Basis of Socionic Functions and Aspects from the Perspective of Ethology and Evolutionary Psychology

I. Rational Functions
1. Introduction
2. Biosocial Purpose of Rational Functions
3. Emotions and Rationality in the Socionic-Ethological Sense
4. Ethological Basis of the Logic of Actions
5. Ethological Basis of Structural Logic and Ethics of Relations
6. Ethological Considerations on the Signs of Rational Functions
7. Ethological “Positivism” and “Negativism” of Rational Functions

II. Irrational Functions
8. Sensing from the Perspective of Ethology and Neurophysiology
9. Analysis of Sensory Information by Aspect Color and Sign
10. Adaptive Role of Static Intuition
11. Dynamic Intuition. Positive and Negative Cross-Functions of Intuition

III. Interaction of Rational and Irrational Functions in Humans
12. Object-Oriented Application of Rational Functions. Labor from the Perspective of Ethology and Socionics
13. Things as Carriers of Social Relations
14. Mutual Excitation of Psychic Functions and Information Metabolism

Part I. Rational Functions

1. Introduction

Ethology is the science of animal behavior, including human behavior, if humans are considered not as bearers of culture but merely as one biological species among many others (that is, human forms of behavior are studied in comparison with similar forms of behavior in other species). Ethology regards forms of behavior – signals, displays, instincts, and so on – as adaptive mechanisms (adaptations) that ensure the success of individuals, populations, and species in evolutionary competition. Here ethology closely converges with another scientific field – evolutionary psychology.

Socionics, however it may be defined, ultimately also studies human behavior, only within the framework of its own models and categories. This raises the question of whether the ethological approach can be applied in socionics. This implies treating socionic functions, aspects, and traits as general biological (more precisely, biosocial) adaptive mechanisms developed by nature in the course of evolution and characteristic not only of humans but also of other – or at least some other – species. To my knowledge, M. F. Stovpyuk 10 was the first to take such a view of certain socionic traits. In particular, the hypothesis was proposed that logical functions are evolutionarily younger than ethical ones (in animals, “logic” is developed much more weakly than in humans); similarly, intuition proved to be an evolutionarily later brain function than sensing.

In our view, the ethological approach in socionics makes it possible to go considerably deeper and even to resolve certain questions that have so far remained open within the framework of the “normal” psychological approach. This concerns, above all, clarification of the content of socionic aspects and functions, or more precisely, identification of their ethological basis. This basis is assumed to be shared by humans and higher animals; naturally, in humans it is overlaid by a great variety of cultural forms that have no direct relation to ethology.

2. Biosocial Purpose of Rational Functions

As the starting point of the analysis, let us consider the rationality/irrationality dichotomy and make use of the fact that its neurophysiological roots have already been identified by V. L. Talanov 12.

Talanov argues that this dichotomy reflects the balance of two subcortical systems that activate the cerebral cortex in different ways (and activate its different regions to very unequal degrees). The “irrational” type of activation is formed by the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus together with several motor centers of the subcortex (the caudate nucleus and nucleus accumbens), spreads primarily to the posterior and temporal regions of the cortex (where the irrational functions are apparently localized), and is characterized by flexibility and variability over time (phasic activation). The “rational” type of activation originates from the reticular formation of the midbrain (coupled with several other structures), spreads primarily to the anterior regions of the cortex (where the rational functions are localized), and is relatively more constant over time (tonic activation).

These two activation systems have fundamentally different adaptive purposes. The irrational system provides speed and flexibility of response under changing circumstances, including the regulation of exploratory activity. The rational system ensures constancy of an individual’s actions, persistent adherence to a particular pattern of behavior despite environmental resistance and randomly changing circumstances. In animals, these qualities are required primarily in social behavior; the environment that must be resisted consists of competitors struggling for a limited social resource (including rank in the hierarchy) 12. The most important programs of social behavior are signaling and hierarchical; they not only organize intragroup competition but also make cooperative actions among individuals possible. Particular regularity and “systematicity” are required by signaling activity (displaying one’s position/rank in the group), observance of various rules and rituals (including suppression of one’s own “incorrect” activity in the presence of a dominant), active presentation of demands to conspecifics whose rank is no higher than one’s own (including “enforcing order” – for example, requiring them to emit submission signals regularly), as well as the building of alliances and coalitions that increase the chances of defending or raising one’s rank. But if signaling programs are subordinated to the rational system of the brain (because of the obvious evolutionary expediency of this arrangement), then the same system must also be engaged in recognizing signals sent by other individuals – if only for the sake of correctly assessing the social motivation of conspecifics, which is critically important. We will return to this question in the following sections.

It should be noted that the use of force and aggression in the narrow sense (the Se aspect) remains outside the “zone of responsibility” of the rational system, despite the crucial role of the latter in the struggle for a place in the hierarchy in all animal species. From the standpoint of ethology, however, this is easy to explain. First, most programs of complex social behavior in animals arose precisely for the purpose of, if not suppressing, then at least regulating direct aggression. Thus, hierarchy and signals expressing an individual’s rank (both dominance and submission; moreover, a dominant has the right to require subdominants to indicate their submission) reduce the frequency of direct clashes: as a rule, only individuals of similar rank that have not yet “settled their relationship” with one another actually come to blows. Clearly, the more frequently signals are sent and the more accurately they are read, and the more systematically rank is indicated, the lower the probability of becoming involved in an aggressive clash “by misunderstanding” (for example, with an obviously stronger opponent), and, accordingly, the smaller the losses the population will incur because of internal competition. For this purpose, individuals must signal their rank continuously and even with a certain persistence, rather than haphazardly and from time to time. This is where the persistence and tenacity provided by the rational system of the brain find one of their most important applications.

As for direct aggression, natural selection imposes exactly the opposite requirements on it. A physical fight requires maximum flexibility: strength must be mustered very quickly, a threatening situation must be recognized immediately (delay is like death!), and, at the same time, aggression must quickly subside if the opponent has been defeated and adopts a posture of submission (and likewise if the opponent proves stronger and it is better to capitulate than to prolong the struggle). According to Talanov, flexibility of response is a property of the irrational system of the brain. Thus neither the irrationality of extraverted sensing nor the movement of social programs aimed at regulating (including suppressing) aggression in the opposite direction is accidental.

Consideration of the behavioral tasks for which the rational system formed in the course of evolution also brings us to the extraversion/introversion trait, because social-motivational functions clearly group into two poles. Thus, the tendency toward active signaling, toward frequent demonstrative influences on the behavior of others, should be assigned to the extraverted-rational pole. (The basic motive here is specifically signaling display, that is, the capacity to exert influence, rather than its direct conversion into material “bonuses” such as food or sex.) Introverted-rational motivation, by contrast, restricts (disciplines) both others’ actions and one’s own. Motivation of this type underlies, in particular, hierarchical relations, which are of paramount importance throughout the animal world: in relation to a higher-ranking individual, many actions are prohibited, whereas others, conversely, may be obligatory. Another example of introverted-rational motivation is holding territory and resisting intruders (= “violators of order”).

3. Emotions and Rationality in the Socionic-Ethological Sense

It is reasonable to suppose that the ethological basis of the rational aspects follows directly from their social specialization. In particular, emotions (the Fe aspect) should be regarded not merely as internal experiences but as involuntary signals carrying information about the individual’s internal arousal. Basic emotions are involuntary in the sense that their expression is carried out according to innate programs. In humans, this ensures their unambiguous recognition by an individual from any culture.

Two qualifications are necessary here. First, despite its involuntary nature, the expression of any emotion can be suppressed by other domains of the psyche, so subjective experiences are not necessarily embodied in emotional signals. Second, the programs for expressing emotions are by no means rigidly tied to the rational system; on the contrary, they can operate just as fully under the control of the irrational system! This is confirmed by the experiments cited by V. Talanov in which the rational system of the brain was chemically switched off using sodium amytal 12; emotions then become even more expressive because the inhibitory influence of the introverted-rational type is weakened. In addition, Talanov argues that innate motor programs (including programs for expressing basic emotions) are stored in the nucleus accumbens of the striatum, which belongs specifically to the irrational (thalamic) system of the brain. Practice likewise shows that irrational ethical types have emotions no worse and no weaker than rational ethical types, and can likewise use them as a means of influencing the behavior of others. In what, then, is rational motivation expressed (and, in programmatic black ethical types, extraverted motivation as well)? In the constancy of the tendency to exert influence (or, in V. Gulenko’s terminology, in the linear-assertive temperament), which makes the emotional behavior of rational types, in a certain sense, regular. If the rational system is switched off, emotion remains merely an involuntary expression of the individual’s situational arousal. Rationality, by contrast, brings “truly social”, that is, actively signaling motivation to the foreground, and the experience of a situation becomes an occasion for emotional influence on those around one. But if the motivation has switched on, an occasion will always be found! In humans, this “social” background is by no means always or fully conscious (at any rate, few EIEs or ESEs would agree to attribute their emotionality to it); nevertheless, from the standpoint of ethology, it is precisely this that constitutes the basis of the rationality of emotions.

It should also be noted that the brain structures responsible for emotional memory and for the long-term motivational action of emotions belong to the same rational system of the brain. In other words, rational types are certainly motivated by emotions more strongly than irrational types. Their “regular” emotions therefore also serve as an unmistakable signal of the individual’s stable attitude toward some object (or, much more importantly for social life, toward another subject).

4. Ethological Basis of the Logic of Actions

The basis of the logic of actions (Te) should be sought in the same social-signaling domain. Its difference from emotions is voluntariness: “logical” signals are in no way obliged to arise from particular internal experiences. What kind of signals are these? It might seem that this refers to the second signal system, that is, speech, which is unique to humans; in fact, however, this is not the case. Voluntary signals also exist outside speech and are well known in ethology. Recall that socionics assigns information about movements to the Te aspect. But movements are among the most important signals in both animals and humans! In the animal world, individuals use movements to display their rank and their intentions toward one another (courtship rituals toward a sexual partner, as well as rivalry without proceeding to an actual attack; for example, a rival is invited to give way or respond with another sign of submission), direct attention (by turning the head), induce others to act (one starts running and the others follow), and so on. In higher primates, gestures of the forelimbs are well developed.

In our view, the signaling function of movements is the most important reason for their separation from sensing into a special (and rational!) aspect. In addition to visual areas of the cortex, motor (!!!) areas are also involved in the perception of movements, more precisely, the mirror neurons located in them 22. The latter fire while observing the actions of other individuals: an action performed by another is, as it were, mentally performed by the observer. The most important function of mirror neurons is to ensure correct understanding of motor signals. Indeed, if perception of a signal (through its mental performance) is handled by the same brain structures that are also responsible for its transmission, this excludes the possibility that the meaning of one and the same signal will diverge “on reception” and “on transmission”. The mirroring effect also operates in the perception of speech and in reading: within a short time (< 200 ms), a person mentally articulates what has been heard or read.

Incidentally, the perception of emotional signals is carried out by analogous mirror neurons, only located not in the premotor cortex but in the limbic system responsible for emotional experience.

However, similarly to what was said above about emotions, motor activity is not subject only to the rational-signaling system. The same experiments with sodium amytal showed that when the rational system is switched off, movement coordination is not severely impaired; only the most complex voluntarily switchable sequences of actions, as well as goal setting, suffer. Nor do all movements have a signaling function. Moreover, ethologists maintain that in animals the same motor acts can perform both a signaling and a completely nonsignaling (utilitarian) role. Signaling displays usually consist of sequences of motor complexes taken from an individual’s everyday activity (feeding, cleaning feathers/fur, aggressive lunges, and so on) 19. In themselves, these actions have no signaling meaning – they are utilitarian motor automatisms. What turns them into a signal is, first, their organization into a deliberately unnatural (that is, practically meaningless) sequence and, second, an emphatically unnatural, ornate 19 style of movement. Displays are thereby distinguished from the individual’s background everyday activity, making the task of signal recognition easier.

As a result, motor activity (like emotions) is, as it were, under dual control by the rational and irrational systems of the brain; therefore, a person’s style of movement strongly depends on the balance of activity between the two systems. It is worth recalling here that in socionics the nonverbal marker of logical rationality is precisely an emphatic sharpness and precision of movements, up to a robot-like quality 5.

It should be noted that the voluntary social signals constituting the basis of the Te aspect do not have to be expressed through physical movements: voluntary acoustic signals also exist, and not only in humans. It is very likely that bird songs belong to this aspect, at least in those songbird species in which song serves as a signal of status and territorial occupancy.

5. Ethological Basis of Structural Logic and Ethics of Relations

The biosocial purpose of rational-introverted functions is best defined as the systematic restriction of activity (both others’ and one’s own), or, more briefly, the establishment of a structure of order within the group. (At the most general level of systems theory, structure is defined precisely by constraints on interaction among elements: no constraints, “everything is permitted” = no structure 17, pp. 60, 121.) The ordering of social actions is the ethological basis of the characteristically rational tendency to plan actions. Indeed, in animals with sufficiently high intelligence (including higher primates), genuinely complex behavioral plans are constructed precisely in relations with conspecifics, whereas relatively simple innate automatisms are used in searching for food, escaping from predators, and so on. This is entirely natural: the most advanced means of adaptation are genuinely required only in the sphere where competition and the elimination of unsuccessful individuals are most severe – in the struggle for social resources, including a place in the group hierarchy.

The ethological basis of introverted-rational aspects is not as obvious as the basis of extraverted-rational aspects. Let us first consider structural logic, Ti. Whereas in the case of the logic of actions it was possible to take hold of a very important part of the aspect’s content – movements – with their signaling function that is obvious from the standpoint of ethology, structural logic, as it is understood in socionics, seems too “advanced”, too remote from any possible ethological basis. Still, hierarchical relations (which are part of structural logic), whose importance for animal social behavior was emphasized above, may provide a clue. The question is: how should the basic form of their informational expression be defined? In the human world, hierarchy is established by laws and orders and indicated by conventional signs (for example, stars on officers’ shoulder boards), but all these forms belong to the cultural rather than the ethological level. In its basic form, signals must be transmitted directly by the body and voice. What kind of signals are these? If we proceed from the fact that motor signals – movements – belong to the domain of black (dynamic) logic, it is reasonable to suppose that the basis of white (static) logic includes static signals – body postures, motionless hand gestures, and the like.

Indeed, the language of static gestures and postures plays a very important role throughout the animal world. An individual thereby indicates its rank, its readiness to stand up for itself, and its readiness to defend its personal space (or territory). In particular, in most animals rank is expressed very clearly by the position of the head and neck – looking down at a rival from above, or conversely. It is very likely – although the author is unaware of direct references in the literature – that the perception and understanding of static postures is again carried out by mirror neurons responding both to the relative positions of the limbs and to static muscle tension.

It should be noted that the division between static and dynamic signals reflects the opposition between extraverted- and introverted-rational basic motivation. Thus, static postures are aimed at stopping, at inhibiting the actions of another individual, which reflects the essence of introverted-rational motivation – maintaining intragroup order. Dynamic motor signals, by contrast, are characterized by a tendency to compel others to act/respond.

Perhaps most socionists (especially white logicians) will find the idea that structural logic is based on nothing more than static signaling postures characteristic of almost all animals somewhat strange, if not actually offensive. Nevertheless, this conclusion appears to us to be well founded. Let us emphasize once again: we are not speaking of the aspect as a whole, with all the complexity of its manifestations in humans, but only of its basis inherited from our animal ancestors. Most importantly, white logic by no means grows out of the second signal system, as many are inclined to think. Naturally, in humans information in this aspect (as in all others!) can take verbal form, but this is by no means necessary: the basis of logic belongs purely to the first signal system. In light of this conclusion, we find it quite noteworthy that structural logic is said to include information about the relative arrangement of parts of constructions and objects in space (including, according to many socionists, relations such as “higher-lower”, “front-back”, “longer-shorter”, and so on), which is entirely visual in nature and would seemingly have to belong to sensing. Why did this information pass from sensing into logic? For the same reason that this happened with movements: because of the (at least potentially!) social-signaling character of the information. The most important “construction” from the standpoint of ethology is the body and limbs of another individual; the relative arrangement of its “elements” (from the head and neck to the fingers) transmits highly important social signals, and they must be read without error. Incidentally, even in the most schematic and abstract drawing of a human being (simple lines instead of arms, legs, and fingers), a very broad range of signals can be conveyed very clearly, a fact widely exploited by artists and designers.

The resulting division of the ethological basis of logic by colors is as follows: dynamic logic, Te – voluntary dynamic signals, including movements; static logic, Ti – voluntary static signals, including postures and gestures. It seems appropriate to us to apply the same criterion to ethics. Thus, in the dynamic aspect Fe, emotions remain in their dynamic expression; static emotional signals – mainly elements of facial expression: the relative arrangement and curvature of the lines of the mouth, eyebrows, and so on – pass into the static aspect (ethics of relations, Fi). Static emotional signals are much better adapted than dynamic ones to expressing a broad range of relations.

As for the adaptive role of ethics of relations, it is connected with establishing order in intragroup life and inhibiting “incorrect” activity. Its difference from Ti is that the inhibition arises directly from emotional experiences, including, possibly, empathy: an individual refrains from some action if it sees that the action is unpleasant to another (especially if that other has properly signaled its attitude). Such self-restraint is possible not only for humans but also for other animal species with the most highly developed social behavior, including higher apes. Ethical restrictions work best at close range, among “one’s own”, linked by strong personal relations, whereas at greater social distances (with less familiar individuals) a logical (formal, impersonal) order is more effective. From the standpoint of brain physiology, ethical restrictions are most likely provided by the inhibitory influence of the limbic cortex (responsible for emotional experience) on other brain structures.

6. Ethological Considerations on the Signs of Rational Functions

A more fine-grained analysis of the social signals described by ethologists reveals yet another binary characteristic that divides each information aspect into two poles. On the whole, these correspond to the signs of functions and aspects used in socionics.

The aspect poles are most clearly revealed by the example of motor dynamic signals (the Te aspect). On the one hand, there are displays of the type described above. These are motor actions (or sequences of such actions) taken from an animal’s everyday activity but performed in an emphatically unnatural (demonstrative in the narrow sense) manner; this is achieved through excessive controllability of the motor activity of individual actions, as well as excessive controllability (switchability) of their composition. As an illustration of such excessive motor controllability in humans, one may take the movements of dancers and gymnasts; it should be noted that the “tighter” the control over movements, the higher the performance is evaluated. Let us designate signals of this kind with the sign ”+” (in the case of +Te).

Motor signals can, however, also be of another kind, without any demonstrative ornateness whatsoever. Examples include pointing movements (with a limb, the head, or the gaze), various rapid lunges toward one another, and the like. These movements are easily “read” and therefore look natural and simple even if they themselves require complex coordination of many muscles. (A good example of such “simplicity” of movement is walking and running: here complex muscle coordination has been transferred to the level of automatism, consciousness controls only direction and speed, and from the outside the movement is perceived as something very uncomplicated. This should not surprise us, since movements are perceived by mirror neurons: the observed movement is decomposed not into sensory but into motor components, with elements of voluntary control being singled out. Simple control = simple movement.) Let us designate signals of this kind with the sign ”–”.

Thus, two poles have emerged in the ethological basis – simple and complex motor signals, –Te/+Te. Ethologist V. S. Fridman maintains that these two types of signals differ fundamentally from one another according to one further criterion. Signals of the simple pole, –Te, are of the indexical type and transmit information in quantitative form: this may be the individual’s level of arousal (encoded in the intensity of movement), the direction of attention (for pointing gestures), and so on. Signals of the complex pole, +Te, are sign-signals; their code is purely discrete (qualitative) in character: the meaning of the display is encoded not in its intensity but in the pattern of its elementary components. (For more detail on sign and indexical signals, see 17, pp. 23-24, 50, 92, 98-99, 131.)

In light of the preceding observation, complex acoustic signals must be considered: this group includes forms as dissimilar from one another as birdsong and human speech. Why do we assign them to the logic of actions +Te? Because the brain stores and processes them as patterns of complex motor activity of the vocal apparatus. In humans, speech motor activity is controlled by Broca’s area (located in the left inferior frontal cortex), which also contains mirror neurons. A revealing fact is that cortical areas in the immediate vicinity of Broca’s area are responsible for fine hand movements (more precisely, movements of the more skilled hand, usually the right), which indicates a clear commonality and spatial compactness of the neurophysiological substrate of the +Te function. In addition, both speech sounds in humans and individual elements of birdsong form the basis of signal signs; in this respect, the patterns of birdsong and human speech are very similar.

In socionics, the simplicity/complexity of forms of signals, actions, and categories is regarded as only one of the criteria for determining the sign of aspects and functions. According to the descriptions 3, 15, the (+) aspect sign corresponds to detail, elaboration of information, narrowness and specificity of meanings, whereas the (–) sign corresponds, conversely, to breadth and universality of meanings and categories and an undetailed view of the subject. Most socionists, however, take into account not only the simplicity/complexity of signals and categories but also their “distance” and scale (”+” – close distance, a detailed, narrow view of the aspect; ”–” – far distance, general view, broad view from afar) 3, 15. In our view, simplicity/complexity should be taken as the basic criterion for determining the signs of aspects and functions, and this is dictated by nothing other than the structure of the ethological basis of the aspects: simple and complex signals have completely different socioadaptive purposes. (Below, this will also be shown for other aspects, including irrational ones.) In socionics, E. S. Filatova 16, and later V. Lyodin 7, arrived at a similar “narrowed” understanding of signs.

The ethological basis of structural logic consists of static gestures and postures. Analogously to what was said about the logic of actions, the criterion for distinguishing poles by simplicity/complexity should not be the configuration of the limbs and body in itself (and how, in any case, should its complexity be determined?), but rather the coarseness (–Ti) or fineness, detail (+Ti) of control over the statics of a posture/gesture. In our view, the “sensors” of the level of control over motor statics are again mirror neurons; this time, however, what is mirrored is not motor activity but the statics of muscle tension. A complex pattern of tension is externally manifested in a tendency toward small stepwise corrections (“fine adjustments”) of posture, giving it a characteristic “predatory” tenacity. The opposite pole, –Ti, is characterized by coarser control over statics and simpler patterns of muscular tension, although the latter can be quite intense – an example is the military posture of standing “at attention”.

The poles of static logic generally differ according to the “indexical/sign (respectively, quantitative and qualitative) signals” distinction described above for the logic of actions. However, the poles of this trait are reversed in static logic. Signals of +Ti are not of the sign type (as +Te is), but of the indexical type; the tenacity of a posture, tension of facial features, straightness of the neck and head – all this reflects, in a purely quantitative form, the individual’s composure and readiness to defend its status and stand up for itself. “Sign-like” qualities are instead more characteristic of –Ti signals: examples of such nonverbal signals in humans are the same military posture “ramrod straight”, saluting, and the like.

It should also be noted that signals belonging to the ethological basis of both colors of logic tend to combine through their “indexical” (quantitative) or “sign” (qualitative) poles. Thus, complex coordinated patterns of static tension +Ti can be combined with a simple overall movement –Te, for example, walking: the result is a characteristic predatory, tenacious gait. On the other hand, complex hand movements, or tapping an equally complex rhythm with the feet +Te, with a tense-static posture of the torso –Ti, are characteristic of many dances and rituals. But both aspects can practically never operate simultaneously with the ”+” sign: combining fine motor control with equally fine control of muscular statics is possible only with extreme exertion of will and attention, and even then only for a short time.

The poles of the ethical aspects can be defined similarly to the logical ones. For dynamic emotions, the +Fe pole includes complex (up to unique) patterns of emotional displays, often constructed from signals taken from different (even opposite) elementary emotions; there is excessive control over expression, giving emotions subtlety and an affected quality. The –Fe pole includes simpler signals that are nevertheless easily and unambiguously read, more or less intense (this is controlled), but without affectation or fine control of expression. For ethics of relations, the +Fi pole encompasses finely controlled statics of expression that conveys subtle nuances of emotional attitude; the –Fi pole includes simpler expressions, with an absence of fine control, entirely suitable for conveying simple relations (in the limit, binary ones such as “like – dislike”). In our view, in humans the play of dynamic emotions +Fe is conveyed best by the voice (including singing), whereas subtle relations +Fi are conveyed by facial expression. The fineness of control over +Fi should manifest itself approximately as it does for +Ti, in the form of a constant readiness for stepwise corrections (“fine adjustments”) of emotional expression.

The poles of emotional signals are also divided according to the indexical/sign (quantitative/qualitative) type of signals and show the same tendency to work jointly. Signals +Fi, –Fe are of the quantitative type: they reflect the level of arousal –Fe and the degree of emotional attitude +Fi; complex patterns of emotional facial expression combine well with general, uncomplicated dynamic bursts of emotion. Signals +Fe, –Fi are of the sign-qualitative type: both the complex play of emotions through the vocal channel +Fe and the accompanying weakly controlled static facial expressions seem demonstrative and unnatural. When perceiving such displays, the question arises almost by itself: “What does this mean, what is he trying to say?“

7. Ethological “Positivism” and “Negativism” of Rational Functions

Poles of the same aspect but of different sign and color, when combined, may be called a cross-aspect (and, correspondingly, a cross-function). There are four rational cross-aspects: in +Te–Ti and +Fe–Fi, all constituent poles are questim (and also negative; see the Reinin traits for aspects in 15); in +Ti–Te and +Fi–Fe, they are declatim, as well as positive.

How does the Reinin trait of positivism/negativism manifest itself in rational functions? One possible explanation is that the basis of some cross-aspects is better at transmitting positive ethological signals, whereas others are better at transmitting negative ones. Yet this in itself seems doubtful: both poles +Fe/–Fe, for example, are capable of conveying emotions of both positive and negative character. The same applies to relations +Fi/–Fi; in the case of logic, meanwhile, there should be no relation at all between the form of the signal and the sign of the signaler’s experience. It therefore seems more appropriate to us to define the “positivism” and “negativism” of rational functions in a somewhat different way, linking them not to the subject’s experiences but to the socioadaptive role of signals and cross-functions as a whole.

On entering into interaction, an individual in one way or another expects some reaction from a partner/competitor. Two types of reaction can be distinguished: convergence (coming together) or, conversely, divergence (moving apart) of the partner’s/competitor’s psychic state relative to the psychic state of the individual that initiated the interaction. Communication of the first type is best suited for transmitting the state of one individual to others, that is, for establishing common relations within the group, coordinating the motivations of individuals (including group cohesion), and producing common actions. Communication of the second type is better suited for singling out the signaling individual from others, for signaling the distinctiveness, perhaps even uniqueness, of one group member’s position relative to the others. We will call signals aimed primarily at convergence between individuals positive, and signals aimed at a divergent reaction negative. Below we will try to show that this dichotomy is very close to the Reinin trait positivism/negativism as applied to socionic functions. In other words, signals belonging to the ethological basis of +Te–Ti and +Fe–Fi operate mainly toward divergence of the experiences and positions of individuals, whereas signals +Ti–Te and +Fi–Fe operate toward convergence of experiences.

We will begin the analysis of this trait by considering the type of reaction of the addressee to a perceived signal. This is not a conscious or planned reaction but a spontaneous-reflexive one: among other things, it informs the sender that the message has been perceived. In type, this unconscious reaction may coincide with the signal or may not. In the first case, there is a certain imitation of the received signal (although perhaps in a weakened or distorted form); in reactions of the second kind, by contrast, imitation is excluded or even, if it nevertheless occurs, is regarded as an explicit rejection of the signal or as a challenge altogether. It is easy to see that an imitation reaction (mimesis) is associated with the convergent action of a signal: in this way the addressee lets the sender know that it has “entered into his position”, and mimesis itself implies a shift in the individual’s internal state toward that of the sender. Avoidance of imitation, conversely, indicates a divergent understanding of the signal, since it signals to the sender that the addressee avoids entering into his position! The latter is highly important if, for example, the signal is a display of social status, because imitation of such a signal is nothing other than a claim to the status of another, possibly dominant, individual… More broadly, such “negative” signals are appropriate for indicating inequality of social positions, not only dominance but also submission (an example is a display of fear before a dominant; clearly, the dominant itself will not become frightened by this – quite the opposite).

Of all rational aspects, the signals +Te and +Fe are the most “negative” in the sense just described. Thus, the natural (= automatically triggered) reaction to a complex motor signal +Te is not another signal +Te of the same kind, but a response through –Ti, that is, through the complementary pole of the same cross-function: a general freezing, even if only for a moment (after the signal has been decoded, the individual may change its behavior). This is how animals react to displays by conspecifics, and how humans react to various elaborate gestures and complex ritual movements, as well as to speech. The same is true for complex emotional displays +Fe. The “normal” reaction is a response through –Fi: if some simple emotional expression freezes on the face, this means the signal is “getting through”. A complex answering display +Fe, by contrast, is perceived more as obvious mimicry or a challenge.

Signals +Ti and +Fi are fully “positive”. For +Fi this is understandable from the general purpose of the function – providing empathy through the transmission of emotional attitude. The same is true of simple emotions –Fe if they “work” jointly with +Fi: “mirroring” such an emotion is not perceived as mockery (as in the case of +Fe); on the contrary, it is regarded as a normal response. The “positivity” of the +Ti function is more complicated, because its basis includes, among other things, signals of readiness to stubbornly defend status (“tenacious” postures), which seem quite negative because they are aimed at stopping and intimidating an opponent. Yet the effect of such a signal is achieved precisely through “entering into the position” of the defender: the competitor thereby directly assesses its readiness for confrontation. A common scene in the animal world is opponents frozen before one another in extremely threatening postures, while what restrains them from direct aggression is precisely the action of signals of readiness for defense! By comparison, simpler postures and gestures –Ti lack this effect, especially when they operate together with a +Te display. The same applies to simple emotional expressions –Fi working together with +Fe: because of the coarseness of the signal, the former transmits the sender’s state poorly and instead acts as a background for the +Fe display.

Let us also recall that the “positive” cross-aspects +Ti–Te and +Fi–Fe have the character of quantitative, or indexical, signals (see the previous section), whereas the “negative” +Te–Ti and +Fe–Fi are sign-qualitative. In this sense, the “positivism” of the former is entirely natural, because indexical signals reflect and transmit throughout the group the level of arousal of the signaling individual. This is not so for sign-qualitative signals, because they display the sender’s position rather than reflect its arousal (more precisely, they do reflect it, but only to a very incomplete degree and in distorted form). Misunderstandings are, of course, possible here (as with all other socionic dichotomies) if the addressee’s psyche, being weak in the given cross-function, begins unconsciously to translate meanings from the cross-aspect that is “inconvenient” for it into its “preferred” opposite one. Thus, instead of the display presented, a person may primarily perceive the demonstrator’s level of arousal, that is, interpret the signal in indexical-quantitative terms. The reverse is also possible if, in a quantitative-type signal, the addressee suddenly begins to seek (and find – that is what imagination is for…) a sign meaning of the type “What was he trying to say?”

Although positivism/negativism in the sense given above is not connected with the sign of the signal sender’s subjective experience, the most general considerations suggest that the opposition of individuals for the most part implies and evokes negative experiences (in the general psychological sense); convergence of individuals’ motivations and group cohesion, by contrast, proceed much more effectively when positive signals are used. This is confirmed by material from psychological portraits of TIMs; for example, EIE (base function +Fe) and ESI (–Fi) are indeed characterized by emotional negativism. Their “mirror” types IEI and SEE, however, are distinguished, conversely, by a clear predominance of positive, upbeat emotions, although the formulas of their TIMs contain the same “negative” poles of ethics. All this leads us to suppose that general-psychological positivism/negativism is not an immanent property of an aspect, function, or even cross-function, unlike the “signaling” positivism/negativism considered above, which is associated with aspect signs. Thus, SEE is characterized by emphatically positive, upbeat emotional displays, usually expressing superiority (in this way the action of the program function +Se manifests itself), whereas IEI is characterized by displays of hope for the better (program –Ni). It can be seen that the program function, as it were, induces its positivism onto the “negative” creative function and also onto the demonstrative/background function. This should not surprise us, because the same is true of other traits, particularly extraversion/introversion and rationality/irrationality; the creative function operates under the temperament of the program function, which noticeably changes its character (see the discussion above of the character of movements and emotions under the control of the rational and irrational systems of the brain). These considerations should prompt us to examine separately the intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties of socionic functions (the latter will include, in particular, vertness, nality, and “general” positivism/negativism), but this question lies beyond the scope of the present article.

Part II. Irrational Functions

8. Sensing from the Perspective of Ethology and Neurophysiology

The two sensing functions – volitional sensing Se and sensing of sensations Si – obviously differ from one another in their adaptive purpose. Volitional sensing is associated with a tendency toward domination and with the use of force both for aggressive expansion and for active-defensive purposes. Sensing of sensations, by contrast, serves the self-preservation of the individual, prompting it to choose better living conditions and regulating feeding and passive-defensive behavior (avoidance of threatening external influences, attention to bodily sensations, to signals of hunger/satiety, pain, and so on). These two groups of biological functions impose directly opposite strategies on the individual. On the one hand – struggle, activity (moreover, activity associated with increased risk), and mobilization of all the organism’s forces (since competitors are not idle either); on the other hand – avoidance of all kinds of threats, minimization of expended effort, and increased attention to feeding behavior. The first (energy-consuming) strategy is called ergotropic, or the “fight or flight” strategy; the second (energy-restoring) is called trophotropic. These strategies are already separated at the neurophysiological level. It is believed that the hypothalamus is responsible for the formation of basic biological needs 14. It consists of ergotropic and trophotropic divisions that regulate the two types of functions. The ergotropic division controls the sympathetic nerves of the peripheral nervous system, and the trophotropic division controls the parasympathetic nerves 13.

However, reducing sensing only to basic biological needs would be incorrect. First, by no means all forms of activity are associated with mobilization of forces in the manner of the “fight or flight strategy”. There is also play behavior, including play aggression: according to ethologists, such forms of behavior as laughter, handshaking, various pats on the shoulder, and so on developed from it. There is also the important need for spontaneous action, and there is exploratory activity, which is not exhausted merely by the discovery of new objects but also includes trying out different ways of acting on them from the available repertoire of programs/actions. In addition, innate and acquired motor programs are themselves sensory acts; it is true that they can operate under the control of the rational system of the brain, thereby becoming incorporated into the basis of the logic-of-actions aspect (as shown above), but they can also operate “for themselves”. Everything listed is just as much a form of extraverted sensing as aggression in the narrow sense; these forms, however, are less total in terms of mobilization of forces and much more diverse. Their adaptive functions also differ from the role of aggression in the narrow sense: they are means of specific and moderate (rather than totally suppressive!) influence on the environment and surrounding individuals. In our view, the dividing line within Se should be drawn here by using signs: the –Se pole retains mobilization of the organism according to the “fight or flight” principle, while the +Se pole includes specific motor programs-automatisms (innate and acquired), as well as exploratory and spontaneous-play activity.

Second, sensing of sensations is likewise not reducible entirely to the requirements of organismic self-preservation (feeding behavior, protection from bad weather, avoidance of physical threats, and so on). There is also a tendency toward pleasant sensations in themselves, outside any connection with biological needs (that is, maximally general hedonism). In its purpose, it is directly opposed to self-preservation instincts. For example, sensations of this kind motivate spontaneous and exploratory activity; the source of pleasure here is the novelty of stimuli and actions, compensating for – and sometimes outweighing – fear of possible errors and the potential threats arising from them. (At the same time, prolonged abstention from such activity produces an equally maximally general dissatisfaction – “something is missing, though it is unclear what”.) More generally, such generalized sensations play a reinforcing, rewarding role in the formation of new patterns of behavior. The signal here is maximally general (“Pleasure!” or “Misery!”), unlike the specific, narrowly selective sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, malaise. (The latter carry crucial information about potential danger to the organism and therefore must be recognized very accurately: if an individual confuses threats and behaves incorrectly, it can easily die.) The generality/specificity distinction provides substantial grounds for assigning sensations of the first type the sign ”–” and those of the second type ”+”.

Thus, in terms of adaptive purpose, the four poles of the sensing functions clearly group into two cross-functions (see the end of the previous part). The first, +Si–Se, encompasses needs directly connected with survival (ultimately biological): passive- and active-defensive behavior (including the “fight or flight strategy”), feeding and other physiological needs of the organism (including, most likely, sexual needs). The second cross-function, +Se–Si, is responsible for more complex motor activity, both spontaneous and externally stimulated, as well as for exploratory activity and the tendency toward new sensations.

The theory of Reinin traits attributes “positivism” to the +Se–Si functions and “negativism” to +Si–Se. The detailed description above of these functions as biological adaptations demonstrates that this is by no means accidental. The “negativism” of +Si–Se derives from the fact that the individual’s response to a broad spectrum of threats to life depends on these functions in the most decisive way: fail to eat, fail to gather one’s strength before a clash, fail to respond to signals of pain and illness – and serious trouble should be expected. The +Se–Si functions, by contrast, are intrinsically characterized by positivism: spontaneous activity is spontaneous precisely because it is driven not by need but by excitement; pleasure comes not so much from the final result as from activity itself. The search for new objects/stimuli is likewise associated with pleasure caused not so much by biological utility as by the novelty of sensations; fear of possible threats is suppressed so as not to interfere with the search. Thus, the positivism/negativism of sensing functions follows directly from their adaptive role.

In addition, the conclusion suggests itself that the two sensing cross-functions are supported by two different subcortical systems of the brain. On the one hand, there is the hypothalamus mentioned above: it contains centers of hunger, thirst, and fear; it regulates autonomic processes in the organism (+Si), including sexual drive; and its ergotropic divisions activate the “fight or flight” strategy –Se. Thus, the hypothalamus controls both “negative” sensing functions. The “positive” functions +Se–Si, as V. L. Talanov has shown, are associated with the thalamus – more precisely, with subcortical nuclei (the caudate nucleus and nucleus accumbens) that, together with the nonspecific nuclei of the thalamus, constitute a general system of brain modulation 12. “The caudate nucleus is associated with the storage of motor programs – primarily motor automatisms, learned movements, and skills, whereas the nucleus accumbens – a more ancient structure – is involved in the storage of innate behavioral programs… Dopaminergic neurons of the nucleus accumbens play a key role in humans and animals obtaining pleasant sensations. In addition, the nucleus accumbens contains many novelty neurons that respond by firing to new objects and unexpected events… which is accompanied by a feeling of hedonic pleasure, subjectively experienced enjoyment” 12.

9. Analysis of Sensory Information by Aspect Color and Sign

From the standpoint of ethology and neurophysiology, the problem of the aspect attribution of sensory information can also be viewed in a new way. There is considerable confusion in socionics over whether a particular characteristic of some sensory image belongs to the “black” or “white” component of the aspect. Where does Si end and Se begin? Strangely enough, the question is most easily resolved precisely on the basis of ethological considerations. First of all, the size and brightness/contrast of an object should be assigned to the Se component. Why? Because in living nature an individual’s chances of success in an aggressive clash depend directly on its physical size. Size is a critically important characteristic: the larger, the more dangerous (which is why rivals before a clash threateningly inhale air, trying to intimidate the enemy by inflating their lungs). In some species (tropical fish and amphibians, especially poisonous species), brightness of coloration plays the same role: bright means dangerous! The speed of objects undoubtedly also belongs here (energetic movements by an opponent are just as much a sign of danger as size). In the auditory modality, sound power is an unquestionable signal of strength, but not in general, only at low frequencies (roaring); high frequencies (squealing), conversely, indicate weakness.

There are also many other ethological markers of strength and aggressiveness: directness and firmness of gaze (because of the special importance of this signal, the oculomotor nerves are located in close proximity to the substantia nigra, where the neurotransmitter dopamine is produced), muscle tension, and so on. These, however, are more specific features present only in the image of an animal (and a human), whereas size, brightness, energy of movement, and sound power at low frequencies can pertain to the image of any object, including an inanimate one, regardless of its actual “aggressiveness”. An engine, for example, expresses absolutely nothing by its roar, yet the brain nevertheless assigns this information to the aspect of black sensing. Nor could anything else be expected, because in nature almost all sounds produced voluntarily originate from living beings, and almost all objects that move voluntarily are likewise living beings endowed with aggressiveness, a tendency toward spontaneous actions, and so on. The brain formed and developed primarily for competitive struggle in living nature, so separating danger cues into a distinct aspect is an entirely natural result of evolution. The association of the characteristics mentioned (size, brightness, speed of movement, power of voice/sound) in inanimate objects with potential dangers arising from living beings is, of course, an atavism, but an evolutionarily justified one: in nature it is better to be overcautious than to fall victim to carelessness.

The informational field of white sensing retains the other sensations that are connected neither directly nor indirectly with “force” manifestations. Thus, if in the visual modality the Se aspect includes the overall size, contrast, and brightness of an object, the Si aspect includes its specific shape, surface texture, and color shades. In the auditory modality, Se is sound power at low frequencies; Si is timbre, pitch, and other characteristics by which the sound source can be identified. Presumably, a division by colors can also be made for tactile sensations if the force of impact (including pain caused by it) is assigned to Se, and finer sensations – the shape of the object being touched, surface texture, and so on – are assigned to Si.

Let us bring aspect signs into the analysis in the sense of simplicity/complexity specified above: (+) – complex, detailed sensory characteristics; (–) – simpler characteristics that are at the same time more broadly (in the limit, universally) applicable. Applied to sensing of sensations in the visual modality, +Si is the form of a complex real object with all details of appearance and subtle nuances of color and texture; –Si is, conversely, simple forms (up to schematic ones), pure colors, and the absence of “ornate” details. A coarse, evaluative grasp of complex forms and nuances is also possible (folding +Si into –Si), or, conversely, the “thinking up” of details (unfolding –Si into +Si; the limiting case is the action of hallucinogens such as LSD). Applied to black sensing, let us define the signs as follows: –Se is a single, weakly segmented object; +Se is an object with sharply contrasting constituent parts or a configuration of many simple elements (for example, spots on a sheet of paper).

The poles defined in this way form two cross-aspects, +Si–Se and +Se–Si, and in each cross-aspect the poles naturally complement one another. Thus, if a single object –Se is in the field of attention, its contours, color nuances, and so on are grasped very precisely (+Si). Conversely, with an overall view of a configuration consisting of many objects (or parts of a whole, +Se), their form, color, and texture are grasped in a coarser general way –Si; the same applies to forms composed of small objects (for example, coins scattered across a table or constellations in the sky). Therefore, as far as the visual modality is concerned, the cross-aspect +Si–Se may be called object sensing, or sensing of the whole, whereas +Se–Si may be called set sensing (or configuration sensing, or sensing of parts).

Sensing poles can also be distinguished with respect to movements (and, more broadly, any changes in external appearance) of objects. Movement of an object as a whole should be assigned to the –Se pole; complex movements of the object’s form/lines, play of colors, shades, and so on should be assigned to the +Si pole of the same cross-aspect. All displacements of the elements of an object/configuration relative to one another (potentially a very complex pattern of mutual movements, including collisions) should be assigned to the +Se pole; the resulting change in the form of the configuration as a whole should most likely be assigned to the –Si pole.

Let us also define the cross-aspects in the auditory modality. The +Si and –Si poles should respectively include detailed and coarse information about timbre, the sound spectrum, and so on; +Se and –Se should include complex, fragmented sound impacts (tapping one’s fingers on a table, a dog’s barking) and, conversely, a unitary sound (in the limiting case, the monotonous whistling of wind or a locomotive horn). The +Si–Se cross-aspect is the perception of an integral sound with all its details, making it possible, among other things, to associate the sound with a specific source and incorporate it into the sensory image of a particular object. The +Se–Si cross-aspect is the perception of the rhythm of a complex fragmented sound that carries information primarily about the sequence of actions to which the sounding object is subjected or which it performs voluntarily (if the sound source is a human or animal). In particular, the +Se–Si cross-aspect should unquestionably include the sounds of human speech taken as a sensory stimulus. At the same time, as noted above, speech in the sense of a sequence of speech-motor acts remains under the control of the +Te function; translation from sensing into logic is carried out by mirror neurons.

On the whole, it can be argued that the two sensing cross-aspects are associated with two qualitatively different adaptive functions. The task of object sensing +Si–Se is maximally accurate recognition of the object, taking into account all its details and all its minutiae (while at the same time preserving the invariance of the object under possible small deformations, rotations, and the like). The most complex visual task of this kind is face recognition. Set sensing +Se–Si, in turn, works to single out some object among many others by some difference: color, size, overall form, texture, movement relative to other elements, position (upper/lower, left/right, and so on). This cross-function is obviously connected with exploratory activity: the gaze jumps from object to object, seeking among them one that differs and is unlike the others. Matters are similar in the auditory modality. The +Si–Se cross-function performs precise recognition of an integral sound, including linking it to a particular source object; the +Se–Si cross-function analyzes and recognizes complex fragmented rhythms-patterns and also compares elementary sounds with one another, classifying them by various criteria. Apparently, the most complex task of this kind is distinguishing the sounds of human speech, especially consonants.

The conclusion also suggests itself that the two sensing cross-functions certainly differ from one another in their sensitivity to weak signals, or, in psychophysiological terms, by the trait of strength/weakness with respect to excitation. Object sensing must be “weaker”, because weak signals and small details can be decisive for precise recognition of an object. Weak signals are not so important for set sensing: the –Si function simplifies information in one way or another, while in the +Se aspect ignoring extremely weak signals is even desirable (one should not treat every tiny speck as a separate object!). What is preferable here is instead the unambiguity of distinguishing a given object from others, that is, a steeper slope of the characteristic curve after a moderately high threshold, which is what strong nervous processes mean in the narrow sense. In 12, V. Talanov directly associates strength of the nervous system with respect to excitation with the operation of the thalamic brain activation system, whose subcortical nuclei support the +Se–Si cross-function (see the previous section); exploratory activity, for which strength of nervous processes with respect to excitation is preferable according to the considerations given above, is linked to the same cross-function. All these considerations indicate, if not the complete certainty of the conclusion that the thalamic system plays the leading role in the operation of the +Se–Si cross-function, then at least the very good consistency of this conclusion with neurophysiological conceptions.

In the same work 12, Talanov associates weakness of the nervous system with respect to excitation with the action of the hippocampus. Possibly, the hippocampus plays some role in the operation of the +Si–Se cross-function (object sensing), because it ensures the extraction of weak components of a signal with their subsequent processing, which facilitates object recognition.

10. Adaptive Role of Static Intuition

From an evolutionary standpoint, intuition, compared with the other functions of the psyche, appears to be certainly younger (and this means higher): in humans it is undoubtedly developed more strongly than in animals. Nevertheless, intuitive functions can clearly be observed in other species with the most highly developed thinking (among mammals – primates; among birds – corvids). Before taking up intuition seriously, however, its scope must be defined more carefully, because existing definitions suffer from a certain vagueness and incompleteness. Thus, black intuition is said to include potential possibilities, ideas, meaning, essence, abstractions; white intuition – time, changes, the course of history, predictions, fantasies, and so on. A number of objections can be raised here: how exactly are such rather vague concepts as “idea”, “fantasy”, “essence”, and “meaning” to be understood? Why are possibilities assigned to intuition rather than the logic of actions (after all, these are possibilities for performing actions)?

To clarify the concepts, it is useful to begin from C. G. Jung’s still broader and vaguer understanding of intuition (as direct, nonsensory perception of the essence of things and situations), as well as from the opposite pole of the dichotomy (sensing). It follows that intuition is the perception of an object or process that is not represented explicitly at the sensory input of the psyche. Nevertheless, intuitive information enters from the external world only through that same sensory input (we are not considering telepathy). That is, information enters, but the person perceives not what is concretely tangible here and now, but something else. There are two possibilities: (a) the psyche substitutes some other object/process for the tangible object or process (statics), and (b) the object/process is the same one, but it is seen not as it is here and now, but as it will be some time later, or as it was in the past (dynamics).

Clearly, there is no place here for mysticism or extrasensory perception – everything is extremely ordinary. A good example of static intuition: before us is the casing of some device, but we “see” not its exterior but a set of functions or even – if we possess the necessary knowledge – the operating scheme (which is its “essence”!) of the device. An equally ordinary example of dynamic intuition: when preparing to perform some action (or communicate information), we “see” the probable reaction of those around us to our action, that is, we see the situation in the future.

Let us first consider static intuition, Ne. For an object/process to evoke in consciousness the image of another object/process, the psyche must contain an association, or correspondence between them. In fact, the association (correspondence) itself, taken as a special informational entity, should be assigned to the Ne aspect, because both sides of the association – what is sensed and what is implied – may belong to other aspects: logic (various types of signals; see section 4), sensing, and even ethics.

Having specified the principle of static intuition in this way, it is not difficult to see that human linguistic communication would be altogether impossible without the Ne function. It is precisely this function that provides “second” (= speech) signals with meanings: a linguistic sign is nothing other than an arbitrary correspondence (association) between a signifier and a signified. Thus, words (sequences of phonemes, or more precisely, if we recall mirror neurons, speech-motor patterns) are associated with their meanings; phonemes, in turn, can be signified by letters, and, if necessary, by something else, for example Morse code. In this respect, the adaptive role of static intuition is also apparent: it primarily serves communication by supporting the functioning of all kinds of sign systems (and for this reason it may with full justification also be called intuition of meaning).

Perhaps assigning the entire sphere of linguistic meanings (“second signals”) to the Ne function alone may seem unfounded, at least because socionics has not found any advantages of black intuitives over sensing types in linguistic competence. Both use language quite successfully. There is, however, a crucial stylistic difference between them concerning the richness of associations. In intuitive types, semantic associations are certainly broader, more mobile (less tied to facts and circumstances), and, on the whole, more nontrivial; sensing types, by contrast, prefer established, concrete meanings tied to concrete objects. Nor does the dominance of one function (in this case, sensing) by any means make the operation of its antagonist impossible. In essence, the situation here is the same as with assigning voluntary motor activity to the rational Te aspect (see section 4), even though when the rational brain activation system is suppressed, the motor areas of the cortex continue to function (only control is weakened, meaning that it is primarily the style of movement that changes). Curiously, V. Talanov’s data indicate reduced memory for the names of objects in intuitive types 14.

One of the most important properties of linguistic signs is arbitrariness, or conventionality (according to Yu. Lotman), expressed in the fundamental absence of similarity between the sensory images of the signifier and the signified: the sound image of a word has nothing in common with its meaning. Hence the arbitrariness of such signs: one and the same object can with equal success be signified in completely different ways. (By comparison, pictograms, as well as some hieroglyphs, which are stylized images of real objects, are not arbitrary in this sense; they are usually called iconic signs.)

Moreover, in our view, the requirement of arbitrariness of the sign (= absence of sensory similarity between signifier and signified) applies not only to linguistic signs but to the entire Ne aspect in general. Purely sensory associations therefore remain outside the sphere of intuition: part-whole, spatial contiguity of objects (as in the pair spoon-plate), different modalities of the image of one and the same object (for example, the appearance of an object and the sound it produces), simple conditioned-reflex connections (joint action of two sensory stimuli – for example, the light of a lamp and food in a feeder), as well as iconic signs (see above). After all, intuition is the antagonist of sensing; it is not accidental that socionics associates it only with hidden, implicit properties of objects. Therefore, associations based on a purely sensory principle cannot be regarded as intuitive objects.

Compared with purely sensory associations, linguistic signs differ in another fundamental respect. Strengthening an association by contiguity or a simple conditioned reflex requires training and repeated joint presentation of the associated objects/stimuli. In contrast, a linguistic sign can be established by a single explanation: “This means that.” This substantially increases the speed and productivity of learning, especially in early childhood, during the sensitive period of language acquisition. Apparently, a special mechanism distinct from the formation of “ordinary” sensory and sensorimotor associations operates here, having developed in the course of evolution as an adaptation that accelerates learning. We are inclined to think that this mechanism is common to the entire sphere of static intuition rather than only to linguistic abilities (we will return to this question toward the end of the section).

Let us bring aspect signs into the analysis of intuition of meaning. The +Ne pole should encompass complex, detailed associations. The latter should be understood primarily in the sense of narrow specificity: the input and output patterns (= the signifier and signified of the sign) are unambiguously linked to each other within a very narrow range of possible input variations – otherwise the sign does not function at all. In this sense, language is distinguished by extremely high specificity: words with completely different meanings may differ by only one letter, and conversely, synonymous words may sound completely different. In this feature, language resembles so-called hash coding in computer programming.

At the opposite pole, –Ne, are “broad-profile” associations/signs that permit broad interpretation of one and the same signifier depending not only on context but also on the subject’s system of conceptions. In linguistics, such “broad-profile” associations with a high level of uncertainty are sometimes called symbols, and theory contrasts them with signs. It should be noted that a considerable proportion of ordinary +Ne signs also permit interpretation and expansion of meaning, that is, translation into –Ne: this occurs in metaphorical use not provided for by ordinary linguistic practice. It should also be noted that “broad” signs as a whole do not possess the discreteness of “ordinary” +Ne signs: their meaning is fluid, their sense is diffuse (not for nothing does the Sapir-Whorf theory of linguistic relativity speak not simply of meaning but of a “cloud of meanings”), and their validity is not strict (the signifier either fits or does not fit the given signified) but quantitative-relative (it fits to some degree). There are many such vague concepts: frequently encountered examples (including in socionics) are “idea”, “soul”, “creativity”, “meaning”, and so on, as well as their derivatives.

It should be noted that the vagueness of meaning in –Ne can be either a disadvantage or an advantage. In any case, the human psyche works very well with fuzzy concepts and meanings. Transfer of meaning is one of the most important literary devices; in particular, the sense of humor is based on it. In addition, translation from +Ne into –Ne and vice versa makes it possible to explicate concepts, that is, to clarify their content in a new way.

The ability to use arbitrary signs is possessed not only by humans but also by a number of animals. Thus, chimpanzees trained in the sign language of the deaf use a vocabulary of about 800 words (although their grammar is poorer – approximately at the level of 3-4-year-old children). Ethologist V. S. Fridman believes that the real “language barrier” lies not between humans and other primates at all, but between lower and higher monkeys 18. His argument is that lower monkeys have species-specific sign-signals (for example, vervet monkeys have been found to use three different alarm calls for different types of threat), whereas no such signals have been found in higher apes. At the same time, chimpanzees can develop their own signs, but these turn out to differ substantially across different groups, whereas “hard-wired” species-specific signs have been lost. Among birds, corvids exhibit similar sign flexibility 21.

It should be noted that species-specific animal signals (the +Te aspect; see section 4) are not intuitive signs in the sense specified by us, although each has its own meaning not directly connected with the sensory form of the signal. Of course, signals of the +Te type can be used to construct signifiers (as is the case in speech), but the “meanings” of most ethological displays are “hard-wired”, that is, are part of the species’ genetic program and in this sense are not arbitrary. The action of such signals is usually explained by the so-called releaser concept, according to which the response program is triggered automatically (English release – triggering). Ethology, however, has accumulated considerable evidence that higher animals are capable of extracting meaning from the signals and displays of conspecifics 19. This means that the automatic reaction is replaced by modeling the demonstrator’s motives (including, very importantly, social intentions – to compete for status, acquire an ally, and so on). Why do we believe that these models belong to the intuition aspect? Because of their implicitness (in the narrow sense): they can attribute to the demonstrator “true” intentions that have nothing in common with those being signaled. Conversely, they can prompt an individual to adhere to behavior that has nothing in common with its actual impulses (including pretending). More precisely, they can force the individual to abandon the reaction automatically triggered by the releaser effect and choose a completely different reaction suggested and mediated by a model of the situation activated in the psyche. Thus, models of actions/intentions find application both in the reflexive and in the activity-oriented domain. This constitutes the second major adaptive function of intuition, both static and dynamic Ni, because a model can also represent expected changes in motives in response to some action (see the next section).

In the ethological literature, the ability to model the motives of other individuals is denoted by the, in our view, not entirely felicitous term “theory of mind”. In particular, most monkeys and some bird species possess this ability.

It should be noted that in both its communicative and modeling applications, intuition works with signals belonging to a rational aspect: these include both the signified of a sign and the social action that activates a theory-of-mind model. Above, a hypothesis was proposed about the special character of intuitive associations, namely the extreme ease of their formation in comparison with sensory associations. It is quite obvious that this is very important not only for acquiring signal-signs (language in humans), but also for accumulating social experience in the form of models linking social actions with individuals’ motives and with relations within the group. The ability to construct a theory of mind rapidly and use it easily is a crucial advantage in social competition. Most likely, this is what determined the development of the intuitive function in the course of evolution; at the same time, the associative system that arose naturally became closed onto the signaling sphere most important for social life, that is, onto the rational functions. Sensory associations remained “outside” the enhanced intuitive-associative system.

Apparently, from the function of modeling an individual’s implicit motives (“essence”), a third, instrumental application of static intuition developed in humans, reflected in the very name “intuition of possibilities”. Strictly speaking, the output of a theory-of-mind model is precisely possibilities for “nonstandard” social action (outside the automatic releaser effect), for using the situation and social partners in an “alternative” way. It should be emphasized that even in higher primates intuitive modeling is applied almost exclusively to social life rather than to inanimate objects (tools): the tools used by apes are simple and entirely transparent in their operation. In general, in the level of social intelligence apes lag behind humans far less than in instrumental intelligence: this has been revealed through comparative testing of human children and chimpanzees of different ages 8. Apparently, the intellectual leap of Homo sapiens compared with other primates is connected not only with speech but also with the sharply increased use of originally social brain structures and functions for purely “asocial”, that is, object-oriented, instrumental purposes. We will return to this question in the next part, where the interaction of rational and irrational functions in humans will be considered.

A theory-of-mind model and, more broadly, intuition of possibilities can also be understood by comparison with its direct antagonist Se: Ne is knowledge-power (after F. Bacon: “Scientia est potentia”), an alternative manifestation of spontaneous action and (possibly) domination, but in the domain of non-explicit dependencies between actions and results. Aspect signs can be applied to implicit possibilities by the familiar criterion of specificity/breadth. The +Ne pole includes possibilities that require observance of numerous detailed conditions (“subtle knowledge-power”). Possession of such instruments is motivated not so much by their objective utility as by the very feeling of the power of knowledge over subjects and objects, reaching in the limiting case a peculiar “intoxication with possibilities”. This is essentially equivalent to a tendency toward spontaneous activity and influence on subjects/objects by a broad range of methods, only not in the explicit, physical +Se domain but in the implicit domain. The –Ne pole includes model-based instruments of more general application (in the limiting case tending toward universality and even omnipotence). Here one can discern a tendency toward “mobilization of forces”, but not in the physical domain, as with the –Se function, but in the domain of implicit possibilities: the actor relies not on many narrowly specific instruments but on only a small number of them, though more powerful and universal. The latter are often characterized by a purely “breaching” mode of action, just like –Se (of the type “There is no defense against a crowbar”).

As an illustration of the +Ne/–Ne dichotomy in human instrumental activity, one can compare the work of computer programmers and hackers: the former create a vast number of software functions, whereas the latter, by contrast, seek “breaching” loopholes and simple ways of disabling or modifying already programmed functions and possibilities.

11. Dynamic Intuition. Positive and Negative Cross-Functions of Intuition

According to what was said above, the operation of dynamic intuition (the Ni aspect) manifests itself in replacing the image of an object/process/system in the present with an image of the expected future (or probable past) of that same object/system. The substitution is carried out by a model of expected changes activated in the psyche; this model is the intuitive object in the narrow sense. The Ni function can therefore also be called intuition of changes.

From the standpoint of evolutionary selection, the ability to take expected changes into account is an extremely valuable quality for adaptation to the external environment and, to an even greater degree, to intragroup competition. Several preliminary qualifications are necessary here, however, as in the case of static intuition: by no means all models of change are properly intuitive. Thus, the visible movement of an object (the flight of a bird, the movement of a car) can be extrapolated by sensing alone. The same applies to learned conditioned reflexes of the type “if the light comes on, then expect food in the feeder in 10 sec.” The criterion of intuitiveness in the narrow sense must be the implicitness of the models (since intuition is opposed to sensing): the future of the object/system should not be derived directly from its appearance and visible movement. This entails the possible arbitrariness of models with respect to the external appearance of changing objects/systems: externally similar systems may change in completely different ways – and conversely, entirely dissimilar systems may be described by one and the same model of change.

The most important adaptive role of the Ni function is predicting the social actions of partners/competitors depending on the situation, as well as modeling possible changes in intragroup relations in response to particular social actions. In other words, theory-of-mind models (see the previous section) include two components – static Ne and dynamic Ni: both the motives of individuals in statics and their possible changes (dynamics) are subject to modeling.

In addition, like Ne, the Ni function in humans can be applied not only in the social but also in the instrumental domain, in relation to any objects and systems. With its help, consciousness works with cause-and-effect relations and models dependencies of system functioning on various action parameters. More generally, it represents the change of any quantity over time in the form of a function (possibly dependent on a number of parameters) that permits extrapolation into the future and the past; in this way people model stock prices on an exchange, the abundance of different species in an ecosystem, and so on. (At the same time, every break in a trend requires the creation of a new dynamic model, because extrapolation on the basis of the old trend will certainly be incorrect.)

The next step is to choose a criterion of simplicity/complexity of models of change for distinguishing the +Ni/–Ni poles. By analogy with static intuition, we will choose as the criterion of complexity the detail with which the model is specified and, to an even greater degree, its specificity, that is, the dependence of the picture of expected changes on variation in some parameter(s). An example is predicting an individual’s reaction to a social action: depending on the intensity of the latter, the reaction may vary over a very broad range, and a small change in the action may lead to a qualitatively different reaction (the proverbial “last straw”). The other pole, –Ni, comprises less specific models of broader validity in which the dependence of expected changes on action parameters is not so strong and is more qualitative than quantitative. An extreme example: “Whatever I do, he will behave in such-and-such a way unless something completely extraordinary happens.”

The Ni function operates similarly backward in time, except that in this case the model produces not an expected future but a probable past, that is, there is a reconstruction of the past from the results of the present: “How did all this begin?”, or more precisely: “What causes and what balance of forces led to the present situation?” Both poles can operate here: +Ni – detailed reconstruction, precise fitting of past parameters; –Ni, conversely – a coarser reconstruction, most often of a qualitative type. Finally, the poles of intuition of changes also manifest themselves in estimating the time intervals separating events. In the case of –Ni there is simply a cause and a consequence but no exact temporal dependence of the latter on the former; in the case of +Ni, by contrast, the occurrence of consequences is modeled as a function of time.

Models in the Ni aspect are not “knowledge-power” (as in the case of Ne; see the previous section), but rather knowledge-sensation (by analogy with the Si aspect). Indeed, modeling changes requires a certain detachment, passive observation of processes instead of active intervention (because the latter is liable to produce inevitable distortion of the model). At the same time, modeling at the +Ni pole is more characteristically an absorbing contemplation of the type “What will come of this?”, with fine weighing of different active forces and unhurried mental “chewing over” of the details of how the situation develops until the model “settles”. –Ni modeling, by contrast, is characterized rather by the suddenness of an insight (“So X is followed by Y!”); fine details of the situation’s development do not arouse the same interest, which is directed mainly toward sharp, stage-defining changes (turning points?) in development.

The poles of static and dynamic intuition form two cross-aspects: +Ne–Ni and +Ni–Ne, within each of which substantial similarity and complementarity of models can be found. Thus, the coarse form of intuition of changes –Ni, predicting only replacement of one state by another but neither the precise course of processes nor their precise dependence on the intensity of an action, is very similar to a discrete association +Ne; the only difference is that the associated patterns are separated in time: the state “before” and the state “after”. Sometimes the change of state, that is, the –Ni model proper, supplements a more detailed +Ne model that assigns some meaning to an action pattern (possibly +Te). In such a case, the model is constructed at once across the entire +Ne–Ni cross-aspect. A possible example from the instrumental sphere: an action and its consequence are connected both as a static association (each machine function corresponds to a command entered through the control panel) and as a simple dynamic model: entered a command – [waited] – obtained the result. This is most clearly seen in computer commands.

In turn, detailed-specific models of changes +Ni are in a certain sense similar to “fluid” associations –Ne. If a developmental model is viewed as an association (state “now” – state “later”), the fluid form of the latter is directly connected with dependence on parameter(s): with continuous change in a parameter (say, the intensity of a social action), the development of the system and its final state also change continuously. On the other hand, “fluid” associations and signs –Ne can be represented as functions dependent on a parameter. Thus, the meaning of a sign may depend strongly on emphases placed in the context, and for its model to be complete, it must also include the dependence(s) of the signified on different contextual parameters.

Comparison of the two intuitive cross-functions clearly reveals the qualitative (discrete) character of +Ne–Ni models and, conversely, the quantitative (continuous) character of +Ni–Ne models. This is a new and quite unexpected result, because previously in socionics the Questimity trait was associated either with the rational/irrational dichotomy of functions 4, or with the static-dynamic trait (on the basis of the motor characteristics 5 and perception 11 of statics and dynamics). When function signs are taken into account, however, matters prove somewhat more complex. Recall that the declatim rational cross-aspects also show a quantitative character (see section 7); questim logic and ethics, by contrast, have a sign-qualitative character. Above, we called questim sensing the sensing of a set/configuration, in contrast to declatim “sensing of the whole”, so once again the criterion of wholeness/fragmentation is found at the basis of this trait. It appears that the basis is common to all information aspects: Questimity is fragmentation and discreteness; Declatimity is wholeness and continuity of images, signals, and models.

According to the theory of Reinin traits, the poles of “discrete” intuition +Ne–Ni are positive, whereas “continuous” intuition +Ni–Ne is negative. In the course of analyzing the sensing cross-functions, it was found that they formed to solve different adaptive tasks and are associated with different subcortical systems of the brain: the “negative” cross-function +Si–Se solves tasks of organismic self-preservation and is associated with the hypothalamus, whereas the “positive” +Se–Si is responsible for exploratory behavior and spontaneous actions and is associated with the nuclei of the thalamic system of the brain. The question is whether analogous arguments can be proposed to explain the “positivism” and “negativism” of the intuitive cross-functions, and how these qualities should be understood in relation to intuition in general.

At first glance, the entire Ni function ought to be distinguished by negativism, because it is associated with modeling the future and therefore with identifying all sorts of potential threats. The Ne function, by contrast, models potential possibilities for action, which would seem to give it positivism. In fact, however, matters are somewhat more complex. First, identifying threats requires fineness and precision of the model and consideration of all parameters of the situation, because both the level and the type of danger depend substantially on them; failure to distinguish different threats is liable to produce an inadequate reaction and, from there, direct risk to life. Clearly, the +Ni pole is suitable for this purpose and –Ni is not. Second, counteracting threats requires actions, and not only physical force but also implicit instruments of Ne. Moreover, by analogy with the need to mobilize forces (–Se; see section 8), in a moment of danger it is appropriate to use instruments with broader, although coarser, action. This reduces the probability of selecting the wrong instrument in a situation in which there is insufficient time for analysis (because one must react quickly to a threat that has manifested itself). At the end of the previous section it was noted that coarse instruments –Ne are characterized by a certain “breaching” action, which makes them suitable for general active-defensive purposes. It therefore turns out that the “negative” tasks of detecting threats and active defense are better solved by the +Ni–Ne cross-function; from this follows the negativism of the latter (in full agreement with the theory of Reinin traits!).

On the other hand, possession of many subtle implicit instruments +Ne, like possession of a broad spectrum of physical action programs +Se, facilitates the achievement of highly diverse goals; to realize this diversity, evolution “attached” these aspects to the instinct of spontaneous activity. The –Ni pole, operating in addition to +Ne, facilitates the use of instruments with delayed action: perform an action now – wait for the result later. Hence the “positivism” (in agreement with Reinin theory) of the +Ne–Ni cross-function.

We do not yet know which subcortical structures should be credited with the operation of the two intuitive cross-functions. V. Talanov has expressed the view that the hippocampus is involved in the mechanisms of intuitive anxiety (+Ni), because it ensures the extraction of weak components of a signal followed by their processing in parts 12.

Part III. Interaction of Rational and Irrational Functions in Humans

Compared with the conceptions of psychic functions established in socionics, the ethological basis considered above seems extremely narrow. This is especially true of logic and intuition. Thus, most socionists assign labor, as well as information about facts, to the Te aspect, whereas the ethological basis of this function is associated only with social signals, not with acting upon material objects (labor) or with facts about such objects. Similarly, information about the structure of object systems at first glance does not fit at all into the basis of the Ti function (which is limited to the same social orientation – static signals of an inhibitory character). We believe, however, that these discrepancies (as well as a number of others) find a simple explanation if the interaction of rational and irrational functions in humans is taken into account.

Compared with other species, humans are not simply social beings but hypersocial ones. The rational system of the human brain is undoubtedly more developed; anthropogenesis is marked above all by the rapid growth of the anterior regions of the cerebral cortex, in which, according to V. Talanov, the rational functions of the psyche are localized 12. In addition, humans possess very close – much closer than in other species – interconnections between rational and irrational functions. In our view, these interconnections manifest themselves in three main directions:

• the rational system takes on certain object-oriented functions, that is, functions not directly connected with signal exchange;
• objects (things) that are originally nonsocial in nature turn into social signals and carriers of social relations, thereby taking on “rational” functions;
• through strongly mutually stimulating interactions with one another, rational and irrational functions form self-excitation circuits of the psyche – the very “information metabolism” whose modeling marked the beginning of the development of socionics.

Let us consider these points in order.

12. Object-Oriented Application of Rational Functions. Labor from the Perspective of Ethology and Socionics

A good example of a “nonsocial” application of rational functions is human mathematical ability: mathematical operations are substantially linked to dynamic logic, while the construction of models and proofs of propositions is linked to static logic. Clearly, the driving force behind the development of logic during anthropogenesis was by no means some need for mathematical abilities – animals manage perfectly well without them (parrots and chimpanzees can count only up to seven). The driving force was the need for social signaling and structuring, more precisely, competition in these parameters; however, originally social brain functions developed in the course of evolution to such a degree that, beginning from a certain level, they became capable of performing highly complex tasks not directly connected with social competition. This includes not only mathematics but also analysis of complex systems and constructions of the most varied nature, where structural logic operates: analysis of mechanical devices, electrical circuits, and even analysis of human thinking itself (within psychological and philosophical introspection). Thus, expressions such as “from the point of view of…”, “on the basis of…”, “within the limits of…”, “in terms of”, “against the background of”, “on the other hand”, and so on (which, according to 6, belong to the semantic field of white logic) all originally arose to describe spatial relations and relative positions of objects; the latter are highly important for assessing static social signals (see section 5), including for modeling social hierarchy (higher-lower, and so on). Yet these same expressions (which, apparently, means the same modes of representation!) subsequently came to be widely used in the analysis and description of the operation of consciousness and thinking. In approximately this way, the sphere of structural-logical analysis extended far beyond the ethological basis of the Ti function.

Of particular interest from the standpoint of the social sciences is the analysis of labor activity, which the overwhelming majority of socionists confidently include in the Te aspect. According to currently generally accepted conceptions, the purpose of labor, like all “rational” human activity in general, is to produce some kind of benefit (usually material). Yet even if benefit belongs to the ethological basis of black logic, this benefit is not instrumental-objective but social. In other words, the main goal of hypothetical proto-labor and, more broadly, proto-activity, from which later forms subsequently developed, is influence on those around one. The properties of the final result of activity (the product of labor) are a secondary and moreover relative criterion: if society evaluates it positively, the product is good (even if it brings no practical benefit; an example is cult objects); if not, it is bad (even if it is perfectly usable; an example is “morally obsolete” goods, although, naturally, morality in the narrow sense is not involved here at all). The evaluation of products does tend to converge with their physical utility, but this unstable rule always admits a great many counterexamples.

The “truly social” functions of labor/activity are no great secret, but on the whole they are regarded as something like atavisms; it is curious that every warrant officer in the army uses them daily, whereas academic economists try not to recall them at all. First, if a person does something on another person’s orders, this is a kind of signal-response: the subordinate accepts his lower status. On the other hand, the more people work for a given person, the more important and influential that person is in the most direct ethological sense; it is not accidental that in all cultures demonstrative manipulation of a multitude of subordinates is regarded as an unmistakable sign of high position. In addition, joint activity (labor) promotes group cohesion. If you like, labor even makes a person safer from a purely physical standpoint: while working, he cannot fight, because his attention and energy are “bound” by the rational-planning system of the brain, which restrains direct aggression. (From this standpoint, the saying that “idle hands breed vice”, usually attributed to the so-called Protestant work ethic, is nothing more than an echo of an ancient ethological evaluative program: an individual occupied with something is certainly safer than an unoccupied one…) Finally, engagement in complex activity (this is already the +Te pole) provides the individual with the distinct social place of a professional (specialist) in almost all cultures.

At the basis of the social evaluation of the quality/usefulness of labor one can identify the same criteria by which signals belonging to the ethological basis of +Te are evaluated. First and foremost, this is voluntary controllability of action according to strictly specified criteria, most clearly seen in the example of qualification. It is not enough simply to make even a functioning object; one must also follow the technology (do everything as required, not merely in the most convenient way!). Moreover, a specialist must possess an excess of competence (knowledge/skills) so that, on external request, he can fulfill an entire range of complex and nontrivial orders without introducing arbitrary elements of his own. In essence, these are the same criteria by which the skill of a dancer or gymnast is evaluated (see section 6), only applied not to physical movements but to processing a product of labor according to a specified set of requirements. The latter may be material or nonmaterial, as in the case of intellectual labor. The greater the specialist’s skill, the more highly society evaluates him (including the professional guild). When different technologies are compared, the more “advanced” is considered to be the one that permits finer processing of the product and, very importantly, easier reconfiguration for different orders within a given spectrum. Example: flexible automated systems (ГАПС), because of their capacity to be reconfigured for tasks across a very broad spectrum, are considered to stand “above” ordinary assembly lines, although their productivity is generally lower and their cost certainly higher.

The most important feature of the social evaluation of complex activity/labor is its nonlinear dependence on quality of execution: even a small improvement generally leads to a very noticeable rise in evaluation (including in monetary terms). There is nothing surprising in this if one recalls the ethological basis of the +Te function: a display is an instrument of competition, and the slightest advantage of one demonstrator over others makes him the winner. The same is true of the dancers and gymnasts mentioned above: if one of them exceeds competitors only slightly in mastery of movement, he is recognized as the best, while the others remain “merely good”.

Products of labor (and, more broadly, results of activity) are often evaluated according to the same “social” criteria. The slightest improvement in a product’s parameters makes competitors’ products “morally obsolete” regardless of actual use and economic profitability in the narrow sense. Here technical parameters play the role of the same kind of quality criterion as the perfection of different elements of a gymnastic exercise. In addition, consumption of such “cool” products is likewise a display of a purely ethological kind: “Look what kind of masters work for me!” The best example is the modern automobile and computer market.

In our view, the –Te/+Te dichotomy essentially coincides with the abstract/concrete labor dichotomy in Marx’s political economy. By abstract labor Marx by no means meant intellectual labor – quite the opposite. By abstract labor, or labor in general, he meant simple unskilled actions involved in servicing operating machines, for example pressing a lever at a specified time interval. Its opposite is the labor of an artisan, master, or skilled worker requiring specific complex skills inseparable from the person.

Money and capital should undoubtedly also be assigned to the –Te pole, as the maximally general (condensed) form of social action. From this standpoint, money directly expresses the quantity of simple labor (because they belong to the same –Te pole); the labor theory of commodity value is based on this. The value of complex labor +Te expresses not its quantity but its social evaluation (see above). We consider fair the observation of some sociologists that the value of products of complex labor is evaluated not according to A. Smith but rather according to Thomas Aquinas: price, the latter taught, should reflect the social status of the producer (which, in turn, is determined by the relative complexity and “advancedness” of the technology employed).

13. Things as Carriers of Social Relations

That things can perform the role of social signals is a well-known and undisputed fact. There are many examples: money, documents, military/police uniform, as well as fashionable or simply “cool” clothing; in general, most consumer goods are “covered” with social meanings 1.

The signaling character (read: social character!) of a given thing is expressed in the fact that it is associated with a specific signified, that is, the thing-signifier and signal-signified form a sign (the Ne aspect). A “thing” sign functions approximately like a linguistic sign (see J. Baudrillard’s For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 1), only “in reverse”, because in the second case the signal is the signifier and the thing the signified, whereas in the first case it is the opposite. As a result, when a “sign” thing is presented and evaluated, the rational system of the brain is substantially engaged. To simplify somewhat, one could say that a person looking at a socialized thing seems to see another person superimposed on it, saying something, waving his hands, and so on. Naturally, this is not normally conscious, but from the standpoint of the basis of the rational system involved, this is exactly what occurs. Moreover, a person relates to a social thing in a similarly “social” way, as though to a person: he may “obey” it, “submit” to it, or conversely “discipline” it (= impose order), “put it in order”, and so on. As a result, the field of application of all the social actions listed (and many others) expands to include, in addition to living people, dead things.

It should be emphasized that the socialization of things in the sense described is an almost exclusively human capacity. As far as other animal species are concerned, even the most “advanced” among them are capable of this only to a very limited degree. Thus, in a controlled experiment chimpanzees learned to use “money” – to earn tokens by pressing a machine lever and exchange them for treats and toys (dispensed by a machine). This, however, is an extremely tightly controlled situation, and even here the tokens do not become self-acting social relations in the narrow sense: by earning them, one can obtain a treat, but one cannot advance in the hierarchy (on the contrary, the alpha male takes tokens from whomever he wants). Apparently, the “capacity” of things for autonomous social action – or more precisely, the psyche’s capacity to associate social actions and meanings with inanimate objects – developed in humans together with speech, because both imply an increase in the power of the associative apparatus (the Ne function; see section 10), as well as strengthened interaction between the rational and irrational domains of the psyche (after all, a thing is a sensory object, whereas social signals fall within the competence of the rational system of the brain).

In sociology, the autonomous action of things lies at the center of many theories and authors, beginning with the young Marx, who wrote extensively about the “fetishism” and “reification” of social relations, which supposedly impede the free development of society. People, he wrote, had fallen under the power of their own creations – things, including money, but also ideas, that is, ideologies (The German Ideology); in the coming “realm of freedom”, according to Marx, reified relations would be deprived of their former power and, moreover, be completely subordinated to the consciousness and will of the individual and society. Yet Marx himself later acknowledged that if the power of things were simply abolished, it would return in the form of the direct, unmediated power of some people over others – that is, in modern language, in a purely ethological guise. Thus, the power of things is neither bad nor good in itself; it is merely a by-product of the strengthening of the brain’s associative system in the course of anthropogenesis and glottogenesis (the emergence of language).

The social functionality of things can provide members of society with new possibilities for social action that radically expand the inherited ethological basis. What is meant here? In animals, the only instrument of social action and social signaling is the individual’s own body (including the voice). Accordingly, whenever signaling (acting) is required, it is necessary to enter a mode of physiological amplification of the corresponding function (usually logic or volitional sensing); otherwise the action will not be sufficiently strong and competitors will easily overturn it with a more powerful counteraction. In particular, this imposes very rigid conditions on advancement in the hierarchy: if the modes of the psyche required for this are physiologically weak, one can forget about a “career” altogether. Reified social signals and relations (which, among other things, means separated from the body), however, radically change the situation. A signal-thing, for example, can simply be presented, without resorting to any amplification of the ethological-signaling functions of the psyche. When, say, a superior gives an order to subordinates, he does not have to growl and wave his arms like an alpha male in an ape troop; the status of the superior derives not from his ability to growl at subordinates (although, of course, nonverbal signals have not disappeared), but from the organization’s staffing table, his diploma, and so on. If someone displays, for example, a new “cool” automobile, he thereby substitutes it for an entirely physical and ethological display, such as a capercaillie’s mating dance; at the same time, the demonstrator does not in any way have to enter a mode of amplification of his own Te function. Thus, the reification of social actions weakens their dependence on basic-ethological (= emitted by the body/voice) signals.

A further far-reaching hypothesis can be proposed here. Having at his disposal signal-things whose presentation and action do not depend on the current power of the corresponding signaling function of the psyche, a person no longer has to maneuver the power of his functions across a broad range in accordance with the requirements of a changing situation. (By comparison, among apes this is rather the norm: now growling and waving one’s forelimbs in a competitor’s face, 5 minutes later tucking one’s tail and presenting one’s back to a dominant.) Of course, functional emphases in humans also change depending on the situation, but to a much smaller degree, because more is simply not required: signal-things are always at hand and are simply presented rather than “used at full power”, as with signals of the ethological basis. The emergence of speech communication and linguistic signs in the pure form also “worked” in the same direction, but because of the “cheapness” of linguistic signals they are fairly easy to counterfeit (for example, to announce “Hello, I am your boss!”); therefore no more or less complex society can rest on one’s word alone – signal-things are necessary, and they must be difficult to counterfeit (gold money, protected documents). In the final analysis, all this makes the human psyche more stable (although far from absolutely stable). It must nevertheless be stipulated that this is only an untested, albeit quite plausible, hypothesis.

In addition, the use of signal-things makes possible the accumulation of social action and social relations to a much greater degree than is possible in populations of higher primates. Figuratively speaking, this circumvents the barrier of finite human “power” in transmitting signals through the ethological basis, thereby opening the way to further complication of human societies.

14. Mutual Excitation of Psychic Functions and Information Metabolism

If psychic functions are weakly connected with one another (as in animals), they switch on and off autonomously as their relative importance changes depending on external conditions and internal motivation for various kinds of social action. The animal psyche is a field of competition among differently directed impulses and behavior patterns, or, in the expression of ethologists, a “republic of instincts”: one behavioral structure wins the competition and, for the duration of its implementation, suppresses the others.

Strong connectivity between rational and irrational functions, however, radically changes the dynamics of the psyche. In addition to competition, extremely strong effects of mutual excitation between functions arise. As a result, strongly connected functions can remain excited even in the absence of external stimuli and even when internal basic impulses are fully satisfied – through mutual stimulation alone.

There are strong arguments in favor of the proposition that the rational/irrational linkage of human psychic functions is provided by intuition, which became stronger in the course of anthropogenesis. Indeed, the ethological purpose of the Ne function includes modeling the meanings of signals: “rational” signals are linked with “irrational” objects (both sensory and intuitive, that is, other signs-ideas). Dynamic intuition Ni, meanwhile, models the possible outcomes of particular social actions, including depending on various object conditions. Intuition is a powerful associative apparatus whose operating principle differs noticeably from ordinary sensorimotor conditioning (= formation of conditioned reflexes), above all in the flexibility and speed of learning (see section 10). As shown above, intuition is responsible for attaching social meanings to physical objects or processes (as in the case of labor).

Almost all informational content attributed in the socionic tradition to one function/aspect or another and extending beyond the ethological basis in fact belongs not to an isolated function but to the interface (connection) with functions of the opposite nality. In other words, almost the entire “superstructural” part of aspect information is carried by interfunctional connections, whereas the functions in isolation are responsible mainly for the ethological basis. Thus, the social meanings of objects and material processes, norms concerning things and labor, are sensory-logical connections rather than sensing or logic separately. The social action of ideas, categories based on abstract characteristics, operations on ideal objects – the interface between intuition and logic. The emotional “meaning” and ethical significance of the external appearance of things, design, and so on, including clothing (all of this depends very strongly on culture) – the interface of ethics with sensing. The emotional influence and ethical content of ideas, abstract concepts, and models of change – the interface of ethics with intuition. All these are cultural forms developed by society, a superstructure over the ethological basis. They fill (= are programmed by culture into!) interfunctional connections-interfaces and only to a very small extent the individual functions themselves.

As personality parameters (factors), one may distinguish the strength of connection of each of the four blocks of Jungian functions separately. Clearly, some will be stronger and others weaker. How should this manifest itself in behavior and in the psychological profile of the personality? In light of the above, connectivity parameters should determine the “dimensionality” of functions according to A. Bukalov 2. Indeed, dimensionality effects can be modeled quite well by introducing a parameter for the strength of the interaction interface between two functions. With a weak connection, the conscious accessibility of “superstructural” models and norms is low; more precisely, conscious selectivity of response actions may be absent, superstructural models may trigger reflexively, or may operate with only a limited number of mastered norms (one- and two-dimensional functions according to Bukalov). If the connections are strong, they suffice not only for comparing patterns of experience but also for modeling and, more importantly, for evaluating the adequacy of actions that go beyond existing norms and experience (three- and four-dimensional functions).

Functional connectivity should also manifest itself in vocabulary, in the richness of the lexicon relating to different aspects. Strongly connected functions are characterized by rich language, often by possession/application of an excessively diverse range of concepts, with the possibility of flexibly applying and manipulating them, but without loss of adequacy of expression. The vocabulary of weakly connected functions is, first, poorer and, second, constrained by templates, while attempts to go beyond templates often result in inadequacy. Richness/poverty of language is directly connected with dimensionality of functions, because the multitude of models-norms available to consciousness must in one way or another be projected onto the multitude of available concepts (“not in conception – not in perception”).

What does not depend on functional connectivity? First, the nonverbal manifestations of the basis of functions (although social norms of nonverbal behavior also exist and must likewise be learned, they do not belong to the ethological basis). Second, the strength of motivation to act through different functions. Unlike the forms of manifestation that must be learned, motivation itself is a purely biological phenomenon, for which subcortical brain structures are responsible, whereas learned forms of expression/action are supported by the neocortex. Both the strength of motivation and “spontaneous” nonverbal behavior depend on the power of individual functions and may fluctuate across a broad range depending on situational amplification of one function or another (the so-called functional states of personality according to V. Gulenko 4), although their time-averaged balance is more or less constant in the medium term. At the same time, connection factors specify a conservative component of the socionic personality profile that is independent of situational influences. Indeed, the strength of the connection between two cortical regions belonging to different functions is expressed by the number of axons “laid” from these regions to their common association field (presumably this is the zone of intuition; see above), and by the number of associative nuclei and neurons onto which the connections directly converge. Once established during ontogenesis, however, the latter remain stable regardless of the situation; they do not “open” and close again (except perhaps in truly extraordinary cases, mainly severe brain injuries), unlike functions whose activity can weaken or strengthen depending on the situation.

Our observations of people with weakly expressed Jungian traits, whose typing by different tests and criteria produces different (up to conflicting) TIM versions, indicate that factors of function power and factors of block connectivity are independent of one another. For example, the strongest function may turn out to be weakly connected with the others, while the pair connected better than the rest may, conversely, be characterized by low functional “energy”. If the typologist uses criteria reflecting functional connectivity (first and foremost the ШСС methodology, as well as content analysis), he will see primarily the leading connection (block), while regarding the strong “lateral” function as a subtype trait. If criteria of function power are foregrounded (observation of nonverbal reactions, typing by appearance), the strong “isolated” function will be taken as the base function, while the strong block will be taken as a subtype (initial-terminal according to V. Gulenko, or block amplification according to E. Filatova). Determining the roles of functions in Model A, as well as the Reinin traits, under the strong influence of such a subtype leads to contradictory and sometimes extremely unexpected results. On the whole, this indicates the possibility and even necessity of constructing a new-generation socionic model that includes a set of factors of at least two types – factors of function power and function connectivity. This, however, will be the subject of another article.

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Ivan Popov, 2009