V. L. Talanov

Structure of the Intuition-Sensing Trait and Its Hypothetical Cognitive Mechanisms

Using material from 233 clusters that substantively generalize questionnaire items correlating with the “intuitives-sensors” trait, the detailed structure of the trait is revealed. Psychological cognitive mechanisms explaining it are proposed, and possible physiological and biochemical explanations are analyzed. The association of intuition with schizotypy is demonstrated. The socionic trait is compared with the diagnosis of intuition-sensing in American type theory, the MMPI, and the five-factor model of personality.

Keywords: cognitive psychology, differential psychology, socionics, personality types, MBTI, intuition, sensing, acetylcholine, serotonin, schizotypy, schizophrenia.

CONTENTS:

Introduction

Table 1. Main oppositions of intuitives and sensors

Permeability of the “filters” between the subconscious and consciousness

The role of neurotransmitter systems of the central nervous system

Level of informational criteria in object recognition

Rate of erasure of perceptual traces

Opposition between orienting-exploratory activity and satisfaction of biological needs; manipulatory and biological motivations; contextual or conditioned stimuli and unconditioned “trigger” stimuli

Hypothetical mechanisms of the “abstractness-concreteness” opposition

Level of sensory and perceptual sensitivity

Hypothesis of a predominant association of intuitive functions with the left cerebral hemisphere

Association between intuition and schizotypy

On some widespread myths and misconceptions

Intuition and sensing in different psychological paradigms

The “Big Five” model of personality factors

Minnesota Inventory

The I. Briggs-Myers system and American type theory

Conclusions

Table 2. Empirical clusters characterizing the cognitive mechanisms of intuition-sensing

Table 3. Clusters associated with memory quality

Table 4. Clusters associated with quality of motor coordination

Table 5. Clusters associated with symptoms of derealization and depersonalization

Table 6. Clusters associated with the “novel-familiar” opposition

Table 7. Clusters associated with the “abstractness-concreteness” opposition

Table 8. Clusters associated with the “altruism-egoism” opposition

Table 9. Clusters associated with sthenicity and dominance

Table 10. Clusters associated with social-hierarchical involvement

Table 11. Clusters associated with the sequence-fragmentariness opposition

Table 12. Clusters associated with the ability to predict the future

Table 13. Clusters associated with the eidetic vividness of mental image-representations

Table 14. Clusters associated with the development of inner speech and the development of a unique personality

Table 15. Clusters associated with practicality and realism

Table 16. Clusters associated with characteristics of self-control

Table 17. Clusters associated with perceptual abilities and sensory sensitivity

Table 18. Clusters associated with level of aspiration

Table 19. Clusters with differing substantive content

References

Introduction

We conducted work on the substantive generalization of primary traits (questionnaire items) correlating with the “intuitives-sensors” trait. Data from socionic questionnaires administered to 1400 people using various experimental questionnaires were used. More than 600 people stated their socionic TIMs a priori; their results were used as a training sample, on the basis of which algorithms for refining the diagnosis of socionic TIM were subsequently developed both for these individuals and for the other respondents. Correlations of questionnaire items used to calculate percentage projections in the cluster tables were measured both with socionic traits calculated from the stated TIMs and with traits calculated using mathematical procedures for diagnostic refinement. Correlation was also measured with the so-called “images” of traits, calculated using formulas for nonlinear socionic generation of some Reinin traits by pairs of other traits. In all cases, very similar correlation values were obtained, which permits the study results to be regarded as reflecting the real profiles of socionic traits. In Tables 2-19, the final projection percentages were calculated by averaging these three types of values, namely: projections of questionnaire items onto the stated TIMs, onto TIMs calculated using 15 traits over the entire sample by the data-symmetrization procedure, and onto TIMs calculated from trait images.

As a result of the analysis, 233 generalized empirical clusters were identified for the “intuitives-sensors” trait and grouped in Tables 2-19. Further generalization of these clusters on the basis of correlational and theoretical analysis made it possible to compile the final analytical Table 1, which brings together the main hypothetical cognitive mechanisms that are interdependent but nevertheless comparatively unrelated in their substantive content and that, taken together, interpret the differences between the intuitive and sensing poles as fully as possible.

Table 1. Main oppositions of intuitives and sensors

On the basis of Tables 2-19, we shall analyze in greater detail some of the principal cognitive mechanisms determining the differences between intuitives and sensors.

Permeability of the “filters” between the subconscious and consciousness

Table 2 brings together the clusters that most strongly characterize the cognitive mechanisms of intuition and sensing. First, this is the “raising” into the conscious sphere of intuitives of reference memory images arriving from their unconscious sphere. As an extreme expression of this characteristic of intuitives, Table 2 includes clusters characterizing various visual and auditory intrusive phenomena, ranging from a sense of constant visual and auditory “flickering” of images spontaneously surfacing from the subconscious to fully formed visual and auditory pseudohallucinations (their distinction from true hallucinations is that pseudohallucinations are not projected onto the surrounding real world and are recognized as a product of one’s own subconscious that is separate from it). Second, intuitives are characterized by broadband associative capture, pluralism of associative versions, and multivariant elaboration of scenarios in thinking.

Let us examine these groups of clusters in greater detail. Unlike a sensor, an intuitive in conscious thinking almost constantly senses either vague shadows of a “dancing” associative swarm of thoughts, ideas, and certain abstract symbols of objects, or still more distinct visual and auditory images entering from the subconscious into the preconscious in response to informational stimuli.

In a sensor, the “dancing” world of unconscious images, which in its exaggerated form very much resembles the world of dreams or mental work on the verge of falling asleep, also exists, but is completely hidden in the subconscious. It does not penetrate into the preconscious or waking consciousness, being completely blocked by narrowband filters at the boundary between the unconscious and conscious spheres. In a sensor, as a reaction to an external stimulus, the response thought or idea is born as though directly in the person’s “current present”, that is, as though immediately in consciousness, in the form of the single needed and final answer. The underlying “associative kitchen”, with its initially chaotic, random, parallel, and multivariant image-hypotheses, remains inaccessible to the sensor’s conscious experience and is not captured by mental self-observation. In sensors, the automated unconscious sphere takes on most of the load involved in decision-making and selection of adequate responses. Owing to this, responses to a stimulus, including motor responses and reactions of recall and recognition, are better coordinated and more adequate among sensors, already at the “preconscious” level (see clusters 24 in Table 2, 55-59 and 60-70 in Tables 3 and 4). It can be said that these reactions are more automated, since they require only minimal conscious participation.

Unlike a sensor, an intuitive constantly becomes aware of and detects the varied “noises and smells” of the subconscious associative kitchen. Vague multivariant response-images and “unfiltered”, strange associations penetrate into consciousness from there. The following analogy can be drawn: from the unconscious sphere of a sensor, the final “clean copy” of the response reaction enters consciousness immediately, reducing the need for additional conscious analytical work. In contrast, in an intuitive all the numerous parallel drafts penetrate into consciousness, leaving the conscious “self” with the task of finally selecting the needed response.

Therefore, the consciousness of intuitives is constantly and intensively loaded with mental work (see clusters 2 in Table 2, 171 and 172 in Table 14, 174 and 186 in Table 15).

Clusters 55-59 (Table 3) demonstrate that among different forms of verbal memory (memorization of poems, long phrases, etc.), intuitives first and foremost show weakened selectivity in recalling the needed words and names of objects. Selection of the needed name is also an example of image recognition. If errors and failures occur in this process, then one of the primary cognitive characteristics of intuitives is reduced selectivity in identification and recognition processes. That, in the case of deterioration of memory for names and designations, the cause lies to a substantial degree in deterioration of the selectivity of recognizing and filtering mechanisms is confirmed by the fact that intuitives much more often than sensors identify with the following statement: “In my speech, carelessly used words are often employed – the word I need is sometimes imperceptibly replaced by something vague that is very remotely appropriate in its exact meaning.” At what stage of information processes can this reduction in selectivity occur? Either at the moment of secondary filtering (during penetration into consciousness) of primary responses already generated subconsciously, or earlier, during their generation, that is, during primary filtering and selection of suitable images. In all cases one can speak of filtering, because any selection by criteria, whether deep in the subconscious or at its boundary with the preconscious, is filtering.

This same primary characteristic of intuitives, reduced selectivity in recognition acts and associative responses, is also indicated by the much more frequent visual and auditory perceptual illusions and errors among intuitives compared with sensors (clusters 6, 7, 18 of Table 2).

The role of neurotransmitter systems of the central nervous system

Another characteristic of intuitives’ memory is that the process of imprinting memory traces for recent events and actions is also impaired in them (cluster 56). These memory gaps can partly be explained by the concentration of attention on thought processes, but another explanation is no less plausible, associated either with deterioration in the functioning of M-cholinergic neurons of the hippocampus that provide the mechanism for trace imprinting (Douglas, 1967; Carlton, 1968; Wiener, Deutsch, 1968), or with some enhancement of hippocampal serotonergic mechanisms that to a certain extent compete with the cholinergic system. Other questionnaire clusters also indicate weakening of M-cholinergic activity among intuitives in certain specific cortical zones. Thus, difficulties in deactualizing signals that have ceased to be significant, the appearance of nonextinguishing orienting reactions to contextual stimuli, and enhancement of reactions to novelty (clusters 3, 54, 51, 43, Table 2) can be interpreted as weakening of M-cholinergic activity in the hippocampal cortex (Suvorov, Suvorova, 1975; Hearst, 1959; Carlton, 1968; Leaton, 1968). This functional weakening is also indirectly indicated by the numerous clusters of Tables 6 and 14, which testify to a substantial increase among sensors in motivations directed toward so-called “trigger stimuli” directly associated with food, sex, drinking, and other purely biological needs and stimuli. By contrast, among intuitives biological motivations are weakened and manipulatory motivations directed toward conditioned and contextual stimuli are relatively strengthened. On the basis of experiments with animals, predominance of reactions of the second type (among intuitives) over reactions of the first type (characteristic of sensors) is customarily associated with weakening of cholinergic and/or noradrenergic influences in the hippocampus (Carlton, 1962; Gasanov, Melikov, 1986).

It is noteworthy that intuitives may also show weakened functions of the premotor cortex of the frontal neocortex and/or of that part of the hippocampal cortex that provides planning of voluntary movements and is likewise associated with cholinergic mediation (cluster 68). The fact that poisoning with central anticholinergic agents that suppress cholinergic activity (amizil, cyclodol, atropine, etc.) reduces memory, worsens the adequacy of image recognition, and at increasing doses also causes hallucinations (normally more characteristic of intuitives than sensors), whereas drugs that enhance central cholinergic activity, for example various organophosphorus inhibitors of the enzyme cholinesterase, do not have such an effect (Traugott et al., 1968; Burnazyan, 1985), also supports weakening of M-cholinergic activity among intuitives. Nevertheless, conclusions about a rigid negative association of intuition with central cholinergic activity seem premature to us. It cannot be excluded that in some brain structures acetylcholine “works” for sensing, while in others it simultaneously contributes to the realization of intuitive cognitive mechanisms.

Almost the same, and to an even greater degree, can be said about the serotonergic system of the hippocampus. Serotonergic neurons strengthen the initially weak reinforcing role of conditioned signals while simultaneously reducing the motivating significance of unconditioned biological reinforcements (Gasanov, Melikov, 1986). The role of the hippocampus noted by P. V. Simonov as an “equalizer” of emotional meanings, specifically increasing the emotional significance of signals whose probabilistic association with satisfaction of current needs is low (Simonov, 1987), is apparently mediated by its serotonergic system. To assess integral central serotonergic activity, we used cluster 26 (Table 2), compiled from the literature (Traugott et al., 1968; Milner, 1973; Burnazyan, 1985; Gasanov, Melikov, 1986; Sinitsky, 1986; Shepherd, 1987; Smirnov, Reznikova, 1988, etc.) and consisting of the following markers characteristic of serotonergic activity: slowing of the rate of activity, tendency toward migraines, tremor, amnesia for recent events, tendency toward states of stupor and immobility, tendency toward stereotyped movements, predominance of melancholic states over anxious ones, distractibility, low muscle tone, perseveration on nonextinguishing orienting reactions during play activity, chilliness and a sensation of cold, reduction in food and sexual motivations, low aggressiveness and high control of undesirable forms of behavior, absence of a need for frequent immediate reinforcement to maintain interest in an activity, low pain sensitivity, intense salivation, avoidance of direct eye contact, taciturnity, loss of pilomotor reflexes, and relative predominance of emotionally colored interest in contextual and conditioned stimuli over interest in unconditioned stimuli (that is, in so-called “trigger” stimuli). Overall, integral whole-brain serotonergic activity, determined from this set of markers (see cluster 26 of Table 2), turns out to be very weakly correlated with positivism, moderately with intuition, and substantially with introversion. Thus, patients with early childhood autism are known to have a sharply elevated level of brain serotonin metabolism, while drugs that lower the level of central serotonin improve their condition. The principal behavioral traits of these patients, taciturnity, avoidance of direct eye contact, and nonextinguishing orienting reactions, correlate mainly with introversion, whereas associations with intuition are small or absent.

If one analyzes the clusters in Table 2 with moderately high loadings on intuition, it is evident that a substantial number of them coincide with traditional markers of predominance of trophotropic regulation, which is known to be accompanied by increased activity of the central serotonergic and peripheral cholinergic systems. These include the cluster of tendency toward stuporous states and melancholic depressions, and the cluster of sensations of suffocation with bronchial spasms (a sensation of insufficient air is most typical of the ILI and IEI TIMs). At the same time, other clusters, although even more weakly associated with intuition, are characteristic, by contrast, of the syndrome of ergotropic dominance (tendency toward low salivation, sweating, tachycardia). On the basis of this “motley” picture, no single unambiguous conclusion can be drawn concerning the association of the intuition-sensing balance with whole-brain serotonergic activity or with the balance of the ergotropic and trophotropic systems.

Nevertheless, the substantial representation in the profiles of intuition and sensing of clusters usually associated with characteristics of central serotonergic and M-cholinergic activity undoubtedly indicates an important local role of these neurotransmitter systems in providing the cognitive mechanisms of intuition and sensing. The important role of serotonergic neurons and of the ergotropic-trophotropic balance in the formation of the intuitives-sensors dichotomy is also indicated by the well-known facts of a sharp reduction in selectivity in the associative process and recognition acts under the influence of ergotropic stimulant-hallucinogens (mescaline, bufotenine, amphetamine, and lysergamide). Lysergamide, which has the strongest effect on cognitive processes, displaces serotonin from its receptors for a prolonged period (Ilyuchenok, 1972; Burnazyan, 1985) and in doing so acts either as a powerful antagonist or, according to some data, as a serotonin agonist,

It is possible that in different regions of the brain, or in providing cognitive processes at different stages, acetylcholine and, especially, serotonin influence intuition and sensing differently.

Level of informational criteria in object recognition

Intuitives are characterized by lowered, excessively generalized and simplified criteria used when matching complex sensory stimuli from the real environment with reference images stored in memory. As a result, matching an appropriate reference image to a real object (and then “seeing” this memory image as if it were a real visible, audible, or felt object) occurs on the basis of a reduced set of elementary features being compared. This leads to the “visible” images of objects arising in an intuitive’s consciousness (as well as auditory and other images of the surrounding world actualized in consciousness) containing fewer concrete details than those of sensors and being more simplified and generalized. A sensor sees a concrete tree before them, one side of whose trunk is greener than the other and on whose outermost leaf a spider web hangs. An intuitive sees a tree in general, and in order to discern its details must consciously direct and concentrate attention.

The impoverishment of directly visible reference images of objects, that is, those penetrating into consciousness, extends among intuitives not only to sensory details but also to the apperception of images, that is, to the complex of all their associative connections and emotional coloring significant for satisfying current needs, actualized simultaneously with “seeing” the image. For this reason, “extreme” intuitives much more often than sensors report symptoms of derealization and depersonalization (clusters 71, 72 of Table 5) – at such moments the visible world seems to them insensible and gray, thoughts about the future and career are frightening because of a strange absence of emotional coloring and semantic content, and close people seem like strangers. This is a consequence of the destruction and impoverishment of the complex apperceptive structure of the perceived image, when at the preliminary subconscious stage of processing and preparation, before the stage of conscious actualization and recognition, its most sensitive emotional-motivational links are “knocked out” after the less important visual details. A sensor sees a tree with different leaves and all its emotional-motivational threads linking it to the subject’s world; an intuitive sees a tree with identical leaves and without an emotionally significant background.

If an intuitive is within the normal range, then the reference images proposed by the subconscious for recognition and the set of elementary features of the object actually used for recognition are more or less balanced “by weight”. This means that the image seen by the intuitive is generalized and deprived of many details, looks rather gray, but at the same time contains no obviously extraneous, alien, unnecessary, illusory details. With a further lowering of the criteria of the recognition apparatus, however, the appearance of perceptual illusions (errors of perception, especially frequent in the visual analyzer at twilight, when the throughput of vision is limited) and visual and auditory pseudohallucinations can already be expected. At this point, the reference images proposed by the subconscious for identification already contain substantially more information than the matching apparatus can compare and verify in a limited time. In this case, the recognition process cannot cope with the task even by impoverishing and generalizing the images admitted into consciousness, from which everything unnecessary is “discarded”. As a result, the person begins to see and hear what is not actually there.

The development of illusions and hallucinations can be traced in examples of model states arising under the influence of psychopharmacological hallucinogenic drugs (some of the most active drugs in this class have increased affinity for serotonin-sensitive neuronal receptors, substituting for and occupying the place of the serotonin molecule in these receptors for a long time, while other hallucinogens lead to hyperexcitation of the ergotropic system). As intoxication develops, perceived objects at first simply seem strangely distorted, while at the periphery of the visual field there arises an illusion of apparent movement (stirring) of objects that are actually motionless (see cluster 16 of Table 2). Then, as intoxication deepens, instead of a soap dish on the edge of the bathtub one may see a box of chocolates or another object similar to the soap dish in general outline (all the sooner the poorer the lighting), while geometric ornaments begin to crawl along the walls (in reality these are the simplest reference images of visual memory breaking into consciousness in response to weak and random stimulation of the retina). Still later, squadrons of enormous dragonflies may appear flying against the walls of the room, companies of cartoon little men may march, etc.; the final formation of pseudohallucinations into integral images occurs when all inhibitory filters and barriers of consciousness have already been broken (Rybalsky, 1983; Störring, 1903; Stolyarov, 1964; Ilyuchenok, 1972).

Hallucinations are provoked and intensified when the eyes are illuminated by flickering light at a frequency of 5-7 Hz – these flickers impose an induced theta rhythm of the same frequency on the hippocampus, and hallucinations manifest at that moment. Theta rhythms are hippocampal in origin, so their influence on hallucinations illustrates the hippocampal origin of the latter. Hallucinations are merely images of unconscious memory, so-called visual reference images, that have broken into consciousness. Therefore, we should not be surprised that actualization in consciousness of any images of subconscious memory is also accompanied by the theta rhythm. According to P. V. Simonov (1987), the theta rhythm is especially characteristic of an active search for ways to satisfy an arising need and is a marker of the quantizing process of extracting from memory engrams information that is compared with current information. In other words, the theta rhythm accompanies the selection of hypotheses in the process of recognition. P. V. Simonov wrote in this work: “The electrophysiological correlate of the mechanism that quantizes the flow of engrams extracted from memory is the theta rhythm, so characteristic of the electrical activity of the hippocampus. All situations in which we observe enhancement of the theta rhythm, whether an orienting reflex, search behavior, organization of complex nonautomated movements, appearance of signs of emotional tension, etc., possess one feature common to all of them: the listed cases require active mobilization of previously developed conditioned connections, extraction of engrams stored in memory for comparison with signals arriving from outside, or revision and recombination of traces in order to construct new adaptive actions. All this makes it possible to speak of the important role of the hippocampus in the creative activity of the brain, in the generation of hypotheses.”

The aforementioned “filters” at the boundary between the subconscious and preconscious, which have different throughput in intuitives and sensors and which we discussed in the preceding section, can be explained in terms of different levels of informational criteria in object recognition. For this, one need only recall that any process of generating hypotheses and, more broadly, any associative process is also a recognition process, and in its course associations meeting certain criteria are selected from subconscious memory in response to a stimulus. Among intuitives, the criteria are, first, simplified; second, the emotional component of biological utility is minimized in them. Because of this, the role of informational affinity between objects according to generalized, class-forming features correspondingly increases. If for a sensor an airplane and a crow are rather very different objects (if only because one cannot fly on a crow, one is alive and the other is not, and they also feed and defecate very differently, etc.), then for an intuitive these objects have much in common – both have wings. This somewhat exaggerated example should make clear the difference between the associative process in intuitives and sensors.

Rate of erasure of perceptual traces

In intuitives, perceptual traces fade and are erased slowly; in sensors, rapidly. First of all, this characteristic is demonstrated among intuitives by the sharply weakened, slowed fading of reference memory images that have “broken through” into consciousness. In strong intuitives this process sometimes occurs with difficulty and “creaking”, requiring conscious effort, but in cases of “extreme intuition” even effort does not always help. As a result, for those strong intuitives who are usually called accentuated schizothymes, various kinds of perceptual and motor “intrusions” are typical.

In sensors, fading and deactualization of insignificant (random), and especially interfering, images or action plans that have already served their purpose occur easily and rapidly; this does not even require conscious effort. Differences between intuitives and sensors in the rate and quality of fading concern not only thought-images and images of visual and auditory representations (clusters 3, 6, 18, 54). The rule of perceptual rigidity also extends to movements (see the increased frequency of episodes with stereotyped repetitive movements among intuitives, clusters 14, 68, 70). To a substantially lesser extent, intrusive phenomena among intuitives can be manifested in the sphere of emotional memories (individual traits within clusters 3, 43, 46), and only very slightly in the rate of extinction of orienting reactions (cluster 233). The rate of extinction of orienting reactions turns out to be associated primarily with another trait, extraversion-introversion; it is higher among extraverts.

The M-cholinergic system of the hippocampal cortex and neocortex is primarily responsible for the rate of extinction of unreinforced conditioned reactions and perceptual images and movement plans that have served their purpose. On the basis of their slowed extinction and displacement, one can hypothesize weakening of the functions of M-cholinergic neurons in certain zones of the hippocampus and neocortex among intuitives.

What, in addition to intrusiveness, results from slowed fading of thought-images and image-representations? First, it leads to multiple competing images and ideas once actualized and extracted from the subconscious remaining in an intuitive’s consciousness for a long time. Second, a substantial number of stimuli retained in parallel in consciousness leads to constant intensified mental activity continuously operating on these stimuli. The number of versions and combinations generated in the course of mental operations with image-stimuli turns out to be excessive relative to the individual’s current needs. Third, image-stimuli do not immediately fade even after their use and after a decision has been made, and this leads to further production of additional and extraneous mental output not directly associated with satisfying current needs. This constant additional output, constituting the lion’s share of intuitives’ mental production, is a typical mental “Glass Bead Game”, and it is created “in reserve” or as pure abstract fantasy, for speculative rather than real situations.

Opposition between orienting-exploratory activity and satisfaction of biological needs; manipulatory and biological motivations; contextual or conditioned stimuli and unconditioned “trigger” stimuli

Intuitives are characterized by increased interest in conditioned and contextual stimuli not directly associated with satisfaction of biological needs, as well as in orienting-exploratory activity that uses these stimuli as objects. Hence the inquisitiveness and curiosity of intuitives. Intuitives often lengthen their path to a goal, because they receive greater emotional reinforcement not from discharge of a biological need but from orienting-exploratory acts along the way.

Sensors, by contrast, have strengthened and consistently directed biological motivations. First and foremost, they are oriented toward so-called “trigger”, unconditioned stimuli, that is, directly toward the reinforcing elements of reflexes (sex, food, drink, safety, social status, money, etc.). Approaching satisfaction of a biological need by the shortest route, sensors receive the greatest emotional reinforcement.

Intuitives possess a feel for everything novel, unusual, and magical, insight into what is special in the ordinary, and a pull toward cognition; they often experience pleasant feelings of “revelation” from comprehending some new truth.

Sensors neglect cognition of the novel and prefer what is tested and tried. The worldview of sensors is more ordinary. Their interest in stimulus novelty is not only weakened; even paroxysms of illusory feelings of “never having seen this before” (opposite to feelings of “déjà vu”) occur substantially less often among them. One gets the impression that of the two kinds of hippocampal detectors, detectors for novelty and detectors for the recognizable ordinariness of stimuli, the former are triggered more often in intuitives and the latter in sensors.

The literature contains numerous works indicating the existence of motivational factors that are not directly associated with primary biological motivations. Rats, for example, may prefer a novel or complex stimulus or an increase in illumination. Different authors have called this tendency of animals and humans toward stimuli in the stimulus environment that do not promise direct satisfaction of a biological need by different names: competence, the concept of curiosity and exploration, the term “stimulus change”, secondary motivation, and manipulatory motivation (Gasanov, Melikov, 1986). Manipulatory motivation seems to us the more successful term. There is an inverse, reciprocal relationship between the activity of biological and manipulatory motivations. The hippocampus of animals and humans is precisely the organ in the CNS where control is provided over feedback relations between centers of biological and manipulatory reinforcement, or between strong biological and weaker conditioned reinforcement (Asratyan, 1978).

Experiments involving application of different neurotransmitters to the hippocampal cortex of animals have shown that acetylcholine and noradrenaline contribute to strengthening the direct role of biological motivations, whereas serotonin equalizes the emotional meanings of stimuli, contributing to a relative increase in the role of conditioned stimuli as behavior-reinforcing elements (Gasanov, Melikov, 1986). Thus, a cat whose hippocampus has been treated with serotonin, in conditioned-reflex experiments in which a feeder opens after a light comes on and a pedal is pressed, pays more attention to the pedal and the light, playing with them for a long time with pleasure, and only afterward attends to the feeder. At the same time, simple contextual stimuli of the experimental chamber that have no conditioned reinforcing significance at all do not interest the cat. Serotonin in the hippocampus thus equalizes the strength of already existing emotional meanings of signals, specifically increasing the reinforcing motivational meanings of comparatively weak conditioned stimuli and partly weakening the motivating meanings of initially strong trigger stimuli (in this case, the feeder).

We have already written above that the association between the level of serotonergic activity and intuition is not obvious (it is more likely an association of this activity with introversion). However, intuition may be associated with the level of M-cholinergic and noradrenergic activity, and negatively so.

When an intuitive explains interest in some subject by saying that it is “simply INTERESTING”, the person is declaring a dominant need for “pure” orienting-exploratory activity, provided by late emotional-motivational components of the orienting reflex that are nonspecific with respect to other needs. This need is almost indifferent to what the obtained results will be needed for, perhaps to provide for certain biological or social needs, or perhaps there are no such needs at all. The main measure of positive emotional anticipation from the results of orienting-exploratory activity is its own “processual” emotional component, and it is determined exclusively by the “interestingness” of the problem, that is, by the extent to which the problem being investigated is key to better “settling”, to increasing the interlinkage of new information and reference images of objects and situations already existing in memory. This manifests the strengthened component of manipulatory motivations among intuitives. Like an earthworm, an intuitive constantly passes any available information through themselves, digests it, deprives it of particulars that do not fit the general scheme by searching for and discovering generalizing rules, and makes the new old and known. This process of “information digestion” is sustained by a special pleasure accompanying it, specific precisely to intuitives.

The opposition of intuitives and sensors in relation to exploratory activity and biological motivations correlates in the population with the oppositions of abstractness-concreteness, generality-detailedness, breadth-narrowness of associative-selectivity tuning, vagueness-accuracy of recognition, multiplicity-singularity of subconscious hypotheses proposed to consciousness in response to a stimulus, slowness-rapidity of image fading, and others. Thus, all these properties constitute a single tightly interconnected syndrome complex.

Hypothetical mechanisms of the “abstractness-concreteness” opposition

The clusters in Table 7 characterize the “abstractness-concreteness” opposition. A tendency toward abstractions and generalizations, speculative thinking, and preference for the general and generalized over the particular and detailed are characteristic and among the most indicative traits of all intuitives.

Thus, an almost indispensable difference between intuitives and sensors is a tendency to view any events through the prism of generalization. A sensor will say: “Petya was 25 minutes late yesterday; I waited for him in the rain by Kazansky railway station. I know he did it deliberately.” An intuitive will say about the same event: “This young man made me wait a huge amount of time. I have always noticed that quick operators like him are unreliable and nasty, and the one goes together with the other.” The second short statement, compared with the first, contains numerous generalizations (“young man” and “like him” instead of “Petya”, “a huge amount of time” instead of “25 minutes”, “always”, omission of the specific location of the events, and a final conclusion with the generalizing moral “the one goes together with the other”).

The cause of these differences is most likely multifactorial. First, abstractness of thinking may be caused by the low degree of detail in perceived images of the external world, which in turn gives rise to a tendency toward perceptual economy and use of more economical generalized, class-forming features. Second, abstractness of thinking may be caused by the constant presence in consciousness of multiple competing images and ideas against the background of the heightened orienting-exploratory need characteristic of intuitives, which constantly strives to order them and isolate a common recognizable quality within them.

Both of these causes, however, can be described in the form of a single mechanism. The broader the band in which response-images are supplied from the subconscious to consciousness, the farther apart they are from one another in the multidimensional space of primary features. The relatedness of these images to one another, distinguishing them from the family of other images, is described by a certain separating hyperplane drawn in multidimensional feature space. The farther apart in content the images on one side of the hyperplane are, the more abstract and generalized the feature expressed by the corresponding hyperplane. Because the criteria for distinguishing objects among intuitives are impoverished in the number of features simultaneously considered, more diverse objects end up on one side of the hyperplane for them than for sensors. This means that the corresponding hyperplane will correspond among intuitives to a maximally abstract and generalized feature. At the next stage of abstraction, the hyperplanes themselves will be classified (criteria for separating and sorting criteria). This gives rise to abstractions of an even higher level. Among sensors this stage usually falls out altogether, because they are not characterized by a need for infinitely self-deepening analysis of the results of analysis, characteristic of orienting-exploratory activity. For example, reflections on how justice differs from fairness bring an intuitive direct sensory pleasure within satisfaction of the orienting reflex. The result of these reflections then enriches the intuitive’s conceptual apparatus, expanding for the future the space of abstractions fixed in memory and available for manipulation. For a sensor, pleasure from this kind of “developmental thinking” will be almost zero; the sensor will prefer to think about much more practical topics, more closely associated with the possibility of obtaining concrete and near-term pragmatic benefit.

Level of sensory and perceptual sensitivity

One frequent and characteristic trait of socionic sensing in humans is increased sensitivity of taste and smell (clusters 217, 218). Accordingly, in the group of intuitives taste and smell are substantially weakened on average. It is noteworthy that sensitivity among intuitives is most weakened in those sensory modalities that are most closely and directly associated with satisfaction of biological needs (food, sex).

In the speech-auditory analyzer, the reduction of sensory sensitivity among intuitives is minimal, presumably because of the generally higher development of inner-speech functions among them. It cannot be completely excluded that the reductions in sensitivity observed in the questionnaires (including in the gustatory and olfactory analyzers, where this reduction appears maximal) may partly represent not a physiological primary cause but a secondary consequence. The primary cause in this case may be a reduction in attentional resources allocated to the sensory sphere and a low level of training in this sphere. But primary functional weakening of the internal basomedial zones of the frontal cortex (facing the fissure between the hemispheres), which are responsible for the function of smell, and of the zones of the medial temporal cortex located “toward the occiput” from them, which are responsible for the function of taste, is also possible. Incidentally, the cortical zones associated with memory for names and designations of objects (this memory is especially weakened among intuitives) are also located adjacent to the gustatory zone (slightly closer to the occiput) in the fissure between the hemispheres, in the internal medial temporal region. It is true that a music-recognition zone is also located in relative proximity (in the lower fold of the basomedial cortex), but the intuition-sensing balance does not correlate with any of the three “musical” clusters (love of listening to music, musical ear, memory for melodies).

If the weakening of smell among intuitives is regarded as primarily determined at the physiological level, it can be assumed that deterioration of olfaction at one time served as an impetus for the development of intuitive mechanisms. At the stage when humans separated from anthropoid apes (3-5 million years ago), changes occurred in the genotype of our ancestors that were associated with a substantial deterioration in olfaction (“Humans lost their acuity of smell as they became Homo sapiens” // Izvestiya.Ru: 21.03.2003, 16:20 – www.izv.info). M. Stovpyuk (2003) writes: “…Sensors count on the repeatability of events, whereas intuitives count on one event soon being replaced by another. This is where the roots lie of the former’s fixation on behavior that has already served its purpose and the latter’s indecisiveness and uncertainty. (…) But cataclysms that fundamentally change the habitat do not occur very often in comparison with the lifespan of a living creature. What if changes, for some reason, become more frequent? For example, because those same protohumans actively exploit surrounding resources? It follows that intuition, like logic, could develop only with the emergence of speech in humans, as well as with Homo sapiens actively developing new territories, new tools, and new hunting techniques. (…) …Mutations interfering with normal olfactory functioning continued to accumulate most rapidly precisely on the human branch. Apparently, excessively strong smells of the world interfered with concentration on the overall perception of the situation… Thus, the mean of the dichotomy under consideration … shifted noticeably toward intuition compared with the mean among anthropoid apes. It is precisely around this new ‘zero’ that specialization could occur, now into intuitives and sensors. For although life began changing faster, it still did not change very fast. In addition to discovering new possibilities and predicting turns in the fate of the tribe, innovations had to be introduced, refined, and applied, in which intuitive types are not always strong, just as they are not always strong in solving everyday life problems. Distribution of material resources and questions of power also remained with the sensing functions. (…) Since the development of human intuitive abilities occurred at the expense of losing sensory qualities (still necessary for survival, development of space, and distribution of material resources), some dispersion in these abilities among different individuals had to be preserved for the successful development of the entire population.” The evolutionary-species formation of intuition described in M. Stovpyuk’s reasoning, with preservation of diversification of the population into subgroups of sensors and intuitives, seems quite plausible to us.

If one assumes that the brain’s main sensory functions gravitate toward ancient and old cortical regions concentrated in the mediobasal areas of the cerebral cortex and in the hippocampus, while intuitive functions develop in human phylogeny and ontogeny together with expansion of the area of the convexital neocortex, it follows that the opposition of intuitives and sensors has some relation to the opposition of upper and lower cortical regions. Most likely, of course, the differences between intuitives and sensors are not limited to this.

In any case, the hypothesis concerning an association between the evolutionary formation of intuition and weakening of the functions of the olfactory brain requires careful investigation because, if confirmed, it may shed light on the most “fundamental”, including biochemical, mechanisms differentiating intuitives from sensors. Since the intuitive substrate practically coincides with the “substrate” of schizotypy, and some psychopathologies in psychiatry are also associated with this substrate, the corresponding studies could therefore reveal the nosology and pathogenesis of the principal mental illnesses as well. Unfortunately, the mediobasal regions of the cortex are difficult to study because they are hard to access and “hidden” deep in the brain. Perhaps this is one reason why the intuition-sensing factor has still found no reflection at all in clinical neuropsychological studies.

Hypothesis of a predominant association of intuitive functions with the left cerebral hemisphere

The reliable tendency toward predominance of the right eye as the dominant eye among intuitives (cluster 21) can be interpreted as a tendency toward a more active role of certain regions of the left cerebral hemisphere, but an unambiguous conclusion on the basis of a single cluster would be premature, especially since this concerns only a reliable statistical tendency and by no means one-hundred-percent “right-eyedness” among all intuitives.

Thus, clusters No. 41 and 42 (Table 2) are not correlated with the intuition-sensing balance, but they are characteristic neuropsychological markers of the activity of regions of the left and right inferior temporal cortex associated with visual perception (Leushina et al., 1981a, 1981b, 1982a, 1982b; Glezer, 1985). We placed them in Table 2 precisely to illustrate this noteworthy fact: the balance of activity of the right and left inferior temporal cortex (determined from the neuropsychological questionnaire markers we used) is in no way correlated with predominance of intuition or sensing.

At the same time, a number of other considerations indirectly indicate a predominant association of intuition with functions of the left cerebral hemisphere. According to E. A. Golubeva (Golubeva, 1980), dominance of the left hemisphere is characterized by exploratory orienting behavior, predominance of recoding functions in memory, predominance of verbal functions in the structure of intelligence, and predominance of the voluntary “conscious” sphere in decision-making, that is, precisely those characteristics more typical of intuitives. Dominance of the right hemisphere is characterized by nonspecific orienting behavior, dominance of imprinting functions in memory, predominance of nonverbal functions (including visual ones) in the structure of intelligence, and predominance of the involuntary sphere in decision-making – all of this is indeed more typical of sensors.

Association between intuition and schizotypy

Attention is drawn to the fact that many clusters in Table 2 characteristic of the intuitive pole are simultaneously regarded in psychiatry as markers of disorders of the schizotypal spectrum, and in a number of cases in their meaning even approach the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Schneiderian 1st-rank symptoms, including auditory pseudohallucinations, a feeling that thoughts are open to others, etc.). On the basis of these and other experimental data of ours not included in the present article, it should be acknowledged that belonging to the intuitive pole and so-called schizotypal accentuation of personality considered within the normal range are, to a substantial extent, one and the same. Most intuitives, it is true, have no manifestations of visual or auditory intrusions, illusions, deceptions, or hallucinations. But their selectivity of the associative process is also reduced, images of the subconscious are partially “raised” into consciousness and are experienced as a peculiar swarming of numerous spontaneous images and thoughts continually replacing one another, while biological motivations are weakened. The same psychological symptoms are also observed in many patients with schizophrenia, and during exacerbation of the illness these characteristics intensify. Where, then, is the boundary between normality and pathology? It is by no means in the presence or absence of first-rank symptoms, which occasionally occur in completely mentally healthy intuitives as well (for example, in states of severe fatigue, in sleep-transition states, etc.). The distinction between normality and illness is not quantitative but qualitative. In the case of schizophrenia it is, in general, exactly the same as the distinction between normality and exogenous poisoning by psychotomimetics. Both schizophrenia as an illness and exogenous model psychoses are not a lawful continuation of the continuum of normality, no matter how schizotypal its symptomatology may be. Similarity of individual symptoms does not mean identity of mechanisms. Illness is a pathological process with its own onset and outcome. Unlike illness, a person’s psychological characteristics within the normal range are determined not by morbid pathological causes but by genetic and natural internal causes, and these characteristics are fully adapted to the environment and stable over time, that is, devoid of progression. The biochemical mechanisms of progressively developing schizophrenia, accompanied by rapid growth of intellectual and emotional deficit with gradual obligatory degradation of the creative principle in a person, are unlikely to be strongly similar to the biochemical mechanisms that form a stable intuitive pole and provide intuitives with enhanced creative advantages throughout their lives. In the same way, the action of mescaline, lysergamide, psilocybin, or another hallucinogen cannot be equated with a complete model of intuition, just as cholinesterase blockers cannot be equated with an exaggerated model of the sensing pole, and not only because of the special temporal dynamics of the clinical picture and the transient nature of intoxication. Much more important is that a hallucinogen at the peak of intoxication selectively enhances certain manifestations of intuition while suppressing others. Likewise, any cholinesterase blocker in its effects only remotely and very fragmentarily resembles strengthening of the sensing pole in its individual aspects, and in exactly the same way the effects of the neuroleptics aminazine and reserpine resemble typical manifestations of introversion only in isolated features. Therefore pathological states are almost always a separate matter. Only partly can they be regarded as a model for nonmorbid individual characteristics, but they cannot be fully identified even with extreme manifestations of stable normality. The invalidity of such identification follows by no means from considerations of political correctness; it is grounded in possible differences in the physiological mechanisms of the corresponding states. Thus, for example, only the positive symptomatology of schizophrenia is linked with the intuitive pole, whereas traits close to the negative symptoms of this illness (including emotional flattening in patients) correlate in the population with the sensing pole.

Another interesting cluster in this respect, “separating” schizophrenia in one direction and intuition together with a normal schizotypal personality disposition in the other, is cluster 22 (predisposition toward frequent yawning). According to our data (1100 subjects), this trait is correlated with intuition. In terms of its associations with individual clusters, it correlates positively not only with a predisposition toward subjective sensations of insufficient oxygen and suffocation but also with absent-mindedness, concentration on one’s own thoughts, weakening of memory for recent events, words, and names, increased autonomic emotional reactivity (sweating, palpitations, finger tremor in situations of agitation), “serotonergic” stuporous melancholy, increased indifference to real biological needs, love of freedom, intuitive “vagueness” and jumps of thought, empathy, and sensitivity to punishment. It also correlates positively with errors and confusion in vocalizing sounds in words and difficulties pronouncing vocally difficult words (the words “prostranstvo”, “transcendentnost”, etc.), and also, at a very high level, with positive schizotypal symptomatology such as thought intrusions, visual and auditory illusions, and pseudohallucinations. At the same time, the trait “frequent yawns” correlates negatively with “rigidity” of personal behavior, preference for definite and rigid social structures and relationships, strength of biological needs, concentration on the present moment, practicality and dislike of abstractions, self-confidence, and indifference to one’s own errors and failures. This trait was also studied in 2003 in the work of a number of researchers from the United States (Kind people catch yawns: Self-awareness makes some yawn-susceptible. – http://www.nature.com/nsu/030728/030728-2.html). Steven Platek of Drexel University in Philadelphia, Ronald Baenninger of Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and their colleagues from the State University of New York at Albany attempted in a series of experiments to determine why some people yawn frequently and are susceptible to other people’s yawning, while others are not. According to Baenninger, yawning makes it possible to maintain the activity of an awakened brain in situations where sleep is undesirable. This author argues that a real deficit of oxygen in the air or excess carbon dioxide has practically no effect on yawning frequency. According to Steven Platek’s results, people who are not susceptible to contagious yawning often also fail to notice tactlessness and even insults directed toward other people and do not understand that this may cause someone pain. By contrast, the ability to identify oneself with other people, susceptibility to others’ mood (empathy), as well as a tendency toward mental introspection and the “self-probing” characteristic of intuitives, are correlated with the unconscious desire to yawn in response when others yawn (this fully coincides with our experimental results presented above). At the same time, it is important that patients with schizophrenia marked by emotional flattening rarely yawn and are little susceptible to “contagious” yawning. Comparing all these facts, one can conclude that frequent yawning, and contagious yawning especially, are correlated with intuition, empathy, and a number of positive schizotypy-like manifestations, whereas among processual schizophrenic patients marked by emotional deficit, yawning frequency turns out to be even below the population average.

On some widespread myths and misconceptions

On psychological Internet forums one often encounters the assumption or even the assertion that intuitives possess a more “vivid” imagination in terms of the eidetic vividness of their mental image-representations. This is simply incorrect (see Table 13). Eidetic vividness and the ability voluntarily to imagine visual, auditory, and olfactory images “on demand” do not correlate with intuition-sensing at all, while the ability voluntarily to generate vivid tactile images mentally shows a positive correlation, but not with intuition at all; on the contrary, it correlates precisely with the sensing pole of the trait. Visual eidetism (vividness of mental visual images) is determined mainly by extraversion, whereas auditory and tactile eidetism are determined by ethics.

Another myth concerns the increased religiosity of intuitives (as though a substantial proportion of them were destined from birth to be mystics and therefore parishioners of some church). This assertion also turns out to be incorrect (see cluster 229). As for the choice between materialism and idealism, here too the opposition of intuitives and sensors has nothing to do with it. Materialism is chosen more often by logicals, idealism by ethicals.

The functions of the physical sense of time, the ability to orient oneself in it and manage the expenditure of one’s own time, which according to many studies are associated with the right frontal cortex, likewise do not at all prove to be the prerogative of the intuitive pole (on the contrary, they show a weak correlation with sensing). Time acquires special significance for intuitives only in the sense that their current present, compared with that of sensors, expands, owing to frequent thoughts about the past and future, from several seconds, minutes, and hours among sensors to scales of years and centuries. For an intuitive, the actually existing world is both what existed in the era of Voltaire and Chesterfield and what awaits humanity in one hundred and one thousand years. Past, present, and future form a single whole for the intuitive, which can be united by the word “that which occurs”. For a sensor, everything is different. An intuitive’s better ability to forecast does not arise from a special relationship with the sense of physical time (which appears no more congenial to the intuitive than to sensors; see cluster 230), but only from the habit of regarding the future as part of the actual and interesting present and therefore constantly analyzing that future in all its potential versions.

There are no differences between intuitives and sensors in the level of personal truthfulness or mendacity, but there is a difference in their attitude toward the values of openness and publicly accessible information. Openness is noticeably more preferred by intuitives than by sensors (clusters 84, 89), although the difference between democrats and aristocrats in this respect is still more substantial.

There are no differences between intuitives and sensors in the level of neuroticism (in the sense of H. Eysenck); pallor and flushing, hyperemia of the facial skin (highly characteristic signs of the ergotropic-trophotropic and sympathetic-parasympathetic balance), occur with equal frequency among them. There are no correlations whatsoever of intuition with impatience and restlessness, conflict-proneness and explosiveness, caution and foresight, hypochondriasis, tolerance of monotony, tendency toward criticism, talkativeness, pessimism and optimism, general mood level, rigidity of social morality, self-assessed intelligence (although objectively the intellectual test scores of intuitives are higher), openness and frankness, tendency toward intrigue, initiative, sociability, modesty, emotional rigidity, activity and industriousness, tendency to recheck oneself, etc., etc.

Intuition and sensing in different psychological paradigms

The “Big Five” model of personality factors

Since the time of R. Cattell (Cattell and other, 1970), classical “trait theory” in differential psychology has postulated a linear-additive contribution of each psychological trait to the prediction of behavior. According to Cattell, the effect of the joint action of several psychological traits is expressed by a linear polynomial of the magnitude of all traits, with coefficients for each of them characterizing the influence of the given trait on the effect of interest. A similar linear model, assuming a twofold increase in the effect when the magnitude of the influencing trait changes twofold, also underlies all procedures of linear factor analysis. Psychological mechanisms that do not fit the linear model remain invisible to factor analysis, although they can be detected by other methods (for example, cluster analysis).

In studies of personality traits using linear factorization methods, from 5 to 10 factors are usually identified, depending on the size of the experimental sample (10 or more factors can be stably identified only in samples exceeding 1000 respondents). Since in practice both the number of questions in a questionnaire and sample size are limited, most studies obtain 5-6 factors. Owing to the NEO-PI diagnostic questionnaire (McCrae, Costa, 1990), which became popular among psychologists, the notion of the “Big Five” factors has become established in recent decades, although these 5 personality factors had already been obtained in D. Fiske’s work in 1949 (Fiske, 1949). The “Big Five” consists of factors of extraversion (energy), friendliness (agreeableness), this factor combines properties of socionic ethics and judiciousness, conscientiousness (consciousness, competence, order; this factor practically coincides with the socionic rationality-irrationality trait), and emotional instability, a factor close to Eysenck’s neuroticism and to socionic constructivism, which also includes individual elements of impulsivity, that is, irrationality. The “five” is completed by a combined factor of openness to new experience and intelligence; in meaning this factor is very close to socionic intuition with some addition of ethics. Consequently, the “intuitives-sensors” trait is reflected in the “Big Five” psychological factors.

What was obtained in English-speaking samples is also confirmed in Russian-speaking samples. As a result of linear varimax factorization of combined data from “group personality assessment” and a repertory construct test completed by each subject “for oneself”, M. Tikhonova and A. Shmelev (Shmelev, 2002) obtained five personality factors approximately corresponding to the well-known “Big Five” personality factors. In this study, intuition-sensing did not form its own independent factor but was “smeared” across two factors. With the greatest weight it entered factor No. 1 (“intellectual freedom”), characterizing extraordinariness-ordinariness, innovation-conservatism, insight-superficiality. But it also entered factor No. 3 (“friendliness”) through such clusters as dreaminess-realism, refinement-coarseness, peacefulness-aggression.

In a study by D. Digman and A. Kondratieva (cited in Shmelev, 2002), teachers rated 480 first-grade pupils using a list of 60 adjectives. Among the five factors identified, the intuition-sensing factor emerged in a fairly pure form (with an admixture of intelligence level) and ranked second in weight. An analogous experiment was conducted on an American child sample using an analogous list of adjectives; the factor structure in that study also proved practically the same.

When 187 Russian-language questions of Cattell’s questionnaire (16PF version) were factorized, five factors were obtained (Shmelev, 2002) that coincided very precisely with McCrae and Costa’s “Big Five” factors. Intuition-sensing appeared as the fifth factor by weight, “openness of mind” (romanticism-pragmatism), showing a slight “ethical tinge” at the intuitive pole.

The number of psychological factors obtained in such studies and the directions of the factor axes identified (whether intuition appears in pure form or mixed with components of ethics or logic, etc.) should not hypnotize us at all. All of these things are highly conditional. First, factor studies of psychological questionnaires identify only those traits for which questions have been built into the questionnaire. If items concerning preferred cuisine and certain cultural traditions are included in a survey of students at an American college, we may identify a factor dividing the sample into students of Asian and European origin. If the needed questions are not included in the questionnaire, the factor will remain fundamentally undetectable.

Second, if questions characterizing, for example, a view of the world “through rose-colored glasses” (one of the properties of positivism we have identified) are represented in the questionnaire by three or four items, while questions on extraversion are represented by fifty items, then the positivism trait encoded in 4 questions will completely “drown” in the influence of extraversion, and the factor corresponding to it will merge with the extraversion factor. In order for the positivism factor to be clearly identified separately, the questionnaire must contain no fewer questions corresponding to it than questions on vertedness (vertedness is better reflected in respondents’ self-observation and self-reports, so questions on vertedness correlate with one another better than questions on positivism; accordingly, there should be more items on positivism).

Third, nuances in question wording are important. For example, if questions on intuition are directed predominantly toward the humanities, the corresponding factor will necessarily acquire a “tilt” toward ethics. If questions on scientific activity predominate, the tilt will instead be toward logic. Thus, in order to identify the “correct” factor structure from a questionnaire, we must in a sense already know it beforehand and a priori; otherwise it will not be possible to construct the diagnostic questionnaire correctly for subsequent factorization. The result would appear to be a kind of vicious circle. It can be broken only by long-term studies with gradual successive approximations to the truth. In short-term experiments with questionnaires constructed in advance within the framework of some preconceived concept, this is rarely possible. The collective experience of practicing psychologists may be much more productive in this respect, because it is formed over years using a method of successive approximations. For this reason, the many years of socionic experience in determining the boundaries of types and traits are very important for psychological science. Under no circumstances should this experience be dismissed as supposedly “unscientific”.

Fourth, sample characteristics exert a strong influence on the results of factorization. If a sample is composed only of NF and ST types, the factors will reflect not four functions (N, F, S, T) but exclusively their pairs. Almost the same result will be obtained if certain paired “linkages” of functions simply predominate in the sample. The predominance in the population of representatives of NF types (“humanitarians”) over NT types (“researchers”) may precisely explain the “linkage” of intuitive and ethical functions obtained in most factor studies. It is clear that this linkage does not at all have to reflect some common physiological mechanisms, if such mechanisms are not the principal cause of the uneven representation of humanitarians and researchers in the population.

Fifth, linear factor analysis has its limitations. One of them is the loss of information about nonlinear interaction of traits, which in reality always takes place. Another is the limited number of factors identified, even if a larger number of them had knowingly and a priori been built into the questionnaire. This circumstance is related to the fact that questionnaire items intended to identify “weak” factors are, as a rule, also loaded on “strong” factors. Owing to the statistical law of “large numbers”, this noise is not dangerous when there are many subjects, but in comparatively small samples (within 300 people), factors with numbers above 5-6 as a rule “drown” in the noise of stronger factors. The third limitation is the a priori impossibility of determining by factor-analysis methods the so-called “correct” direction of factor axes. Factors are determined only up to their linear combinations. Different procedures of “additional rotation” according to formalized criteria (varimax rotation, etc.) often prove weak or even false assistants. For rotation to lead to the “correct” result, that correct result must already have been built into the structure of the questionnaire from the outset. But questionnaires are constructed by people, not by nature. Therefore, in studies of personality structure it is very important to rely on so-called objective primary traits reflecting psychiatric, neuropsychological, and psychopharmacological syndromes. These properties are more objective and more accurately characterize the natural structure of personality than the structure of language, culture, or, still more, an arbitrary concept of the researcher.

Thus, neither the number of factors in personality models developed on the basis of factor studies nor the directions of the factor axes in these models can be regarded as dogma and a standard to which one must conform. In any case, they are not standards for socionics, whose theoretical models and directions of basic traits apparently reflect the physiological mechanisms of the brain better than “cultural” factor models of personality. Within personality theories based on factor analysis, the directions of the principal factors are selected so that the first factors absorb the maximum variance of respondents’ answers to a psychological questionnaire. In this case, the factor axes inevitably deviate “to the side” from socionic directions, absorbing part of the variance of weak socionic traits. In contrast to this method, in socionics the search for the direction of axes should be based not on the criterion of maximizing factor variance but on the criterion of maximizing inter-factor nonlinear relations, owing to which the product of any two factors correlates to the greatest degree with a third factor. It is clear that the “socionic criterion” for the direction of factor axes leads to a different solution than standard factor-analysis methods. Moreover, the socionic criterion always yields the same invariant solution (on the basis of any questionnaire and any sample), whereas variance-maximization criteria lead authors each time to different directions of factor axes, depending on the homogeneity of the sample and on the percentage representation in the questionnaire used of questions on different socionic traits. For this reason, in that part of contemporary psychology of individual differences that continues to use standard factor-analysis methods, voluntarism in the choice of a coordinate system for describing personality still prevails to this day, and even within a single school, for example among proponents of the “Big Five”, factor directions “wander” by 5-15 degrees among different authors.

Let us note another circumstance important for evaluating some of the experimental results we obtained. The fifth factor, “openness to new experience”, which is most closely associated with intuition and is measured by the NEO-PI or similar standard five-factor questionnaires, a priori contains no schizotypal traits in its diagnostic base. Yet positive correlations with schizotypal manifestations defined according to the DSM-III-R psychiatric classification have been found for all of the clusters of this factor most heavily loaded on intuition (three of six). The overall correlation coefficient of factor “O” with schizotypal manifestations, according to different data, ranges from 0,47 to 0,56 (Ostendorf, 2002). This is fully consistent with our results concerning the inclusion of schizotypal markers in the profile of intuitive qualities.

MMPI

Not all psychological typologies of personality reduce to models of linear factor analysis. For example, prediction of personality traits within the long-standing and highly popular MMPI psychodiagnostic questionnaire (Hathaway, McKinley, 1967; Berezin et al., 1976) is methodologically very reminiscent of that socionics which “believes” in Reinin traits. In the MMPI it is likewise assumed that nonlinear dependencies predominate in the multidimensional space of personality traits. Therefore, points and regions lying at different distances from the origin are by no means assigned a proportional increase in the corresponding traits. Moreover, traits can interact nonlinearly, generating in certain zones of psychological space new qualities that cannot be reduced to a linear sum of the coordinates of basic traits. According to the rules adopted in the MMPI, prediction of one trait at some point in space depends not only on the coordinate along that trait’s own axis but also on the values of other traits at that point.

The usefulness of the MMPI example for our article is not limited to illustrating the circumstance that socionics is not the only system today to recognize and state nonlinear mechanisms of trait generation (recall that the product of two socionic traits generates a third; for example, intuition*extraversion=carefreeness). The MMPI also effectively has its own scale for intuition, scale No. 8. A moderate elevation of scores on scale No. 8 is interpreted as “originality of thinking”, and this fact is regarded as highly positive for creative workers. An excessively strong elevation of the eighth scale, however, already signifies intensified manifestation of symptomatology of the schizotypal spectrum, including positive symptomatology (intrusions, hallucinations, etc.). By itself, however, this means only schizotypy within the normal range, while a diagnosis of “schizophrenic symptomatology of disintegration of thinking” is made only if this elevation corresponds to values of other questionnaire scales characteristic of schizophrenia (interaction of traits!), and if the diagnosis is also independently confirmed by clinical observations.

Thus, the MMPI intuition axis describing originality of thinking, in its continuation, like the openness factor of the five-factor questionnaire, leads to positive (but not negative!) symptomatology of the schizotypal spectrum. The same result, as already stated above, was experimentally obtained by us for socionic intuition.

The I. Briggs-Myers system and American type theory

In conclusion to this section, let us consider ideas about intuition and sensing in the American type-theory system founded by I. Briggs-Myers, which is closely related to socionics. Judging from review works, in American type theory the poles of intuition and sensing are defined with consideration of the following principal substantive clusters:

Intuition:

interest in the future;

love of wordplay, puns, and paradoxes;

curiosity and inquisitiveness;

generality and abstractness, lack of concreteness in mental output;

parallel thoughts simultaneously about several different things;

neglect of details;

inquisitiveness, striving to understand everything oneself, to find deep interconnections;

indifference to absolute time – an intuitive’s time is simultaneously present “everywhere”;

tendency to indulge in fantasies;

concentrated absent-mindedness.

Sensing:

concreteness in the sense of dislike of abstractions;

concreteness in the sense of clarity and definiteness;

conservatism and attraction to the familiar and tested;

dislike of fantasizing;

sequentiality;

need for clear instructions;

focus on details rather than on the whole;

focus on the present;

requirement for visual demonstrability and tangibility in evidence and facts;

requirement for tangibility of the result.

It is easy to see that the list given precisely coincides with the principal empirically identified clusters of socionic intuition and sensing (Table 1). It is true that the set of diagnostic traits of intuition-sensing in American type theory is incomplete; it, including the Keirsey questionnaire, lacks some of the important substantive clusters presented in Table 1, including:

• predominant orientation toward contextual stimuli among intuitives compared with orientation toward satisfaction of biological needs among sensors;
• arousal of an effective thought process by background sensory stimulation among intuitives compared with an increase in its effectiveness under sensory deprivation among sensors;
• intensive mental work and predominance of the conscious level of action regulation among intuitives compared with predominance of automated reactions among sensors;
• low accuracy of perceptual recognition, increased probability of perceptual errors, illusions, and pseudohallucinations (positive symptomatology) among intuitives compared with high accuracy and error-free perceptual recognition among sensors;
• reduced absolute and differential sensitivity in the sensory modalities among intuitives compared with high sensitivity among sensors (especially in olfactory and gustatory modalities);
• impaired visuospatial abilities among intuitives compared with good abilities among sensors;
• low level of motor dexterity and coordination among intuitives compared with good motor abilities among sensors;
• slowed displacement of thought-images, perceptual images, and movement plans that have “served their purpose” among intuitives compared with rapid displacement and efficient deactualization among sensors;
• weak visual memory, memory gaps for recent events, and difficulties recalling names and designations of objects among intuitives compared with good memory among sensors.

With the exception of the first three, the other listed clusters have a negatively evaluative character with respect to the capabilities and abilities of intuitives. This justifies not including them in short diagnostic questionnaires, where it is important to ensure an equal contribution of social dissimulation to opposite poles of the scales. The absence of some clusters from a questionnaire, however, does not at all mean that they cease to be correlates of the measured trait. For example, automatism of reactions, as adaptation to repetitive, monotonous actions, is not directly diagnosed by instruments of the American type-theory system, but nevertheless correlates negatively with the values of the “intuition-sensing” trait measured within that system and, on this basis, is confidently classified by American proponents of the Myers-Briggs typology (Tieger, 2001) as a sensing rather than intuitive characteristic.

Overall, it must be stated that there is no appreciable difference between the socionic “intuitives-sensors” trait and intuition-sensing as interpreted by the American type theory grouped around the MBTI® questionnaire. However, the trait of intuition in both socionics and type theory differs substantially from the “openness” factor in the “Big Five” factors. There, ethics is added to intuition within the factor, and clusters associated with different Jungian functions simultaneously participate in the calculation of overall “openness”. The reason for this persistent mixing of functions obtained in factor studies, where intuition is mixed with ethics and sensing with logic, may be the different frequency with which functions are linked in the population. Indeed, NF types occur in the studied samples more often than NT types, but some fundamental physiological mechanism does not necessarily lie behind this. Likewise, textbooks on natural science and arithmetic lie together in the schoolbags of younger schoolchildren, while textbooks on English and economics lie together in those of older schoolchildren. But it obviously does not follow from this that there is necessarily more genuine commonality between economics and linguistics than between economics and arithmetic. M. F. Stovpyuk (Stovpyuk, 2003) explains the more frequent paired linkage of ethics and intuition, sensing and logic, as a hypothesis, by the fact that ethics and sensing belong to evolutionarily older functions, which also form earlier in individual human ontogeny, whereas intuition and logic both belong to younger and later-forming functions. From this one can indeed conclude that the probability of formation of types with simultaneous dominance of two “young” functions (intuition and logic) should be lower than that of types with a simultaneous combination of two “ancient” functions or one “ancient” and one “young” function.

Conclusions

1. The principal difference between intuitives and sensors is a tendency to view any events through the prism of generalization. The syndrome complex of intuition also includes: an inquiring mind striving for general conclusions and comprehension of general regularities; curiosity and inquisitiveness; originality and paradoxicality of mental output; attraction to the novel; weakening of the role of biological drives and social-status motives; a distinctive “ideational altruism”; expansion of the boundaries of the subjective current present with equal inclusion in it of past and future events and times; frequent thoughts about the distant past and future; parallel thoughts practically simultaneously about many different theses at once; a fragmentary-continuous character of thinking that “jumps” between different thoughts and temporal episodes; a vague broadband character of associative-process tuning; incorporation into the thought process of multistage circulating appeals of consciousness to images and associations of the subconscious, during which attention is disconnected from the surroundings; slowed displacement of thought-images, perceptual images, and movement plans from consciousness; motor clumsiness; reduced sensory sensitivity in the olfactory and gustatory analyzers; reduced visuospatial abilities; reduced memory for recent events; reduced memory for exact names and designations; ease of occurrence of perceptual deceptions and illusions under difficult conditions of perception; the possibility of experiencing through self-observation the “swarming” of numerous images and associations in the preconscious; improvement in the quality and productivity of the thought process under external arousing sensory interference. In addition, the intuitive pole is associated with certain markers at the physiological level: frequency of yawning, sensations of suffocation or insufficient oxygen, frequent blinking, darting of the gaze, frequent dreams, reduced aggressiveness, dullness of tactile image-representations, finger tremor, sweating, relative dominance of the right eye, etc.

2. Many clusters of properties linked with intuition indicate reduced M-cholinergic activity in the hippocampal cortex and neocortex of intuitives. The influence of the serotonergic system on formation of the trait is also noticeable in many of the markers studied, but in different brain zones this influence is apparently less unambiguous in direction.

3. Some neuropsychological correlates of intuition can be interpreted as indicating its preferential association with the cortex of the left hemisphere, others as indicating its association with dominance of newer upper, convexital cortical regions over internal and lower, more ancient mediobasal regions. The functions of the hippocampus are apparently heterogeneous in relation to intuition and sensing, but overall its active functioning is more favorable to sensing.

4. Traits of the intuitive pole show an undoubted association with positive traits of the schizotypy pole. The more pronounced the intuition, the more characteristic and probable perceptual intrusions, illusions, and pseudohallucinations become, as well as other symptoms of the schizotypal spectrum (disturbances of smooth pursuit eye movements, certain disturbances of perceptual constancy, derealization symptomatology, etc.).

5. Traits of socionic intuition-sensing do not differ from the traits used to diagnose intuition-sensing in the MBTI® type-theory system. In the “Big Five” factors, the so-called “openness” factor is closest to the socionic intuition-sensing trait, but in it the intuition axis is shifted toward the axis of socionic ethics.

6. The direction in multidimensional psychological space of the axis of the socionic “intuitives-sensors” trait or the equivalent trait of the American Briggs-Myers type-theory system is presumably the most adequate to real physiological mechanisms. The directions of the “Big Five” factors are presumably less adequate to the degrees of freedom underlying the physiological mechanisms of higher nervous activity of the brain.

Table 2. Empirical clusters characterizing the cognitive mechanisms of intuition-sensing

Table 3. Clusters associated with memory quality (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 4. Clusters associated with quality of motor coordination (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 5. Clusters associated with symptoms of derealization and depersonalization (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 6. Clusters associated with the “novel-familiar” opposition (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 7. Clusters associated with the “abstractness-concreteness” opposition (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 8. Clusters associated with the “altruism-egoism” opposition (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 9. Clusters associated with sthenicity and dominance (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 10. Clusters associated with social-hierarchical involvement (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 11. Clusters associated with the sequence-fragmentariness opposition (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 12. Clusters associated with the ability to predict the future (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 13. Clusters associated with the eidetic vividness of mental image-representations (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 14. Clusters associated with the development of inner speech and the development of a unique personality (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 15. Clusters associated with practicality and realism (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 16. Clusters associated with characteristics of self-control (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 17. Clusters associated with perceptual abilities and sensory sensitivity (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 18. Clusters associated with level of aspiration (for column names, see Table 2)

Table 19. Clusters with differing substantive content (for column names, see Table 2)

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CARL JUNG 1875 - 1961 by Dr. C. George Boeree

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MBTI® Form M Self-Scorable

Introduction to Type® and Coaching

Working with MBTI® Step II Results Binder

Type and Retention

Introduction to Type®

Type and Career Development

Introduction to Type® and Communication

Measuring Results of MBTI®Type Training: ROI in Action

Introduction to Type® and Change

MBTI® Conflict Management Program

Introduction to Type® and Teams

Using the MBTI® tool in Organizations

http://www.opp.eu.com/

http://www.discover-your-type.com/perstype.html

March 2007

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