Neurophysiological Nature of Function Dimensionality

In socionics, the dimensionality of a function is its most important characteristic (in theory – one that depends on its position in Model A) and the most important parameter of its operation. Nevertheless, the nature of dimensionality remains completely unexplained. The four possible components (which are also the dimensions) still remain in the form postulated by A. Bukalov 2. With regard to the functions themselves, socionics has made repeated attempts to associate them with specific systems and areas of the cerebral cortex (see 1, 8, 11), but no such attempts have been made with regard to their dimensionality.

In one of our previous works 9, we proposed the hypothesis that the dimensionality of functions depends on their activation by the brain’s subcortical temperament systems, as well as on the connections between the functions themselves. More precisely, it was assumed that strongly connected pairs of functions excite one another during operation and mutually maintain one another in an activated state. The asymmetry of interfunctional interactions was attributed to the structure of thalamocortical connections and of the thalamus itself (connections between its different nuclei). As a result, the primary factor of dimensionality proved to be the asymmetry of connections rather than of the functions themselves.

Within this approach, it was implicitly assumed that the socionic functions themselves exist as stable structures in the cerebral cortex and are activated by subcortical temperament systems. But this picture is a rather substantial simplification of reality and requires significant supplementation and clarification. In particular, here we will consider the role of the prefrontal cortex (and, more broadly, the entire tertiary association cortex) in the operation of functions, as well as the mechanisms coordinating the activity of different functional areas of the cortex.

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In 8, following V. L. Talanov and S. A. Bogomaz 1, 11, we assumed that the rational functions of the psyche are localized in the anterior regions of the cerebral cortex, while the irrational functions are localized in the posterior and temporal regions. This statement, although not without grounds, requires substantial clarification.

In neurophysiology, the cerebral cortex is sometimes classified on the basis of a three-level hierarchy. The first level (primary, or projection, areas) directly represents information arriving from outside: visual sensations – in the posterior cortex, auditory sensations – in the temporal cortex, tactile sensations – in the parietal cortex (the olfactory and gustatory centers are located deeper in the brain). In socionic terms, all of these areas belong to the sensing functions. The primary areas also include the motor cortex: it is located in the anterior region, near the central gyrus, provides voluntary control of movement, and is associated with the socionic logic of actions Te.

Secondary, or modality-specific association areas of the cortex are located near the primary areas, but they do not directly represent sensory stimuli. They mainly store sensory images of objects in the external world. They also belong to sensing, with two important exceptions. The premotor cortex (located in the anterior region, near the motor cortex) is associated with Te and is responsible for controlling complex, learned movements (including speech, object-related activity, and throwing an object at a target). The second exception is, presumably, the parietal lobes. After leaving the primary visual cortex, visual information spreads in two directions: toward the temporal lobe (the ventral, or P-system) and toward the parietal lobe (the dorsal, or M-system) 20. The dorsal system is responsible for the perception of movement, as well as for constructing a rough spatial scheme of objects located in the visual field (including a scheme of object configuration). We therefore believe that the dorsal visual stream serves socionic logic, in both colors; from the general sensory information it extracts a “primarily logical” component (not in the everyday, but in the socionic sense!), performing the role of a kind of “logical perception.” (Although Jung regarded logic not as a perceiving but as a judging function, the introduction of the logical information aspect in socionics implies not only evaluation but also the perception of information according to this aspect. We should also note that this “logical perception” is essentially irrational (!!!), including being localized in the posterior parietal region of the cortex, which Talanov associates with irrational functions.)


Fig. 1. Two visual systems of the brain: the ventral system (shown in lilac) and the dorsal system (green).

As for the ventral visual stream, it terminates in the inferior temporal cortex, where integrated sensory images of objects are stored, face recognition takes place, and the emotional component of facial expressions is extracted (together with the same component of voice from the auditory stream). In other words, the inferior temporal cortex contains not only sensory but also “primarily ethical” centers that perform the role of “ethical perception” (see above on logical perception).

Finally, the third level of the cortical hierarchy consists of regions that developed at late stages of brain evolution and perform the most complex processing of information. They are called the heteromodal association cortex (that is, they are not tied to any one modality) and are capable of working with arbitrary associations of objects and stimuli (that is, associations not based on physical similarity, simultaneous appearance of objects, etc.). They include the inferior temporal, inferior parietal, and prefrontal cortex 4, ch. 5.

The inferior parietal tertiary association areas (Brodmann areas 39 and 40) are located near the so-called angular gyrus, next to Wernicke’s area, which is responsible for speech recognition (area 22), symmetrically in both hemispheres (Fig. 2). Their functions are associated with speech comprehension (semantic analysis), as well as with performing mathematical operations. The middle temporal lobe (area 21) and inferior temporal area 37 are also involved in the same tasks. (A. R. Luria considers these areas components of the general parieto-temporo-occipital region.) In socionic terms, the tasks in whose solution these cortical regions are involved are closest to the function of intuition, as was first noted by V. L. Talanov. Indeed, the semantics of speech, the signs of natural language, and their meanings (both literal and figurative) are, in essence, arbitrary “signifier–signified” associations that do not imply any sensory similarity between the signifier and the signified. The essence and genesis of intuition, as a function for working with such arbitrary signs, are examined in detail by us in 7.


Fig. 2. Association areas of the inferior parietal region (shown in yellow). Next to them are the angular gyrus (orange) and Wernicke’s area (green). Broca’s area in the inferior frontal cortex is also shown in blue (together with Wernicke’s area, it is responsible for speech activity).

Thus, the parietal and temporal lobes of the brain contain centers specialized in the primary processing and recognition of information according to all four Jungian aspects. Moreover, there is a very high probability that it is not the aspects themselves that are zoned, but their combinations (blocks). Thus, the specialization of the superior and posterior parietal lobes is sensing + logic; that of the inferior parietal lobes is intuition + logic. It is possible that the temporal lobes are specialized in the same way, with their medial (inward-facing) areas being part of the limbic system associated with emotions. Thus, the entorhinal cortex (areas 28 and 34) is associated with both sensory and emotional memory; the inferior temporal cortex – with intuition and emotions.

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Finally, let us give due attention to the last and perhaps most important part of the tertiary association cortex – the prefrontal cortex (PFC). It provides decision-making, control, and planning of complex behavior 4. In the literature, an umbrella concept – executive functions – is sometimes introduced for most PFC functions 17. It includes:

• planning and decision-making;
• correction of behavior in light of errors;
• working with new, untried sequences of actions;
• behavior in technically complex situations;
• action in situations requiring the overcoming of environmental resistance (including social resistance), or refraining from temptation.

At the most general level, executive functions can be divided into two subgroups of completely different nature: informational and motivational (volitional). The “informational” mechanisms of executive functions are generally engaged in complex situations requiring rejection of standard, automatic reactions (innate and acquired) and the development of a new reaction. In particular, it has been shown that the prefrontal lobes provide selectivity of attention and flexible dependence of behavior on context. The “volitional” mechanisms – perseverance and persistence in advancing plans toward the intended goal, adherence to plans – are demanded mainly in situations of competition, especially social competition (which, according to ethological views, is the harshest and most energy-intensive).


Fig. 3. Prefrontal region of the brain (shown in color; the numbers indicate Brodmann cortical areas).

In a certain sense, the informational and volitional components of executive functions contradict one another: the first provides flexibility and switchability of behavior, while the second provides persistence and perseverance, that is, precisely inflexibility of action and constancy of effort in opposing the environment. In psychology, this corresponds to the concept of dependence (or independence) on context. 4 presents data according to which damage to the left frontal lobes leads to extremely context-independent behavior, while damage to the right frontal lobes leads to context-dependent behavior. But this is the picture only in men; in women, damage to both frontal lobes leads to context-dependent behavior, whereas (notably) healthy women are more context-independent than men.

In socionic terms, the “volitional” component of executive functions clearly corresponds to the rationality trait, which is why V. Talanov associated the activity of the frontal lobes of the brain with rational functions (logic and ethics). Indeed, the orbitofrontal and ventromedial regions of the forebrain belong to the limbic system and their function is the emotional evaluation of situations; the regions of the prefrontal cortex facing outward (toward the skull) are responsible for logical analysis and logical evaluation. But just as we have shown the existence of logical and emotional perception (together with the brain areas responsible for them), in the same way one can assume the existence of sensory and intuitive evaluation and planning. In this sense, Jung’s definition of rational and irrational functions (the former as exclusively judging, the latter as exclusively perceiving) should be approached with the appropriate degree of relativism: these are only average tendencies, not immanent properties of the functions. Thus, typical sensory planning is the management of attention, the ability to see only what is needed and not be distracted by incidental stimuli (an ability more developed in rationals). Intuitive planning, in turn, is a plan in the ordinary sense, as a complex of nontrivial measures and steps (sometimes of a very unobvious character) that bring a situation to a specified final state.

And what does the informational component of executive functions correspond to? Dependence on context may at first glance be taken for irrationality. But I consider this interpretation erroneous. The point is that the main thing in executive functions is not flexibility and situationality in themselves, but excessive voluntary manipulability: the ability to divide stimuli and actions into components and assemble new objects/actions from them. This is precisely where situationality itself and the rejection of standard solutions in favor of newly invented (or, more precisely, constructed) ones arise. Moreover, it may occur even in the most inveterate rationals, except that in them excessive manipulability manifests itself in constructing ever new plans (instead of unsuitable old ones) for the most varied life situations, with a rather acute sense of the expediency and preferability under the given circumstances of some plans over others.

This component of executive functions has an exact counterpart in socionic theory. But this is not irrationality; it is the multidimensionality of a particular function (according to A. Bukalov and V. Ermak, 2, 15). Indeed, correction of behavior, rejection of standard solutions, use of new chains of actions, and flexible orientation in complex situations are all signs of the third dimension of a function (situationality). Excessive voluntary manipulability occurs in both three- and four-dimensional functions (with excessiveness of action more pronounced in the latter, and voluntariness, that is, conscious controllability, in the former; four-dimensional functions are less controllable and more imperative in their operation, they are very difficult to stop, and for them constant manipulation of information is not simply an ability but a need).

All of the above seems to me a sufficiently weighty basis for asserting that the “higher” dimensions of socionic functions are provided by the operation of the prefrontal lobes of the cerebral cortex. This is also consistent with the fact that, in the human brain, compared with other primates and mammals in general, it is precisely the prefrontal lobes that have undergone the greatest development.

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According to socionic theory, in a pair of opposite functions (say, sensing and intuition), only one of them is multidimensional, while the other is low-dimensional. In other words, only half of the functions possess a “higher” dimensionality. The neurophysiological explanation of this rule, apparently, should be based on asymmetry in how the prefrontal lobes work with information according to different aspects (while taking into account the fact that information according to any aspect can reach the frontal lobes).

Neurological data indicate that the prefrontal lobes are not a storehouse of information; they store only references to specific association areas (see above). At the same time, one cannot assume that multidimensional functions necessarily accumulate more such references and low-dimensional functions fewer; quantity in this case reflects experience and training rather than function dimensionality. However, the prefrontal lobes require real-time access to memory, that is, the establishment of a dynamic connection (and one with sufficient bandwidth!) with the specific association areas of a particular function. It is here, in our opinion, that the secret of multidimensionality lies.

Neurophysiological studies have established that for a neural connection between distant areas of the cortex to function, not only must the connection itself exist (in the form of white-matter axons), but the rhythms of operation of the connected cortical regions must also be coordinated. The latter resembles resonance: nerve impulses from one group of neurons constantly reach another during a phase of heightened excitability. It has also been established that synchronization of EEG rhythms, including individual components of its spectrum, is an indicator of connectivity 6. Moreover, the degree of synchronization of the same brain centers while solving the same tasks differs among different people. Furthermore, the ability to coordinate the operation of particular centers is reflected in a person’s creativity, that is, in the person’s ability to solve complex tasks with elements of innovation and creativity.

On the basis of these ideas about the nature of neural connections, we believe that the multidimensionality of a particular function reflects the brain’s ability to coordinate the operation of the prefrontal cortex and the specific association areas in which information according to the given aspect is stored. For example, in sensing types the PFC is well coordinated with sensory areas and poorly coordinated with intuitive ones. Thus, the PFC will be able to operate with a larger number of patterns (engrams) of sensory information in real time, and a smaller number of intuitive patterns. The frontal lobes will “handle” more sensory information and less intuitive information; sensing will become, as described above, excessively manipulable, whereas intuition will not, because only a very limited amount of intuitive information will be available to the PFC in real time.

The structure that performs synchronization of the activity of distant cortical areas is (according to current concepts in brain physiology) the thalamus. It is part of the diencephalon and is diffusely connected with all areas of the cortex (the so-called thalamocortical connections) and with other subcortical structures. The thalamus consists of a large number of nuclei of three types: specific, nonspecific, and association nuclei. It is precisely the latter (including the anterior, dorsomedial, lateral dorsal nuclei, and the pulvinar) that are connected with association areas of the cortex: the dorsomedial nucleus – with the prefrontal cortex, the lateral dorsal nucleus – with the parietal cortex, the pulvinar – with association areas of the parietal and temporal lobes of the cortex 16, 21.

Most likely, coordination and synchronization of the prefrontal and parieto-occipital association cortex are provided by the action of the specified nuclei: the dorsomedial nucleus, lateral dorsal nucleus, and pulvinar. Why are some areas activated and synchronize their operation better, while others do so worse? Most likely, the reason is the asymmetry of ascending thalamocortical connections, asymmetry of the association nuclei themselves, or of the connections between them within the thalamus itself. (For example, if the dorsomedial nucleus interacts more strongly with the lateral dorsal nucleus than with the pulvinar, the PFC will coordinate better with the parietal lobes and worse with the temporal lobes.)

Above we indicated that the association areas of the parietal and temporal cortex are specialized not by aspects (functions), but rather by blocks: there are sensing-logical and intuitive-logical areas, sensing-ethical and intuitive-ethical areas. This means that it is not an individual function but an entire block that is coordinated with the PFC. In our previous work 9, we already argued that multidimensionality is a property not of individual functions but of blocks. But previously we believed that the association cortex was specialized by functions, while blocks were formed through activation and integration of their operation by the thalamus. We now make a very substantial correction here: information blocks already exist at the level of the association cortex in the temporal and parietal regions, while activation and coordination with the PFC by the thalamus gives the “selected” block the property of multidimensionality.

We should also note that there are neural processes in the brain that limit and inhibit the coordination of distant regions, and more generally the exchange of information between them. This is provided by activation of inhibitory M-receptors of pyramidal neurons in layers I – II of the cortex by cholinergic subcortical structures (in particular, the nucleus basalis of Meynert 18). In a certain sense, this inhibitory channel is an antagonist and external regulator of the associative thalamus: it limits interaction between distant cortical areas. For example, activity of the nucleus of Meynert isolates the primary visual cortex from the influence of the “higher” regions of the visual system, reducing the role of “filling in” during visual perception, which from the socionic point of view appears as suppression of intuition and enhancement of the sensing function. In socionics, V. Talanov also associated the role of the brain’s cholinergic system with sensing, in opposition to intuition 14. But an important qualification must be made here. The fact is that, in the course of analyzing the neurophysiological systems of the brain, the sensing–intuition trait split into two components of completely different nature. First – the multidimensionality of sensing or intuition, as a consequence of better coordination of the PFC with the specific parieto-occipital areas of one function relative to the other. Second – the overall strength or weakness of information exchange by socionic functions; in 9 we showed that this factor corresponds to subtype-level intuition/sensing and in the general case is by no means required to correlate with the dimensionality of these functions, that is, with sensing/intuition in the narrowly informational sense.

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Let us return, however, to the problem of implementing function dimensionalities (more precisely, as we have already assumed, block dimensionalities). One possible flaw in our hypothesis is that coordination and synchronization of cortical areas are variable processes and depend both on time and on the task being solved. Thus, in routine tasks the higher dimensions of strong functions are usually not engaged at all; in complex or new tasks, even for low-dimensional functions, the brain attempts, insofar as possible, to synchronize the PFC with the required function. The connection between PFC activation and task novelty has been repeatedly confirmed experimentally; it has also been noted that novelty affects the activity of the right PFC more strongly and the left PFC more weakly 4. How can the dynamic nature of synchronization be reconciled with the static nature of dimensionality in socionic theory?

One possible hypothetical solution in the spirit of TRIZ (the theory of inventive problem solving) is replacing separation in time with separation in space; in other words, to assume that competition among different neurophysiological systems for the same resource (in this case, for coordination of the PFC with particular socionic functions and blocks) leads during ontogenesis to a stable division of the resource (that is, function blocks) among systems. What does this mean in practice? It means that the four socionic blocks are “distributed” among different executive systems (centers) of the cortex. Moreover, the latter are initially unequal, which provides the difference in dimensionality: one of the executive centers provides all four dimensions, another – only 3, the third – 2, and the fourth – only the first dimension.

If the higher dimensions are provided by the PFC, then tertiary association areas of the temporoparietal region may act as “low-dimensional” executive centers. Above we correlated their operation with socionic intuition. But, by analogy with the tertiary cortex in the prefrontal region, they too may be “dual-purpose.” (Recall that besides informational executive functions, the PFC is also responsible for rational motivation.) In any case, experiments have shown that as one becomes accustomed to a task (routinization), the activity of the inferior parietal cortex increases in place of the prefrontal cortex 4 (see Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Relative activation of the prefrontal and temporoparietal cortex when solving a new task (left) and after becoming accustomed to the task (right).

Finally, one can assume that the executive centers of the two hemispheres also differ in their dimensionality. On the basis of an analysis of data from 4, the following scheme seems appropriate to us: the right prefrontal cortex supports all 4 dimensions, the left PFC – three, the left temporoparietal cortex – two, and the right temporoparietal cortex – only the first dimension. This division generally corresponds to ideas about the more “conscious,” instrumental character of the second and third dimensions (according to Bukalov – norms and situationality), and, conversely, the more spontaneous and less consciously controlled operation of the first and fourth dimensions (experience and globality).

The distribution of the four socionic blocks among executive centers (ECs) is expressed in the formation of positive activation feedback between the function-block regions of the cortex and the ECs. As a result, situational excitation of each block entails activation of “its” EC of fixed dimensionality. Conversely, activation of an EC (in the case of a conscious effort of will, or, conversely, switching the latter off) will excite “its” block even if the task being solved requires another one.

The distribution of blocks among ECs can in principle be arbitrary. An example (the author’s): the 4-dimensional (“right anterior”) block is intuitive-logical, the 3-dimensional (“left anterior”) block is sensing-logical, the 2-dimensional (“left posterior”) block is sensing-ethical, and the one-dimensional (“right posterior”) block is intuitive-ethical. This can be represented visually as a matrix:

How do these block dimensionalities manifest in practice? First, the brain is almost always occupied with searching for intuitive and logical information in the external stream; it constantly turns it over, compares it, translates intuition into logic and vice versa, even when there is no need for this, “just in case.” Four-dimensionality is always excessive block activity, excessive diversity of models and interaspect connections. Moreover, the activity may not be conscious at all, may occur in the background, and intuitive-logical connections may be perceived as something completely natural, “self-evident”; the absence of such activity and such connections in other people sometimes causes outright bewilderment – as if to say, it is so simple… Four-dimensionality of a block may also lead to an almost complete blending and interpenetration of functions – thus, it took me considerable effort to separate intuition from logic, to understand where the first ends and the second begins.

A three-dimensional block (in my case, sensing-logical) lacks “globality,” that is, it does not operate almost all the time but is engaged as needed (mainly from the side of the more active logic). The third dimension manifests mainly in excessive flexibility of sensing-logical correspondences; for example, in conscious restructuring of classification schemes and rules when applying them to objects of different kinds. Unlike a four-dimensional block, a three-dimensional block clearly separates “its” functions – in this case, the properties of objects as such and the properties of the classificatory concepts within which we describe those objects.

A two-dimensional block (in this case, sensing-ethical) lacks excessive flexibility and manipulability; it can only make a choice, distinguish “correct” solutions and connections from “incorrect” ones. In this case – to make an emotional evaluation of appearance, design, or clothing, to distinguish “one’s own” style from “others’,” and quite clearly. The criteria of correctness themselves, however, are very inflexible; for example, I find it difficult to accept the point of view of a person with different sensing-emotional evaluations and preferences, and it is also difficult to change my style and adapt to the taste of a particular social environment.

A one-dimensional block (in this case, intuitive-ethical), in turn, lacks not only excessive manipulability but also awareness of connections, as a result of which the possibility of conscious choice among different alternatives disappears. That is, the psyche reacts somehow, some connections are engaged, meanings and significations are somehow projected onto emotions and relations, but precisely “somehow.” For example, it is very difficult to evaluate the emotional load of a message if it is not encoded directly by the corresponding words but is contained only in the subtext. It is also difficult to anticipate the reaction of different people to one and the same semantic form of expression. Because of this, people with a one-dimensional intuitive-ethical block sometimes demonstrate astonishing tactlessness.

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Here I have described a specific case of distributing blocks by dimensionality; socionists familiar with the theory of function dimensionality will not find it difficult to “calculate” the manifestations of all dimensionalities for all blocks. From what has been said, I hope it will become clear that, when applied to blocks, dimensionality is a property of informational connection-models between aspects. The psychological and sociological manifestations of connections for all blocks are described in 9.

However, the same work showed that besides an informational component, blocks also have a motivational component. And while information is transmitted in both directions, through aspects of both colors (say, between Ne, Te, Ni, Ti), in motivational terms only one of the functions dominates; moreover, it is switched on automatically under the informational load of the block and organizes the operation of all the other functions “under itself.” For example, in ILI, tasks involving Te, Ti, and Ne activate Ni motivation – reflection, evaluation of actions in perspective (discarding highly costly or purposeless actions), and consideration of logical categories and intuitive concepts dynamically, as functions of various kinds of influences and parameters 9. Motivation by the other multidimensional functions, especially those of the opposite color (in this case, Ne and Te), is suppressed. And it is precisely the motivational dominant of the block (rather than the overall balance of extra-/introversion and rationality/irrationality in the psyche!) that determines its base function.

Here we have to make a digression somewhat away from the topic. It turned out that the extra-/introversion and rationality/irrationality traits have two components of completely different nature. The first is best called, following V. Stukas, energodynamic: it includes such general psychological properties as activity–passivity, action–reflection, spontaneity–systematicness, etc. The neurophysiological nature of these properties was well explained by V. Talanov as a consequence of the dominance of different activation systems in the brain’s subcortex and different neurotransmitters 13, 14. But in the course of socionic practice it became clear that “energodynamic” extra-/introversion and rationality/irrationality too often diverge from the character of functions in Model A (base–creative, ego–id). It therefore became necessary to introduce subtypes, in particular the DCNH system authored by V. Gulenko 5, in which extra-/introversion and rationality/irrationality have type and subtype components, with precisely the energodynamic manifestations assigned to subtype.

What, then, determines the “truly socionic” rationality/irrationality and extra-/introversion, that is, the difference in character of the base function from the creative, demonstrative, and ignoring functions? We assert that they are determined by asymmetric feedback of blocks with subcortical motivational-informational centers. The connection is most likely implemented by executive centers (prefrontal or temporoparietal), rather than by specific functional areas of the cortex (although the reverse is also not excluded). In the example given: the 4-dimensional EC is predominantly “tied” not only to intuitive-logical information but also to the irrational-introverted cortical activation system. When information loads the EC, it “requests” activation of “its” type from below; the subcortical system (in this case, the irrational-introverted one) becomes excited and its activation is directed to the required (intuitive-logical) cortical areas – even if this system is not the strongest. For example, the objectively strongest system may be the irrational-extraverted one, but because of stronger feedback the EC will “request” for its own purposes activation of another type. In that case, irrationality-extraversion will manifest at the subtype level as active, flexible resourcefulness (C subtype according to Gulenko). But the particular block itself will operate in another activation mode, for example, in the irrational-introverted one.

It is noteworthy that the same thalamus is responsible for transmitting subcortical activation upward and distributing it among cortical areas 3, 19. Activation is transmitted through ascending thalamocortical connections (which provide coordination and synchronization of the operation of distant cortical areas; see above); the reverse influence is implemented through descending connections, from the cortex to the thalamus. The thalamus itself, in turn, controls the activity of subcortical temperament centers.

According to our hypothesis, the four functional blocks are distributed among different executive centers, but in the same way each of the latter may be coupled to “its own” subcortical activation system. As a result, the four blocks will not only have different dimensionality, but will also operate in different modes of extra-/introversion and rationality/irrationality.

At present we have no reliable information about the nature of the distribution of temperament activation systems among executive centers. For example, the four temperaments may “diverge” among dimensionalities and ECs in the same way as the blocks; in that case one can even speak of the dimensionality of temperaments (example: irrational-introverted – 4-dimensional, rational-introverted – 3-dimensional, irrational-extraverted – 2-dimensional, rational-extraverted – one-dimensional). But this is only an untested possibility. Nor should it be forgotten that the connections of ECs with specific structures are only relatively asymmetric. In reality, all connections are present, but because of the greater activity of the dominant connections they encompass a larger number of neurons in the association cortex and activate a larger number of patterns per unit time. Subdominant connections may be activated, for example, in the case of active, directed concentration on complex (or new) tasks involving low-dimensional blocks. But they will activate fewer neurons and, accordingly, fewer information patterns per unit time. (For example, the 3rd dimension will be engaged only for a very narrow range of information and actions in low-dimensional blocks.) The same applies to connections with temperament centers; under active attention (or in an emergency situation), it is nevertheless possible temporarily to engage subdominant connections and activate the cortex in an “off-design” mode (from the standpoint of the dominant connections). But such a mode is very energy-intensive and can be maintained only for a short time.

It should also be taken into account that the brain, by virtue of the principle of minimizing energy expenditure, tries to offload all more or less routine tasks for which the higher dimensions of functions are not needed onto low-dimensional temporoparietal ECs 4. Thus, the latter spend part of the time operating with multidimensional functions and blocks, so their character (in the sense of connectivity with particular blocks) is necessarily less pronounced than that of the ECs of the prefrontal cortex.

Another possible scheme of distributing temperaments among executive centers also seems promising to us, one in which the set of four blocks forms a benefit or supervision ring, while different Jungian functions are base functions in the four ECs. Let us consider it in more detail using the example given:

This is the right benefit ring. How does it function? Any Jungian function belongs to two blocks of the ring, but in only one of them is it the base function. Its activity (in the base position of the first block) leads to informational loading of the second block, as a result of which, according to 9, the motivational component of that block’s base function is activated. In this way the activation dominant moves from one block to another: Ti Se ––> Ni Te (more precisely, from the 3-dimensional EC to the 4-dimensional one), then the ring continues: Ni Te ––> Fi Ne ––> Si Fe ––> Ti Se ––> …

Let us also consider an example of the left supervision ring (incidentally, this case proved very difficult to diagnose):

The difficulty was caused, in our view, by the opposition of the multidimensional blocks, as a result of which they directly exchange no information at all, and the left (and more accessible to awareness!) 3-dimensional EC cannot in any way help the right (less conscious and more spontaneous) 4-dimensional center become aware of its functions. In the localization scheme, the ring turned into a “figure eight”: ⁴Ne Fi ––> ¹Ti Ne ––> ³Se Ti ––> ²Fi Se ––> ⁴Ne Fi. We especially emphasize that functions and blocks in the supervision ring are activated in the order opposite to the direction generally accepted in socionics (recall that in theory the left static supervision ring is Ne Fi ––> Fi Se ––> Se Ti ––> Ti Ne ––> Ne Fi). This occurs because the trigger for activation of the base function of the new block is information reaching the creative function from the base function of the previous block. V. Gulenko and SHS came to the same conclusion regarding activation of functions in supervision rings (that is, in the order opposite to the classical ring order) 22.

Once again, we emphasize that the question of the distribution of temperament activation among dimensionalities and executive centers of the brain currently remains only hypothetical.

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In conclusion, let us list our principal assertions:

• The higher dimensions of socionic functions (according to Bukalov and Ermak – situationality and globality) are provided by the operation of the prefrontal cortex. Their manifestations at the psychological level are practically identical to what neurophysiology and cognitive science call executive functions. This assertion is central for us, and its truth raises almost no doubt.

• From the neurophysiological point of view, the dimensionality parameter better characterizes the operation of blocks than of individual functions. The basis for this assertion is not only the conclusions of our previous work 9, but also the specialization of areas of the parietal and temporal cortex of the cerebral hemispheres, in which information according to different functions is integrated. In the specialization of these areas, as a rule, one rational and one irrational aspect can be seen together.

• The tertiary association cortex of the cerebral hemispheres can be divided into four executive centers (in the prefrontal and parieto-occipital cortex, left and right), in whose operation different numbers of dimensions are manifested: the 2- and 3-dimensional centers are localized on the left, and the 1- and 4-dimensional centers on the right. The tertiary association areas themselves also perform other functions: in the frontal cortex they are involved in the operation of the brain’s rational system, while in the temporoparietal cortex they provide intuitive functions.

• Different dimensionalities of blocks (or functions) are a consequence of asymmetry of the thalamus’s connections with the cerebral cortex, as well as (possibly) asymmetry of the thalamic nuclei and/or their interaction. Multidimensional blocks are distinguished by a strong connection between “their” specific functional areas and the executive centers of the prefrontal cortex; in low-dimensional blocks the connection with the anterior executive centers is much weaker. Moreover, the connection is expressed primarily in the capacity to coordinate and synchronize the operation of executive centers and functional areas. The latter is provided by thalamocortical connections, because it is precisely the thalamus that is responsible for directed activation of different cortical regions.

• There is a tendency toward a preferential connection of each executive center with a separate block of functions (and vice versa), as a result of which the four blocks tend to have different dimensionality. But this regularity exists only in the form of dominance of some connections over others, not in the form of an absolute absence of alternative connections. Thus, active, directed attention to a complex or new task involving low-dimensional blocks partly makes them somewhat more flexible and manipulable, in the manner of multidimensional ones. On the other hand, the brain generally shifts routine tasks onto low-dimensional executive centers in order to conserve energy.

• There is also asymmetry of feedback between executive centers and subcortical temperament activation centers (most likely implemented through descending corticothalamic connections, while activation is distributed, again, by the thalamus). This asymmetry of connections determines the base function for each executive center and block. Again, we should qualify that this manifests as a tendency rather than a rigid connection; for short periods of time, blocks and executive centers may also operate in an “off-design” mode.

• It turned out that all Jungian traits are essentially two-component and consist of informational and energodynamic (or, equivalently, TIM-related and subtype) components. The informational, or specifically TIM-related, component is determined by the asymmetry of thalamic connections with the cortex (and also, possibly, of thalamic nuclei with one another). The energetic, or subtype, component for extra-/introversion and rationality/irrationality is determined by the strength of subcortical activation centers; for sensing/intuition – by the overall intensity of interaction between distant cortical areas and of information exchange along long-range connections (cholinergic activation of the cortex by certain subcortical nuclei weakens this information exchange and strengthens the sensing pole); for logic/ethics – most likely by the relative activity of the neocortex and limbic cortex in the forebrain. It is noteworthy that the neurophysiological nature of the energodynamic components of all traits has already, in general, been explained in the works of V. Talanov 12, 13, 14, whereas the specifically TIM-related factors determined by the connectivity of functions, centers, and distant cortical regions had received practically no attention before our previous work 9.

• A possible, but nonmandatory and as yet unproven, scheme of information metabolism has been proposed, based on alternation of the activity of four executive centers in modes forming a benefit or supervision ring.

References

1. Bogomaz S. A. Model of Mental Orientations and Psychophysiological Types // Socionics Newspaper: No. 4 (31), 02.04.2004
2. Bukalov A. V. Structure and Dimensionality of Functions of Information Metabolism. Socionics, Mentology and Personality Psychology, 1995, No. 2
3. Verkhlyutov V. M. How and Why Consciousness Emerged (2008).
4. Goldberg E. The Executive Brain: Frontal Lobes, Leadership and Civilization. M.: Smysl, 2003.
5. Gulenko V. V. Theory of Subtypes: the DCNH System.
6. Ivanitsky A. M. Consciousness and the Brain. // V Mire Nauki.
7. Popov I. Basis of Socionic Functions and Aspects from the Standpoint of Ethology and Evolutionary Psychology (2009).
8. Popov I. Positivism/Negativism, Questimity/Declatimity and Functional Asymmetry of the Brain (2010).
9. Popov I. Connections (Blocks) of Socionic Functions (2010).
10. Stukas V. A. Functional Asymmetry of the Hemispheres from the Perspective of Jungian Psychic Functions. Hemispheric Asymmetry of TIMs. (Hypothesis) Socionics, Mentology and Personality Psychology, 2010, No. 1.
11. Talanov V. L. New Concepts of the Physiological Mechanism and Localization of the Basic Jungian Functions. // Socionics, Mentology and Personality Psychology, 2002, No. 4.
12. Talanov V. L. Structure of the “Intuitives-Sensors” Trait and Its Hypothetical Cognitive Mechanisms (2007)
13. Talanov V. L. Detailed Cluster Structure, Cognitive and Physiological Mechanisms of the “Irrationals-Rationals” Trait. (2007)
14. Talanov V. L. Markers of Dominance of the Ergotropic Sympathetic System and Neurotransmitter Activity in Projection onto Socionic Traits. (2007)
15. Eglit I. M. Dimensionality of Functions. Socionics, Mentology and Personality Psychology, 2007, No. 2.
16. Human Physiology (eds. V. M. Pokrovsky, G. F. Korotko). M., Meditsina, 2007.

Wikipedia articles:

17. Executive functions
18. Nucleus basalis of Meynert
19. Thalamus
20. Two Streams hypothesis
21. Consciousness Studies/Neuroscience 1

Blog posts:

22. Vertical Connections – V. V. Gulenko’s blog
    Massaraksh – V. V. Lyodin’s blog

Ivan Popov, February 2011