Why Socionics Is Necessary and Could Be Very Useful for Modern Neuroscience

Unfortunately, most modern scientific works devoted to the study of the genetics and neurophysiological basis of psychological traits have the most serious shortcomings in the psychological part of their methodological support, even in very solid Western university laboratories. To this day, this greatly reduces their effectiveness and informativeness, slowing the progress of science in this direction. Let us examine the topic in more detail. Modern socionics provides, compared to other personality classifications in differential psychology, the fullest possible description of virtually all innate personality traits of a person. It takes into account and uses not 5 personality factors, but at least ten, that is, it gives a much more detailed “complete map of personality” for each individual.

A functional profile, composed of a set of values of 12 socionic functions characterizing an individual, already describes more than 95% of the variance of all possible personality traits at his or her innate, i.e. temperamental level, while a full type profile, which represents a quantitative measure of an individual’s closeness to each of the 16 “standard” socionic psychotypes (or a profile of 15 socionic orthogonal factors-traits), describes almost 100% of this variance. Unlike the factors extracted by different psychologists within trait theory on the basis of purely formal factor analysis, the socionic functions are localized in a multidimensional space of psychological properties in such a way that they are easily understandable and explainable from the standpoint of the advantages and even the stages of their evolutionary formation, and therefore they are maximally close to the objective physiological and genetic factors that underlie individual differences in brain functioning among different people. Many neural networks discovered to date in neuroscience—that is, stable interconnections of various structural elements in the brain that become active when a person is faced with solving some specific task—fit very well in their psychological properties with the socionic functions. For example, the so-called “default mode network” is practically Ni.

And full socionic profiles, constructed on the basis of our fragmentary information about a given person, then allow one to accurately predict those of his or her characteristics that were not reported at the moment the profiles were constructed—in other words, socionic profiles, built using modern socionic questionnaires, possess significant predictive power. Let us consider a relatively recent example from neuroscience. James Fallon showed significant hypofunction of the amygdala and temporal lobes in imprisoned serial killers. From this he concluded that there was a link between aggression and reduced amygdala size (an important subcortical brain structure responsible primarily for the accumulation of negative emotional experience). The only thing that puzzled Fallon was that among several subjects whose amygdalae were also reduced in size (including himself), no increase in aggressive motivation was observed at all. However, a competent socionicist in Fallon’s place would not have drawn the erroneous conclusion of an unequivocal link between aggression and reduced amygdala size, but would have immediately said that among serial killers, according to socionic canons, one should expect both increased aggression in the form of a high rise of Se, and simultaneously (though not dependent on it) a deficit of empathy, compassion, and understanding of another’s emotional state, associated with a sharp decline in the Fi function in their socionic profiles. Therefore, Fallon’s results regarding reduced amygdala size and hypofunction of the temporal lobes may relate not at all to increased aggression—that is, not to Se—but to a defect of empathy, that is, to a deficit of socionic “white ethics.” After all, many other studies have shown the role of the amygdala in providing the feeling of fear, pangs of conscience, and the imprinting of negative emotional experience, which in socionics, according to its experimental data, relates primarily to the Fi property complex, white ethics. A socionicist would therefore immediately predict amygdala hypofunction both in criminals and in many creative scientists—because socionics knows that a deficit of Fi is observed in two different psychological types out of the sixteen, one of which possesses the highest competitiveness and aggressiveness in the socion, not always restrained (SLE), and the other of which differs little from the population average in aggression but is frequently found among scientists (ILE). Instead of, for the purposes of searching for physiological markers of psychological traits, taking and studying very strange psychological samples in extremely expensive physiological studies—samples united by unclear psychological markers (such as “criminals,” “psychopaths,” “creative people,” “athletes,” “air traffic controllers,” “schizothymes,” etc.)—a socionicist would conduct fMRI and genetic studies on a random sample of volunteers, ensuring control over the representation in it, preferably equally, of all 16 psychological types, having verified them using reliable questionnaires. The socionicist would then examine which mental functions and which socionic traits correlate within this sample with various physiological features of the brain. And only after that, solely to make the results more convincing for the general public and research sponsors, one could add to the program an additional “professional” sample in which these mental functions should, in theory, be extreme—for example, criminals, air traffic controllers, or someone else. Unfortunately, not only in Fallon’s experiment, but in most other expensive physiological studies of individual brain differences, everything is done completely differently in the psychological part. Testing just one volunteer in an fMRI and MRI program often costs several thousand, if not tens of thousands of dollars. In the psychological part of the experiment, however, researchers usually use either some very vague achievement test—vague in terms of the psychological factors underlying it—or at best some single short self-report scale of 20–30 questions, also aimed at some psychologically almost arbitrary trait (often by its nature, according to the questions in the scale, evidently composite, that is, supported according to socionics by several functions at once). For example, many expensive neuroimaging studies are devoted to examining the features of people with high creativity. Creativity is measured either by self-report scales containing elements of both Ne and Ni and Fe, or by achievement tests—for example, the classic test in which one must come up with as many possible uses for some object within a limited time. In the case of this test, high scores are contributed first by general extraversion (speed of actions), then by general intelligence, and then specifically by two distinct functions—Ne and Se (and their role in the results is almost equal). It is clear that with respect to their physiological correlates, the two different ways of measuring creativity—self-report and achievement tests—do not coincide among different researchers (and should not coincide), and in any given study it is also impossible to determine which exact psychological factor the observed physiological correlates belong to—whether they were obtained due to Se or due to Ne. If a researcher uses a sample in which “decisive” subjects predominate, he will conclude that the neural network corresponding to high creativity consists of such-and-such brain areas (corresponding to the operation of Se). And if his sample predominately contains subjects of “reflective” psychotypes, then the correlates of high creativity in that study will be entirely different brain areas, corresponding to high Ne. Similar defects in the planning of the psychological part of the experiment are widespread in modern genetic research aimed at identifying which gene variants correlate with particular psychological behavioral traits. For example, in the conclusions of some study they may state that risk-taking tendency coincided with the predominance of such-and-such gene variants in the genome. And one researcher confirms these results in his sample, while another does not. Whom should one believe, and what do these suspect gene variants actually correspond to? Do they really correspond to risk-taking? Hardly. Risk-taking in its socionic profile has elevated peaks of Se, Ne, and even Ni, as well as sharply negative peaks of Si, Fi, and partly Ti. Therefore, based on statistical association of some gene variant with such an obviously composite psychological trait as risk-taking (which only at first glance seems simple and elementary), it is simply impossible to uncover the genetic nature of the true psychological factors underlying this trait. Let us imagine for a moment that some gene variant identified as associated with high risk-taking is such because it encodes the balance between Ne and Si (incidentally, a quite plausible situation for some candidate genes). It would hardly surprise us that due to this same gene, albeit to a lesser extent, the balance between Ni and Se also increases (again in favor of intuition). Then, if the experimental sample whose genetic maps were analyzed and whose risk-taking tendencies were assessed consists primarily of strongly expressed Ne-types and strongly expressed Si-types, the researcher will find a very high positive correlation of risk-taking with our candidate gene. But in another researcher’s sample, the most strongly represented types may instead be strong Se-types and strong Ni-types. In such a sample, the sign of the correlation between the gene and risk-taking will be the opposite!

Thus, it is easy to suppose that most contradictions in the published results of genetic experiments by different researchers are explained not by chance but by differences in the socionic composition of their samples and in the percentages of psychotypes represented in them. Competent methodological support for the psychological part of experiments aimed at finding relationships between the psychological and physiological levels of the human being must necessarily include meeting several conditions: