 16,7 | 1,3 | 10,1 | 6,5 | 6,7 | 7,8 | 8,7 | 2,0 | 1,2 | 19,2 | 3,3 | 0,7 | 10,0 |
| 6 | 2,7 | 2,4 | 3,3 | 6,8 | 5,1 | 9,5 | 10,3 | 7,0 | 7,6 | 9,5 | 6,8 | 2,7 | 9,2 | 6,0 | 6,5 | 4,6 |
| 7 | 7,0 | 12,0 | 8,0 | 6,0 | 6,0 | 7,0 | 4,0 | 7,0 | 6,0 | 6,0 | 6,0 | 5,0 | 4,0 | 7,0 | 5,0 | 4,0 |
| 8 | 9,1 | 6,5 | 5,3 | 4,5 | 3,4 | 5,5 | 10,9 | 5,1 | 4,2 | 5,0 | 7,5 | 4,1 | 11,2 | 6,3 | 5,1 | 6,4 |
| 9 | 8,9 | 12,2 | 4,6 | 3,7 | 2,3 | 4,7 | 9,3 | 5,5 | 3,8 | 4,8 | 7,6 | 3,9 | 11,3 | 7,3 | 6,3 | 3,6 |
| 10 | 5,1 | 7,5 | 4,9 | 6,3 | 6,1 | 6,3 | 6,7 | 6,5 | 7,0 | 6,2 | 7,0 | 4,7 | 8,1 | 8,5 | 6,5 | 2,6 |
| 11 | 7,2 | 5,6 | 4,1 | 7,6 | 8,0 | 6,6 | 4,6 | 4,9 | 6,1 | 6,1 | 7,8 | 5,3 | 4,8 | 7,0 | 9,5 | 4,8 |
Models of the “Big Five” Personality Factors {#раздел62}
The Rationality-Irrationality trait coincides with one of the principal factors in the models of the so-called “Big Five” personality factors. The syndrome complexes of psychological properties corresponding to each factor were identified empirically as a result of factor analysis (Fiske, 1949). The most widespread and recognized “Big Five” questionnaire among psychologists is the NEO-PI questionnaire (McCrae, Costa, 1990). Rationality in the five-factor NEO-PI questionnaire corresponds to factor “C” (called by the authors “Conscientiousness,” or the “Conscientiousness factor”). To diagnose the Conscientiousness factor in standardized “Big Five” questionnaires, including the NEO-PI, the following content clusters are mainly used:
Competence and social responsibility (prudence and common sense, social involvement - including civic participation in political activities, competence and success in one’s profession, thoughtfulness and quality of decisions);
Industriousness and striving for perfection (absence of laziness and sluggishness, possession of a set of long-term goals, persistent consistency in self-improvement, hard work, readiness to strain oneself for the sake of achieving long-term goals, striving for perfection and superiority in any activity undertaken, workaholism);
Conscientiousness, conscientious social “correctness” of behavior (conscientiousness, responsibility and reliability, striving not to incur debts and to repay them on time, honesty even in small matters, adherence to a strict system of ethical principles, meticulous thoroughness in completing tasks and assignments, discipline at work);
Self-discipline (tendency to do everything on time, trouble-free engagement in work, striving for completion of any undertaking begun, tendency toward advance preparation, perseverance, work self-discipline);
Inclination toward order (inclination to outline and plan everything in advance, everyday neatness, everyday order, methodicalness, organization, pedantry, scrupulous exactingness);
Careful deliberation preceding actions (reasonableness and thoughtfulness of most actions, careful weighing of decisions and responses, nonimpulsivity, inclination to weigh consequences, foresight, inclination to act only after careful preparation rather than at the sharp point of the moment and improvisation, planning of activities).
It is not difficult to see that the Conscientiousness scales of “Big Five” questionnaires correspond rather closely to the profile of socionic Rationality (see Tables 1-19) - in any case, more closely than the typical Rationality scales used in American type theory. The Conscientiousness factor contains practically all of the principal clusters of socionic Rationality. The main exceptions are socionic clusters not represented in the “Big Five” Conscientiousness scales and characterizing:
a) inertia, emotional rigidity and viscosity, slowed deactualization of emotional memory traces and “spent” behavior plans;
b) controllability and manageability of “biological” drives;
c) defensive reactions (anxiety, tension, vulnerability, self-criticism, and an orientation toward the primary avoidance of failure).
Defensive reactions fall into another “Big Five” factor - the so-called Neuroticism factor (not to be confused with Eysenck’s neuroticism, which is reduced merely to emotional lability and instability - the differences are substantial!). As a result of excluding the three listed clusters (all of which have an introverted shade) from the Conscientiousness factor and, simultaneously, including in this factor the property of “striving for achievement” (which has an extraverted shade), Rationality according to the NEO-PI and other standardized “Big Five” questionnaires acquires a more extraverted character than in socionics. (However, the three groups of socionic clusters not taken into account in Big Five “Conscientiousness” are also not represented in “MBTI® Rationality,” which likewise conditions a somewhat more extraverted character of type-theory Rationality.) With respect to associations with Sensing and Logic, the Rationality of standard “Big Five” questionnaires, compared with the MBTI®, judging by cluster structure, stands somewhat closer to socionics (corresponding better to the direction of socionic Rationality). Let us recall that with respect to the “Intuitive types-Sensing types” scale, the comparison among the three psychological paradigms produced the completely opposite picture: Intuition-Sensing in American type theory almost ideally coincides with the socionic trait, whereas the “Openness” factor corresponding to Intuition in the NEO-PI and similar questionnaires deviates strongly toward socionic Ethics (Talanov, March 2007).
Summarizing the results of the comparative consideration of the rationality-irrationality factor in socionics and the two other psychological paradigms, one must conclude that the socionic direction of the factor corresponds more precisely to the balance between the two judging functions and the two perceiving functions and is, accordingly, more symmetrical with respect to the representation within each pole of the functions of the right and left cerebral hemispheres. By contrast, the directions of the rationality-irrationality factor in American type theory and “Big Five” questionnaires produce rather substantial hemispheric asymmetry of the trait: the rational pole is more closely associated with the left cerebral hemisphere, with Logic and Sensing, while the irrational pole is associated with the right hemisphere, with Ethics and Intuition. Subcortical modulating mechanisms are reflected more accurately by the direction of the rationality-irrationality factor adopted in type theory and in the “Big Five” system.
Irrationality-Rationality Projected onto R. B. Cattell’s Factors {#раздел63}
Comparison of the content structure of the socionic “Irrationals-Rationals” trait with the content structure of R. B. Cattell’s factors (Cattell, 1965) shows that the “Irrationals-Rationals” trait has no one-to-one correspondence among Cattell’s 16 factors, but is divided among projections onto 5-7 factors at once. The results of this division are shown in Table 24.
Table 24. Qualitative Assessment of Projections of the Rational Pole of the “Irrationals-Rationals” Trait onto 7 of Cattell’s 16 Personality Factors (16PF) {#раздел64}
| Factor designation | Factor name according to Cattell | Sign of projection of the rational pole onto the factor: (+) or (-) | Content of the factor at the pole correlated with Rationality |
|---|---|---|---|
| C | Emotional stability-emotional instability | (+) | Mature, realistic, stable, calm, well self-controlled |
| F | Seriousness-carefreeness | (+) | Serious and taciturn; “airy” carefree enthusiasm is not characteristic of him |
| G | Conscientiousness-irresponsibility | (+) | Responsible, moralistic, stoic, rule-observant, industrious, consistent |
| O | Apprehensiveness-calmness | (+) | Worried, anxious, concerned, self-critical |
| Q3 | Undisciplinedness-controlledness | (-) | Punctual, disciplined, restraining his impulses |
| M | Dreaminess-practicality | (-) | Conservative, down-to-earth, uncreative (the factor corresponds more to Sensing than to Rationality) |
| Q1 | Radicalism-conservatism | (-) | Respecting traditional ideas, skeptical toward liberal freethinking (the factor corresponds more to Sensing than to Rationality) |
Thus, the results of the Cattell questionnaire can approximately be recalculated into values of the Rationality indicator if the first five factors in Table 24 are summed as an estimate of Rationality (factor Q3 should be taken with a “minus” sign). Factor G should be taken with double weight when summing. The other factors of Cattell’s questionnaire (PF16) are associated with the socionic “Irrationals-Rationals” trait to a noticeably lesser degree.
Main Conclusions {#раздел65}
1. It has been shown that the principal properties of the rational pole of the socionic rationality-irrationality trait are:
- low rate of decay of emotional traces and especially negative emotional traces, slowed displacement of them from memory;
- high level of emotional declarative memory associated with instantaneous encoding of negative emotional experience, offenses, and the like;
- high level of all forms of behavioral self-control, including control of movements, control of instincts, and control of acquired socially undesirable forms of behavior;
- psychological inertia up to viscosity, low mobility and difficulty rapidly switching attention, especially in situations of neuropsychological tension;
- conservatism with respect to the perceptual environment, absence of a need for new, varied, and arousing sensations, preference for the habitual and calm over the new and exciting (low level of sensation seeking according to M. Zuckerman);
- conservatism of habits;
- inclination toward ethical moralizing;
- depth of emotional experiences, on average a higher level of empathy;
- industriousness and perseverance;
- competence, meticulousness (striving to train any experience and bring it to a degree of perfection);
- responsibility;
- excessiveness of evaluative activity (mental rumination, doubts and vacillation, constant rechecking of what has been done, evaluation and summing-up at all stages of work, intolerance of any uncertainty, striving for excessively detailed information about the situation, and the like);
- dependence on outside opinions, on public opinion or the opinion of one’s reference group;
- increased sociability of attitudes and aspirations;
- demands directed toward others to comply with accepted social (conventional) norms of behavior;
- inclination toward advance preparation, disinclination to rely on improvisation;
- predictability of behavior;
- high requirements for predictability of other people’s behavior and predictability in the development of a situation;
- organization;
- consistency in carrying out intended programs and sequences;
- striving for completion in everything, unpleasant feelings from disruption of sequence or from incompleteness;
- inclination toward planning affairs and life goals, both for the distant future and within the current day (daily schedule);
- increased interest in the future from the standpoint of career and planning one’s behavior;
- elevated level of defensive reactions (anxiety, psychological tension, worry, vulnerability, self-criticism, an orientation toward the primary avoidance of failure);
- self-criticism;
- tense muscle tone;
- adherence to rules and principles, a higher level of truthfulness than among irrationals;
- inclination toward order, neatness, and pedantry in everyday life, increased exactingness toward others in matters of order, quality, compliance with rules, discipline, and organization;
- discipline;
- long-term memory better than short-term, working memory;
- on average greater activation and a higher level of wakefulness;
- intolerance of intense sensory stimuli, noise, and external distractions;
- resistance to monotony and routine.
The listed properties are by no means distributed uniformly among TIMs of the rational pole. Irrationals possess opposite properties, which are likewise distributed unevenly.
2. Membership in the rational pole is primarily provided not by one or another hierarchy of mental functions, but by increased functional activation of the “rational” subcortical modulating center, which includes the mesencephalic reticular formation, posterior hypothalamus, amygdala, basal cholinergic nuclei and pathways of the forebrain, insular cortex, prefrontal neocortex, frontal limbic cortex, and other structures. Left-sided structures are more intensively involved in the activity of the rational center. The leading and more inert role of the “judging” mental functions is a consequence of the general pattern of cortical activation (preferential activation of its anterior regions), which in turn is conditioned by the nature of cortico-subcortical relations under conditions of dominance of the “rational” subcortical modulation center.
All of the same applies to the irrational pole and the perceiving functions, except that the structures of the “irrational” modulating center primarily include the nuclei of the nonspecific thalamus and striatum (the caudate nucleus in the dorsal division and the nucleus accumbens in the ventral division), which provide the phasic character of cortical activation, and preferentially of its posterior (perceiving) regions. The disinhibition of irrationals’ behavior is explained by removal of the activation induced by the anterior cortex from the system of GABAergic neurons of the striatum that inhibits and controls the automated programs of innate and acquired behavior stored in the striatum. Irrationals’ need for new arousing stimuli is explained by the large number of novelty neurons in the thalamic and striatal nuclei and their interaction with the dopaminergic system of the basal ganglia. A special role in formation of this property is played by dopaminergic D-2 receptors of the ventral striatum, primarily the nucleus accumbens.
The higher level of defensive reactions in rationals, emotional declarative memory, and rigidity of emotional memory are explained by their increased functional activity of the amygdala, especially the left, and the left region of the insular cortex.
3. The sum of all manifestations of both perceiving functions (both Sensing and Intuition) is indeed higher in irrationals, whereas in rationals the sum of manifestations of the two judging functions is higher. The corresponding correlation does not exceed 0.5 - 0.6. This means that the correlation is measured between two partial consequences of a single physiological factor associated with the opposition of two subcortical modulation systems.
4. The direction of the Rationality axis in the paradigms of type theory and the five-factor model of personality is closer to the physiological model of two mutually opposing systems of subcortical modulation than is the direction of the vector of socionic Rationality. Socionic Rationality, however, is better balanced across the functions of Logic and Ethics, the left and right hemispheres, and is better equalized with respect to the participation of the prefrontal and limbic cortex in determining the properties of the rational pole.
5. In the activity of the rational modulation center, the noradrenergic, cholinergic, glutamatergic, and GABAergic neurotransmitter systems of the CNS are presumably used more intensively, while in the activity of the irrational modulating center the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems are used more intensively.
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Internet sources on “Big Five” questionnaires:
The Big-Five Trait Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Theoretical Perspectives
Goldberg’s IPIP-NEO Free Online Big Five Personality Test
Five-Factor Model from Great Ideas in Personality
Criticism on Big Five Personality Tests
History of the Big 5 from Kuro5hin
The Personality Project Good source of references for further reading.
Chinese Personality & Performance at Work Research Provides some extensive information on Big-5 research in Hong Kong, Singapore and mainland China.
PsyAsia Publications Downloads Downloadable information on Big-5 research conducted by PsyAsia International.
Out of Service index a site which allows you to take a personality test based on the Big Five personality traits and compare your results with those of other people
International Personality Item Pool research website containing findings and public domain scales
Internet sources on MBTI®:
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® Online Discover your personality today!
CARL JUNG 1875 - 1961 by Dr. C. George Boeree
The Relationship Between Psychological Type and Professional Orientation Among Technology Education Teachers by Robert C. Wicklein & Jay W. Rojewski
GSU Master Teacher Program: On Learning Styles
The Story of Isabel Briggs Myers
Quenk, Naomi L. Essentials of Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Assessment (John Wiley & Sons, 1999).
Introduction to Type® and Coaching
Working with MBTI® Step II Results Binder
Introduction to Type® and Communication
Measuring Results of MBTI®Type Training: ROI in Action
Introduction to Type® and Change
MBTI® Conflict Management Program
Introduction to Type® and Teams
Using the MBTI® tool in Organizations
http://www.discover-your-type.com/perstype.html
April-May 2007
© V. L. Talanov 2007
Original source address: http://www.newsocionicsmodel.narod.ru/